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**RESISTANCE FACTORS
and
SPECIAL FORCES AREAS
HUNGARY (u)**

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PART I

RESISTANCE

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1. Resistance Background of the 1956 Revolution

Throughout most of their history the Hungarian people have been unable to mount any significant resistance movement against their oppressors, whether against the Turks during the period from the 16th to the 18th century, against the Austrian Hapsburgs from the 18th to the 20th century, or against the heavy-handed Horthy regency from 1920 to 1944. The most noteworthy outburst of resistance during these long centuries was the abortive revolution of 1848 led by Lajos Kossuth. During the period between World Wars I and II the Communists were the only subversive group in Hungary, but being an insignificant fraction of the population the principal accomplishment of their underground was the setting up of a skeleton organization and archives for the post-World War II Soviet-dominated Hungarian regime.¹

The following discussion of World War II resistance is excerpted from the National Intelligence Survey on Hungary:²

After the Germans occupied Hungary in March 1944, two important groups emerged to resist them: 1) The Hungarian Independence Movement (Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom--MF), which consisted mostly of influential persons closely identified with the Horthy regime and which therefore had a resistance potential far greater than its small membership (estimated at about 2,700) would have otherwise warranted; and 2) The Hungarian Front (Magyar Front--MF), which comprised the parliamentary left-opposition to the government and included Smallholders, Social Democrats, and Radical Peasants.

The Communists during this wartime resistance were split into two major factions, one Soviet-sponsored and led by Matyas Rakosi, the other a so-called "Hungarian Communist" movement, led by Jozsef Dudas (Dudas became a member of the Smallholders Party after the Liberation and was rumored to have been arrested in 1946). Both factions were active in the resistance, but their effectiveness was sharply reduced by the split in their beliefs as to the proper degree of closeness to the Soviet Union. The orthodox, Soviet-sponsored group joined forces with the MF, while the "Hungarian Communists" cooperated with the MF. After the war the latter group disbanded and while some of them joined Rakosi's group, most joined non-Communist political parties.

In addition, three minor groups also participated in the resistance: 1) the Students' Resistance Movement, the membership of which derived primarily from a Protestant youth group but which had a one-third orthodox Communist

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representation; 2) the Freedom Movement of Hungarian Patriots, the membership of which was a mixture of "Hungarian Communists" and middle-class elements; and 3) the Union of the Friends of the U.S.S.R., which was under orthodox Communist domination.

The resistance movements were a military failure; their only successes beyond sporadic acts of sabotage were in illegal propaganda activities. Efforts to organize armed resistance on a large scale never achieved tangible results. The primary reason was Horthy's indecisiveness. Though his misgivings about Hungary's alliance with the Axis constantly grew, he did not make the final decision to break with it until July 1944, four months after the German occupation. He failed even to consult with the MFV and MF until too late to do any good. An orthodox Communist-dominated Committee of Liberation, ostensibly under Smallholder Endre Bajcsi-Zsilinszky (subsequently arrested and executed by the Arrow Cross) was belatedly established to coordinate the activities of all resistance groups ten days after a pro-German coup undercut Horthy's proclamation on October 15, 1944 withdrawing Hungary from the war, but it failed to achieve any significant results. The failure of Horthy, the nominal head of the resistance, to pull Hungary at once out of the war signalled also a change in the Soviet attitude toward the resistance from one of cooperation to one of indifference; this loss of Soviet support removed the resistance movement's last possibility of success.

Furthermore, the leaders of the main resistance groups were at least as anti-Marxist as they were anti-Nazi, and some of them opposed the Communists even more than the Germans. Even though many of them tried to establish a reasonable modus vivendi with the Communists, they inevitably became targets for Communist suspicion.

During the post-World War II period, prior to the uprising of October-November 1956, active resistance of both the guerilla or underground variety had apparently been notably less in Hungary than in other East European satellites of the USSR.³ This phenomenon is attributable both to the lack of a significant resistance movement during World War II and the consequent scarcity of experienced resistance leaders and personnel and to the relatively poor topographical suitability of Hungary for the cover and concealment factors necessary for guerilla-type activities.

During the post-war period, between 1945 and 1956, there is little evidence that armed guerilla bands in Hungary endured for any length of time and some of those reported consisted entirely of criminals and army deserters. Reports of partisan bands in the past have placed them in those areas where the topography provided some possibility of cover and concealment.

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A summary account, presented in a previous Georgetown University study,⁴ of alleged guerilla-type activities based largely on incomplete and inadequately authenticated reports and occurring mostly in the period around 1950 identifies among the localities of guerilla operations such areas as the Bukk, Matra, Borzsony, Bakony, Pilis and Mecsek Mountain regions, the marshy regions of the Hortobagy River, and the lower course of the Danube near the Yugoslav border. An incomplete listing in the same study of other evidences of active resistance incidents between 1953 and 1956 reveals the occurrence during this period of a number of positive attacks upon the property, institutions, symbols, or ideals of the regime by means of mob action, leaflet distribution, and sabotage, but very little to suggest extensive and/or highly organized opposition. A similar compilation of arrests and trials of anti-regime elements during the years 1953 to 1956 reveal many regime allegations of organized conspiracy, but while some traces of actual resistance activities and leaders may be found therein, much of the content of such trials is probably exaggerated and geared to the regime's propaganda machine.

Available evidence is inconclusive as to the extent of the post-World War II clandestine underground movement in Hungary. The aforementioned report on resistance lists a number of such resistance organizations alleged to have existed during the post-World War II periods, but it notes that the regime itself may have sponsored some of them for provocative purposes, that no such movements had been reported since around 1954, and that to all appearances none of the alleged movements singly or together could be construed as signifying a highly organized underground movement.

Despite the apparent low incidence of active resistance in Hungary during the post-World War II period, the accumulation of evidence seems to indicate that passive resistance in that period--absenteeism, job-hopping, low-quality output, waste, fraud, and sometimes deliberate sabotage--was more common in Hungary than elsewhere in the satellites.⁵

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Moreover the sociological characteristics and traditional values of the people have marked them as fertile sources of potential resistance.

Hungarian nationalism is anti-Slav, anti-Rumanian, anti-Czechoslovakian, anti-Semitic, and anti-Communist. On the positive side it is Christian, pro-German (as the lesser of two evils), and pro-Western, consisting of a deeply ingrained sense of the historic role of Hungary as a Christian nation and an outpost of Western civilization and culture.⁶ The establishment of Roman Catholicism as Hungary's national religion in 1000 A.D. oriented not only religious feeling but also the nation's cultural and political development toward the West and encouraged the Hungarians to regard the Eastern Slavs as culturally inferior.⁷ Although many fundamental and largely irreconcilable differences remain between Hungarian mentality and German character, the cultural affinity of the two peoples is based on a common Western heritage. Magyars bear a deep-rooted resentment toward the concept of Slavic supremacy. Their animosity toward Rumania and Czechoslovakia is an expression of revisionist ambition--to regain some of the territories lost to these countries by the World War I settlement.⁸ Demands for revision of the Treaty of Trianon, by which Hungary lost about 71 per cent of its former territory (including Croatia and Slovakia) and 63 per cent of its earlier population, have been a focal point of nationalist agitation ever since it was signed.⁹ In contrast with some of the other satellites, Hungary has no territorial issues to settle with Germany.

Because Communism is diametrically opposed to each element of Hungarian nationalism its acceptance involves a complete rejection of the latter. That Hungarians realize this can be presumed in view of their memory of the short-lived Bela Kun government of 1919 and their current experiences under a Communist regime. The Sovietization of Hungarian society and culture, the rejection of Hungarian revisionist ambitions, the disproportionate number of Jews in high official positions, the savage attempts to collectivize the peasants, and the persecution of religion are forceful illustrations that Communism is the very antithesis of Hungarian nationalism.¹⁰

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Against the background of a limited resistance history in Hungary during modern times but, at the same time, of a popular mentality teeming with grievances, the uprising of the whole nation in October-November 1956 and the rapid formation of military and political organs of resistance offer important lessons about the inherent weakness both physical and ideological of Communist-dominated countries and about the potential of an aroused people to turn against its oppressor even in the face of forbidding odds.

2. The Revolt of October-November 1956

a. Introduction

As indicated in the foregoing section of this report the puppet, but at the same time unoccupied, status of Hungary during World War II, as well as certain of the people's political predilections, kept at a minimum the circumstances which would have favored the development of an underground or guerilla movement. In the post-war years some resistance against the Communist regime has occurred, but information on these activities does not permit more than tentative conclusions. Whatever limited and local resistance activity took place after World War II is completely overshadowed by the Hungarian rebellion of October-November 1956. It provided the only post-World War II example in the Soviet satellite empire in which the resistance potential of the population was translated into organized armed hostility on a national scale and in which the various segments of the population were given a real opportunity to demonstrate their true allegiances and their capacities for guerilla warfare. An examination of these events, which were widely reported to the Western world, permits conclusions about human and geographical factors which are of particular interest to Special Forces planning. The validity of these findings has been highly enhanced by the investigation of the uprising by a special committee of the United Nations and by the publication of its findings in May 1957 in a volume called "Report of the Special Com-

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mittee on the Problem of Hungary,"¹¹ which is used extensively throughout the present study.

Contrary to the official thesis of the Soviet government and of the post-revolutionary Kadar government, the upheaval in Hungary from 23 October to 4 November 1956 was not a counter-revolutionary attempt by reactionary forces inside and outside Hungary but rather a spontaneous national uprising against a decade of totalitarian oppression, particularly against Soviet domination and a system of control by terror, epitomized by the AVH, which together were the real constitution of the Communist state. From start to finish, the uprising, which was led by students, workers, soldiers, and intellectuals, many of whom were Communists or former Communists, bore the hallmark of continuous improvisation. The most publicized political demands stipulated democratic socialism as the basis for the Hungarian political structure. Although a broad popular movement of dissatisfaction had been taking shape ever since the death of Stalin, the uprising was brought to a head by chance events, the most definable of which were (1) the successful defiance of the Kremlin by the Gomilka faction in Poland, the news of which was largely instrumental in bringing the Hungarian students together in meetings on 22 October, (2) the truculent and non-concessionary speech of Erno Gero, First Party Secretary, on the evening of that day, and (3) the firing of the AVH upon the demonstrators and the subsequent appearance of Soviet reinforcements. The political character of the revolution was largely determined by the Revolutionary and Workers Councils, which sprang up spontaneously in different parts of the country and replaced the collapsing structure of the Communist Party. Imre Nagy, a popular liberal Communist, who, like the country at large, was somewhat taken aback by the pace of developments, was persuaded to throw in his lot with the insurgents and became head of the new government but never really gained the leadership of the revolution. The popular nature of the uprising, the strongly democratic content of the people's aspirations, the responsible intentions of the insurgents, and the determination to be free of Soviet domination

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were evidenced not only in the circumstances surrounding the rise of the various territorial and functional councils but by such developments as the free press and radio, the disbanding of the AVH, the steps taken to give the workers real control of nationalized industrial undertakings, the negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the readiness to use arms against them if they intervened, and the agreement by the insurgents to amalgamate, while maintaining their identity, into a National Guard for the purposes of maintaining order together with the Army and Police. An analysis of the Hungarian uprising clearly demonstrates that the charge of "counter-revolution" is appropriate not with respect to the insurgent forces but rather with respect to action of the Soviet Union in setting up the puppet Kadar government and in suppressing the new political arrangements and the new government set up by the will of virtually the entire Hungarian people.

b. Organizational Aspects

The swift and spontaneous formation of village, town, and county Revolutionary Councils, which filled the vacuum created in public administration by the virtual collapse of the entire Communist-controlled Party apparatus, and the simultaneous development of Workers Councils in factories, mines, and other industrial enterprises, as well as of councils in government offices, in the Army, and among students, other youth groups, and intellectuals, clearly signify, more perhaps than any other phenomenon of the uprising, the intense and universal resistance potential of the Hungarian people and at the same time their capacity for the creation of political and military organs under such circumstances of pressure as Special Forces will be confronted with in wartime operations. The quick formation in a matter of a few days, and in some instances in a matter of a few hours, of a leadership group which commanded the respect and cooperation of a community or a group and which set up contact with similar organizations in other parts of the country provides some assurance that Special Forces operating in Hungary in time of war will be able to accomplish

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their primary mission of contacting leading elements in a community for the purpose of organizing, training, and coordinating resistance forces.

The determination, popular support, and unity of purpose of these councils were attested to by the efforts made during the few days of freedom to achieve a national coordination of these initially autonomous groups and by the recognition of, and favorable attitude towards, them by the central government, by the Central Committee of the Party, and by the National Trade Union Council.¹² Since at the outset of the Revolution Mr. Nagy was not free to exercise the full powers of the premiership, the real power of the nation lay within the Revolutionary and Workers Councils; when free to act and seeing the true intent of the nation, he threw in his lot with the insurgents.¹³ Negotiations were carried on between the government and several leading revolutionary councils once the government became aware of the strength and significance of these councils, e.g., the Hungarian National Revolutionary Committee, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Hungarian Army, the Revolutionary Insurgent Forces, the Revolutionary Committee of Hungarian Intellectuals, the Students' Revolutionary Council, the National Council of Free Trade Unions, the Writers' Union, and representatives of the Workers Councils of Budapest's large industries.

It may be noted not only that the spontaneous, swift, and unanimous surge of these councils clearly resulted from a felt need for such a democratic instrument but also that the Communists in installing a uniform system of local governmental committees after World War II had sharpened the popular awareness of the utility of these political bodies and hence unintentionally contributed to the success of the organizational aspect of the uprising. During the uprising these councils were precisely the organs of public and social activity--both the highest expression and most articulate mouthpiece of various national and class grievances and ambitions.

The efficiency of the impromptu revolutionary government organs during the brief period between the outbreak of the uprising on 23 October and the

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beginning of the second Soviet intervention on 4 November is testified to by the conditions which came to prevail in Budapest, the central stage of the rebellion. On the eve of the second attack, order was being rapidly restored in the damaged streets of the capital. Good progress was being made in the direction of political consolidation and the resumption of work on Monday, 5 November, could be confidently expected. Negotiations had been completed for the formation of a National Guard under General Kiraly, head of the Revolutionary National Defense Committee (see below), with a view to ensuring internal security. A sense of confidence had developed among the people.¹⁴ Thus, the emergence of Revolutionary and Workers Councils throughout Hungary was one of the most characteristic features of the uprising. It represented the first practical step to restore order and to reorganize the Hungarian economy on a socialist basis, but without rigid Party control or the apparatus of terror.¹⁵

(1) Territorial Councils:

The origin, activity, and characteristics of the territorial councils in the following cities or counties are referred to in the aforementioned report of the Special U.N. Committee on Hungary:

Dunapentele	Nyiregyhaza
Miskolc	Szeged
Debrecen	Szokesfehevar
Gyor	Szolnok
Jaszbereny	Zalaegerszeg
Mosonmagyarovar	Nograd County
Tatabanya	Somogy County (perhaps identical
Szombathely	with Council at Kaposvar, the
Kaposvar	administrative center of this
Pecs	county)
Veszprem	
Eger	

It is possible that the councils of those cities in the foregoing list which are county seats were not in all cases one and the same with the county councils; yet, while available information is not conclusive on this point, it is apparent that this list includes most of if not all of the primary Revolutionary Councils operating during the uprising, except those operating in Budapest proper and the Transdanubian National Council

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(see below). This is inferable from the fact that each of the above-listed locations is either a county administrative center or a leading industrial city, that the various "free radios" transmitted from these cities, and that most of the significant political developments in the provinces during the uprising stemmed from one or more of these councils. In addition, smaller local councils arose everywhere, which in certain individual cases may have wielded influence comparable to those above listed. The relatively even distribution of these councils throughout the whole country, except in its southeast quarter (see Map A), illustrates the nationwide character of the revolt. At the same time it must be noted that active resistance against Soviet intervention was not uniformly intense throughout the country. In general, with the notable exception of Pecs, very little actual fighting occurred in the southern half of the country--a phenomenon attributed in the U.N. report largely to the neutralization of the local Hungarian Army units and the inability of the Revolutionary Councils to secure the necessary weapons.¹⁶

The circumstances surrounding the formation of these councils, as well as the class participation in them, point up significant resistance potentials in Hungary. In almost all instances the setting up of these councils was preceded by some altercation between the populace and the AVH. The councils included representatives of all segments of the population. In Debrecen, the council had 100 members, of whom 60 per cent were workers, 20 per cent university students, and 20 per cent representatives of the armed forces. The councils of Gyor and Eger consisted of workers, peasants, soldiers, and intellectuals, while half of the 28 members of the council of Jaszbereny were peasants. Revolutionary Councils were fully supported from the beginning by the armed forces (e.g., Debrecen, Eger, Gyor, Szeged, Szolnok, Veszprem), and by the local police (e.g., Debrecen, Gyor, Mosonmagyaróvár, Szolnok, Tatabánya, Veszprem). Some of the Revolutionary Councils were set up with the consent of the local committee of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party (e.g., Debrecen); many of them had from the

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beginning to the end Communist members (e.g., Debrecen); others dropped their Communist members after 1 November (e.g., Pecs). Most of them enjoyed the editorial support of the local organ of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party. On the other hand, according to the editorial pronouncement of one of the revolutionary press organs (*Hetfoi Hirlap*, 29 October 1956), no action was taken against Party organizations which endorsed the aims of the revolution, which after all were essentially "socialist and democratic."

Some of the Revolutionary Councils had radio stations of their own, which broadcast news and announcements during the whole period of the uprising. The main radio center of the provinces was in Gyor, where Free Radio Gyor and Free Radio Petofi operated. Another important center was the radio of the Workers Council of County Borsod in Miskolc.

The demands of the Councils varied somewhat according to geographical and political differences, those from the western parts of the country being more extreme than those of the Councils in the east. Thus, demonstrators in Gyor put forward demands, which were subsequently reiterated at the conference of the Transdanubian National Council, for a formation of a "counter-government" to that of Mr. Nagy, for a request for military help from the West, and for war with the Soviet Union. The great majority of the Councils called for immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and free elections. An analysis of the demands of the Councils of 12 cities and counties reveals a widespread insistence on the following actions: complete independence and freedom for Hungary; a protest to the United Nations against the presence of Soviet troops and the intervention of the U.N. into the Hungarian situation; equality with the USSR; recall of the old regime's representative to the U.N.; withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty; the proclamation of neutrality; the abolition of the AVH and the creation of a new police; the establishment of the National Guard; liberation of political prisoners, in particular Cardinal Mindszenty; freedom of speech, press,

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religion, and association; setting up of Workers Councils in factories; new agrarian policies and, in particular, abolition of compulsory delivery of produce by the peasants. At the same time it was reiterated over and over again in the demands made by the Councils, as well as in the various manifestoes issued by functional groups throughout the period of the uprising, that no return to the estate system of agriculture or to the individual private ownership of factories and mines would be tolerated.

The most forward steps taken during the revolution in the direction of coordinating and subordinating the multiple autonomous revolutionary councils and in pressing the major demands of the Hungarian people were those of the Transdanubian National Council, which claimed to represent the people of Western Hungary and which appears to have wielded the greatest political influence of all the Revolutionary Councils.¹⁷ It was set up in Győr on 30 October 1956 at a conference attended by some 400 delegates from the cities and counties of the Transdanubian region as well as by delegates from the Revolutionary Councils of the eastern counties of Borsod and Bacs-Kiskun and from the Csepel Workers Council of Budapest. The council, at first receptive to a proposal that a "counter-government" to that of Imre Nagy be set up, decided to enter into negotiations with the latter's government when it became apparent that he had begun to take action on such matters as the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the broadening of his cabinet to include members of the non-Communist parties. It is apparent that the chief significance of this regional council was its ability to move the Nagy government to act upon some of the national demands, such as the declaration of neutrality, its insistence upon the inclusion of an adequate representation of the freedom fighters in a new government, and its role in the organization of the military aspects of the uprising, such as inducing the Ninth Army Division to become associated with it.

(2) Budapest Councils

Some of the earliest councils to be set up were in the city of Budapest itself. These groups, which at an early stage came together

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with the Workers Councils and set up unified Revolutionary Councils, contained a mixed representation of freedom fighters, political parties, workers, soldiers, police, students and other intellectuals, small artisans, and small shopkeepers. These councils like their counterparts in the provinces took over the tasks of public administration and dealt with the political and ideological issues of the revolt. General support was expressed for an independent, socialist, and democratic Hungary.

(3) Functional and Occupational Councils:

Numerous functional and representative councils, largely limited in extent, however, to the cultural center of the nation--Budapest, were formed during the uprising to give expression to the special grievances and attitudes of their particular groups and at the same time to perform some types of activity of general national interest. Many of these councils played a significant role in armed resistance plans and activities.

The Students' Revolutionary Council (Egyetemi Forradalmi Diakbizottság) of Greater Budapest attempted to bring together the various groups of student fighters scattered about Budapest, engaged in leaflet circulation and in pressing political demands upon the government, and helped organize the National Guard.

The Free Hungarian Revolutionary Youth Alliance (Szabad Forradalmi Magyar Ifjúság Országos Tanácsa) was founded on 27 October to include all revolutionary youth and student organizations. The Students' Revolutionary Council and various other new youth groups became members of this Alliance.

The Revolutionary Council of Young Workers and Working Youth (Ifj munkások és fiatal dolgozók Harcos Szervezete) was intended to cooperate with student and peasant youth groups and was to help in strengthening the National Guard.

The Revolutionary National Defense Committee (Forradalmi Honvédelmi Bizottság) (abbreviated below as R.N.D.C.) was set up in the early hours

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of 31 October, at a meeting held at the Ministry of Defense, by 250 representatives of (a) The Revolutionary Insurgent Forces (Felkelt Forradalmi Erok); (b) The Revolutionary Military Council of the Hungarian People's Army (Magyar Nephadsereg Forradalmi Tanacs); (c) The Revolutionary Council of the National Police Command (Orszagos Rendorkapitanyseg Forradalmi Tanacs); and (d) The Revolutionary Committee of the Frontier Guards (Hatarorseg Forradalmi Bizottmany). The first three groups had been set up on 30 October and represented young freedom fighters--including the Hungarian Revolutionary Youth Alliance, soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers, cadets, and staff officers of the armed forces--and the central authority of the Hungarian National Police. The officers and soldiers of the Frontier Guards, which since 1949 had operated under the authority of the AVH, pledged their loyalty on 29 October to the Government of Mr. Nagy, stating that they sincerely agreed with the revolutionary changes. The invitation to the meeting also summoned "the leaders of the Revolutionary Army Committee of the units of the Third Motorized Army Group, which have replaced the Soviet troops withdrawing from Budapest." It implied that the power of disposition of the armed forces at that date rested with the Revolutionary Military Council, in which leaders of all army branches were represented, and not with the Minister of Defense--at that time Karoly Janza. Local revolutionary army committees and military councils had been set up about 28 October all over the country, in different units, including the Air Force Commands and the military academies. The R.N.D.C. was headed by General Bela Kiraly, formerly chief of the training centers of the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Pal Malet, Commander of the Kilian Barracks; Major-General Gyula Varadi of the Tank Corps; Colonel Andras Marton of the Zrinyi Academy, and Lt. Colonel Istvan Marian, leader of the freedom fighters of the Technological University. It adopted a resolution of eight points which demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the entire territory of Hungary, the repudiation of the Warsaw Treaty

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after the convocation of a conference of the signatory governments, and the occupation of the uranium mines by the Hungarian Army. The R.N.D.C. approved the dissolution of the AVH, and demanded that former members of the AVH should not be allowed to join any armed formation or the National Guard. The Committee stated that the Soviet troops would be engaged by the Hungarian armed forces if they did not leave Hungary by 31 December 1956. A few hours before the constitutive meeting of the R.N.D.C. on 31 October, Mr. Nagy, acting on behalf of the Council of Ministers, "acknowledged and confirmed" the formation of the Preparatory Committee of the R.N.D.C. which was, apparently, at that time already in existence. Mr. Nagy added that the R.N.D.C., once formally established, would form the new armed forces, made up of the units of the army, the police, the revolutionary insurgent forces, and the workers and youth brigades; would restore the internal peace of the country; and would operate until the new government had been formed, after general elections by secret ballot, and had taken office. Thus from 31 October, the R.N.D.C. became the supreme directing power of the Hungarian Army, of other semi-military formations, and of the freedom fighters. Between 1 and 3 November the Committee made several decisions of considerable importance and issued statements of policy with or without the government's formal blessing. During the day of 31 October, the Committee proceeded to establish the Revolutionary Committee of the Public Security Forces (Forradalmi Karhatalmi Bizottsag), composed of the army, the police, and the factory guards, which was charged with coordinating the activities of all security forces and developing further the National Guard (Nemzetorseg), which was to be composed of members of armed formations of those fighters who were not members of the army, police, or factory guards. Gen. Bela Kiraly was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard, which was to enjoy equal status with the regular army and police.

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From 30 October, Revolutionary Committees were established in most of the government departments--the Ministries of Construction, Education, Food, Foreign Affairs, Internal Trade, Justice, Metallurgy and Machine Industry, and State Economy. Similar Committees were established in the National Bank, the Supreme Court, the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, the General Directorate of the Railways, and the Hungarian Radio. Revolutionary Committees were also set up in the Hungarian Embassy in Belgrade and in the Legation in Vienna. In some cases, the Minister was included on the Committee, as was Rezso Nyers, Minister of Food; while in others the Committees removed the Minister from his post, sometimes with high officials serving under him. According to available information, in the following Ministries and offices the Revolutionary Committees took over the functions of the deposed Minister: the Ministries of Construction, Internal Trade, Justice, Metallurgy and Machine Industry; the National Bank, the Chief Prosecutor's Office, and the Radio. Thus, in many departments of Mr. Nagy's government, the Revolutionary Committees were in complete control after 30 October. In some cases there is evidence that the Prime Minister endorsed the changes.¹⁶

Among the several committees set up by or for specific professional groups was the Revolutionary Committee of Hungarian Intellectuals (Magyar Ertelmisegi Forradalmi Bizottsag). It was originally composed of revolutionary organizations of students, writers, journalists, and artists, as well as representatives of the professors of universities, the People's Colleges, the Petofi Club, and of the League of Hungarian University and College Students (MEFESZ), but it was joined later on by the National Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, as well as by associations of historians and medical workers. Transforming itself after 4 November into the Revolutionary Council of Hungarian Intellectuals (Magyar Ertelmisegi Forradalmi Tanacs), it was to play a part in events after that date.

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(4) Workers' Councils:

Just as the Revolutionary Councils appeared to be an expression of popular dissatisfaction with the local councils of the regime, so the Workers' Councils were an attempt to establish control by the workers themselves in factories, mines, and similar enterprises and to improve their conditions of work.¹⁹ In view of the paramount importance of the industrial working class in a Communist country and of their supposedly vanguard role in the creation of a socialist society, the revolutionary Workers' Councils, which actually transcended purely functional and class significance, have a particular importance in any evaluation of the national resistance potential. Mutual recognition, close cooperation, and overlapping membership and responsibility characterized the relationship between these and the Revolutionary Councils. The role of the councils was recognized without delay by the Trade Unions, the Communist Party, and the Government. The Workers' Councils' role of putting forth political and economic demands to the Government, which declined somewhat in importance after the Revolutionary Councils were established, once more assumed importance in the first days of November with the increased concentration of Russian troops on Hungarian soil, and after 4 November it became of paramount importance. The demands of the Workers' Councils in most cases resembled those of the Revolutionary Councils, save that they were accompanied with the threat of strike. The Councils were characterized by a free democratic election of membership in which few Communists were included, by the frequent voluntary relinquishment by the former Communist leaders of their posts, the dismissal of the existing managerial staff of the factory or establishment, especially if they were Communists, the destruction of the "white card" files formerly held by the plant personnel officer, and in some instances, even preparatory plans for the improvement of production methods. The Workers' Councils differed from the other revolutionary councils throughout the land in that they were intended to evolve into permanent Councils in charge of the actual management of the plant, such as those in Yugoslavia. The National Council

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of Trade Unions and the Government itself approved of a reform program which featured this installation of Workers' Councils as the governing bodies of enterprise, although they were apparently as much motivated in granting the concession by the desire to get the workers back to their jobs as by any great conviction about the justice of the workers' demands. Nevertheless, the overwhelming support given to these Workers' Councils confirms the impression that they were among the most important achievements of the Hungarian people during their few days of freedom. After the second Soviet intervention and the return of Communist tyranny to the land, the workers carried on the resistance through the use of the passive weapon of strike until January 1957.²⁰

(5) Indications of Factionalism:

During the Revolution attempts were made to set up central organizations similar to the Transdanubian Council, in order to coordinate the numerous councils and committees throughout the country and to assist the Government in re-establishing order and in holding elections. Some such bodies were in the process of formation but had not developed to any significant extent prior to the destruction of the Revolution by the Soviet forces.

Inherent in the formation and activities of certain of the incipient central organizations referred to above was the intent of some portion of the population to effect a more drastic revolution in Hungary than most of the programs, manifestoes, and petitions which have come to the attention of the Western world seemed to envision. Western reporters visiting Gyor (apparently the unofficial center of the revolution) observed that at least two revolutionary factions had been found--one favoring the support of the Nagy national front government, the other insisting on the "repudiation of Communism and all its works."²¹ Such a radical element was apparently to be found in the above-mentioned Transdanubian Council established at Gyor, which, however, at one of its conferences voted to reject a proposal that

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an anti-Nagy government be set up. Another evidence of this radicalism was the apparent attempt of Jozsef Dudas, a veteran Communist who led a faction of the World War II Communist underground but who became a member of the Smallholders Party after the liberation,²² to gain leadership of the Revolution through the instrumentality of the Hungarian National Revolutionary Committee which he set up in Budapest. He claimed at that time to be in control of the majority of revolutionary groups, including civilian armed patrols and former soldiers,²³ and issued an invitation to various national revolutionary organs to attend a national congress, which however had to be called off because of subsequent Soviet encirclement of the capital.²⁴ At the second meeting of the Transdanubian National Council, held on 31 October-1 November 1956, a delegate of Jozsef Dudas was reported to have proposed once again the establishment of a "counter-government" within the framework of the Council, a proposal which was once again rejected.²⁵ On 2 November Dudas was arrested by the government of Imre Nagy. In January the Kadar government announced that he had been accorded the death penalty in a secret hearing,²⁶ and on 7 May it was announced that three followers of Jozsef Dudas had been sentenced to death.²⁷ Arrests in late July and early August, 1957, of persons accused of involvement in "counter-revolutionary" conspiracy against the regime and identified as ecclesiastical personnel, right-wing politicians, and former military officers may be further illustrative of the diversity of political aspirations during the uprising, as well as what seems to have been a stronger strain of radicalism in the motivation of at least some revolutionary elements than accounts so far available indicate.

c. Armed Resistance

A complete account of the military and guerilla activity of the insurgents against the Soviet forces as well as of the numerous resistance actions of the populace against the Communist regime--notably

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the AVH--is not presented in this report. On the one hand, information of such a comprehensive nature is not yet available, and on the other, the universality of the resistance of the Hungarian people during the uprising has been sufficiently established to obviate the necessity of advancing proof of resistance or resistance potential in each region of the country or with respect to each class of the population.²⁸ The declaration of war by the Nagy government on 4 November against the Soviet invaders as well as all major actions of the Nagy government, which in most cases merely reflected the attitudes and demands of the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils, were backed by the entire nation. Only members of the AVH and a small number of former Party officials fought on the Soviet side.²⁹

The types of armed or violent resistance which occurred during the revolution were 1) vengeful action against the oppressors of the old order; 2) sporadic *ad hoc* incidents arising from efforts of insurgents to take over the reins of public power both on a national and local plane; and 3) active resistance by individuals or by guerilla-type or semi-militarized formations against Soviet military power. Of the various types of overt resistance which occurred during the uprising, the most highly developed from the military standpoint and the most indicative of the range and depth of the people's revolt was the armed and violent reaction against the second Soviet intervention. This phase of the conflict illuminates clearly the guerilla-potential of the Hungarian people. The following discussion of specific regional resistance activity is intended to provide Special Forces planners with actual examples of guerilla-type activities in an area of possible future engagement. Although available information is insufficient to present an all-inclusive survey of country-wide resistance during the period of the uprising, it is apparent that the regions figuring most prominently in the fighting have a particular bearing upon the regional suitability of guerilla-type warfare in Hungary. The tactics and movements of the insurgents during the uprising may be projected to similar activities that may in the future

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occur in Hungary. In addition, a brief summary of the fighting in Budapest and of the negotiations with the Soviet forces carried on by the revolutionary organs in that city is necessary to a proper understanding of the eventual development of guerilla activity in the provinces.

(1) Budapest:

The first violent resistance of the Hungarian people occurred on 23 October, when the AVH opened fire on the crowd around the Radio Building in Budapest who were awaiting the return of the student delegation which had entered there to have their demands broadcast. A part of the infuriated crowd attacked arriving AVH reinforcements and in this way the first weapons were acquired. The uprising spread quickly in Budapest as workers from Csepel, Ujpest, and other working-class districts obtained arms from friendly soldiers or police or from military barracks and arms factories. The detested AVH, which had been the chief instrument of oppression during the preceding years of Communist totalitarian rule, found itself paralyzed. Its members were forced to seek refuge in various strongholds, where they were subjected to persistent attack.³⁰ In the early morning of the 24th Soviet tanks arrived in Budapest from Cegled and Szekesfehervar and were soon engaged in counter-action.³¹

For five days, until a cease-fire order of 28 October, a hard-fought battle ensued in Budapest between the insurgents and Soviet armour assisted by the AVH. Negotiations between the Government, which were firmly pressed by the Revolutionary Councils, and Soviet representatives concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Hungary seemed to be successful. The Soviet command conceded the evacuation which, because of technical difficulties, was to take place gradually, commencing with the city of Budapest. Subsequently, on 3 November, an agreement was reached for the withdrawal from all of Hungary. The withdrawal from Budapest, however, coincided with the surrounding by Soviet troops of, first, Budapest's principal airports and, shortly after, the military airfields held by the Hungarian Air Force, which had come under the control

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of the revolutionary "Hungarian National Air Command" and which was on the whole kept in waiting, except for reconnaissance missions, until neutralized by Soviet "withdrawal" tactics. During the period of negotiations the Soviet military command was rapidly moving reinforcements into the country and along its borders and the strategic rail and highway routes were being seized.

The various manifestations of Soviet buildup and intended treachery during the cease-fire period were apparent to different insurgent elements, some of which would have engaged the Soviets without further delay; but the insistence of the Government and certain revolutionary leaders that negotiations be allowed to proceed, the hope-against-hope that the Soviets might for some unprecedented reason turn loose one of its Satellites, and the fearful spectre of Soviet retaliation, all undoubtedly inhibited the responsible leaders from permitting a suicidal attack. When the Soviets intervened once more in Budapest early on the morning of 4 November, the insurgents in the city and in its outlying industrial districts were ill-equipped to fight the unequal battle. The resistance was conducted by separate groups, each under its own leadership. The fighting, conducted in several sectors and strongholds of the metropolitan area, was waged fiercely for several days, but one by one the various groups were forced to surrender and the last vestige of organized military activity disappeared on 11 November. By this date also the insurgent groups in the provinces had been routed from their strongholds in the towns and only isolated pockets of resistance remained.

(2) Provinces:

During the period of the first Soviet intervention, most of the available Soviet forces had been despatched to Budapest and fighting in the provinces was limited to a number of incidents pursuant to the transfer of power from the Communist bureaucracy to the new Revolutionary and Workers' Councils. The local Soviet units were concerned rather to avoid conflict with the Hungarian people.³² Thus units in Győr, in Hajmáskü near Veszprém, Jászberény, and Debrecen stood aloof while revolutionary elements took over

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control of the areas. Contact between Soviet units and local revolutionary authorities in the provinces often revealed on the part of the former an understanding of and sometimes even sympathy for the objectives of the people³³--whether genuine or feigned is not certain. The interlude after the cease-fire was one of watchful waiting for the Revolutionary Councils in the provinces, during which time they pressed upon the Government, as their primary demand, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the entire country.³⁴ Simultaneous with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest, Soviet troops in the provincial centers withdrew from the towns or, if garrisoned there, to the barracks, giving the impression that their intervention in Hungary was coming to an end.³⁵ The hope that the Soviets would comply to this demand was, as indicated above, short-lived.

Apparently the largest continuous sector more or less controlled by the rebels at the height of the revolt was the western border area, the eastern extremity of which was defined roughly by a line proceeding in southerly direction from Komárom in the north, along the northwestern shore of Lake Balaton, and terminating in the south in the vicinity of Nagykanizsa near the Yugoslav border.³⁶ The chief centers of resistance in this border area and elsewhere in the country were apparently Mosonmagyaróvár, Sopron, Győr, Szombathely, Tatabánya, Szekesfehérvár, Veszprém, Pécs, Dunapentele, Vac, Miskolc, and Szolnok.

The extent and character of the fighting in the provinces throughout the revolt was in large measure determined by the activity or inactivity of local Hungarian Army garrisons. As already indicated, the rank-and-file of the Army everywhere sympathized with and identified themselves with the insurgent cause. Although very few units joined the insurgents intact--since regular organization broke down almost completely--the participation of small groups and individuals became a common feature of the fighting. In general, the participation of Army elements depended largely upon the attitude of the commanders of local garrisons. Since

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many senior officers had declared themselves neutral or against the uprising, the rank-and-file of their garrisons were unable to assist the insurgents either through lack of ammunition or through action by the AVH or the Soviet MVD. Activity in the provinces suffered--undoubtedly more than in Budapest itself--from the failure, inability, or lack of opportunity of the military leaders of the revolution to draw up an over-all plan of defense. Even if such a plan had been drawn up it was obvious that the Soviet command had more than sufficient troops in Hungary to make any widespread coordinated resistance effort impossible. Thus whether in Budapest or the provinces, the resistance organizers worked on a local level and with improvised means.³⁷

The apparent intention of the Soviet High Command to avoid clashes wherever possible is substantiated by the fact that throughout the whole of southern Hungary, from Bekescsaba in the east to Kormend in the west--with the notable exception of Pecs--there was no significant fighting during the revolution. In towns and villages where no Soviet or Hungarian troops were stationed, and where the AVH did not resist the transference of power to the Revolutionary Councils, no weapons could be secured nor were they needed until the second intervention. In some towns such as Szeged and Kecskemet either Soviet intelligence agents or pro-Soviet Hungarian Army officers took steps to neutralize the local garrisons and thus prevent the distribution of arms to the insurgents.³⁸ The presence of Soviet troops at Miskolc and other cities of eastern Hungary, their continuous withdrawal and buildup movement, and the consequent inability of the insurgents to formulate resistance plans based either on the city or the countryside limited the duration of actual fighting in this region during the second intervention to a shorter period than in such western towns as Pecs, Dunapentele, and Veszprem.³⁹

On the whole the fiercest fighting during the second intervention, with the exception of a few clashes in the hills of Nograd and Baranya counties, occurred in the industrial districts of Budapest.⁴⁰ This phenomenon was inevitable in light not only of the origin of the rebellion

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in Budapest itself but of the very short duration of the affair. The fighting did, however, last long enough to see the development of guerilla-type forces which sought the protection of outlying areas and which utilized guerilla hit-and-run tactics.

The following descriptions, excerpted from the United Nations report except where otherwise indicated, of the principal armed resistance actions having some of the characteristics of guerilla activity provide details of special significance for Special Forces planning.

At Pecs, the chief city of Baranya county, and an important center due to its proximity to the uranium mines, nothing of any military significance occurred between 23 October and 1 November. The AVH did open fire on the first demonstrators, but during a second demonstration on 1 November, it was forced to surrender and the Revolutionary Council took over all the functions previously discharged by Communist Party officials. A declaration of policy drawn up by the Council demanded as its first point the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. It also called for the exploitation of the uranium mines by the Hungarian State. On the evening of 1 November, the Soviet officials of the uranium mines were asked to leave with their families; they were sent by truck to Szekszard, where some Soviet units were stationed. During the next two days, everything was quiet at Pecs and the Revolutionary Council went to work to reorganize the various public services. After 1 November, however, reports regarding the systematic building up of Soviet troops at Dombovar, some 25 kms. north of Pecs, created an atmosphere of anxiety. Before the Russians returned, the uranium mines were flooded. By the evening of 3 November, it was obvious that the Soviet troops intended to take military action against the insurgents. The commander of the Hungarian forces in Pecs, who had originally agreed to fight in case of a Soviet attack, decided during the night to disarm his troops. The Revolutionary Council, in order to avoid the destruction of the city, resolved to resist in the hilly regions surrounding Pecs. On the morning of 4 November, the Soviet troops took over the city. In the meantime, some 5,000 volunteers--mostly miners and students carrying arms and ammunition--joined the insurgents in the Mecsek Mountains. The Soviet troops made numerous sorties against the positions of the insurgents but, owing to the mobility of the latter and their lightning guerrilla tactics, the Soviet troops suffered many casualties and, for some three weeks, were unable to subdue the insurgents. (Fighting against the Soviets also occurred in the mining town of Komlo north of Pecs.⁴¹) On the 8th, the insurgents attacked a convoy and killed the Commander of the Soviet forces. Day by day, they harassed the Soviet troops by commando raids and, though the insurgents had lost many men, it was mainly lack of ammunition that forced them to give up the fight and escape across the border to Yugoslavia.

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The events during the uprising at the important industrial center of Dunapentele are particularly noteworthy because of the representative character of its population. After the war, it rapidly developed from a small village into an industrial city under the name of Sztalinvaros. Steel foundries, iron works and chemical industries caused its industrial population to grow to 28,000 by 1956. It was the most important experiment undertaken by the Party in its industrialization programme and was considered to be one of the main strongholds of Communism. On 24 October the workers decided to follow the example of Budapest. They organized a Revolutionary Council to represent them and established Workers' Councils in the various factories. The next day, during a demonstration, the AVH opened fire on the crowd, killing eight people and wounding 28. During the next two days, there was more fighting with the AVH, who were now barricaded in the Army barracks. On the 29th, a helicopter landed on the barrack-ground and a Soviet official with his family, the senior officers of the AVH, and two senior Hungarian officers were flown away. Shortly afterwards, a deputation from the barracks declared that the Army was on the side of the revolution. The following days were spent in organizing the activities of the Revolutionary Council and in the military training of some 800 workers. Radio "Rakoczi," which was transmitting from Dunapentele after 4 November, was repeatedly heard asking for assistance in weapons and equipment. It called on RFE to pass on these appeals for outside assistance against the Soviet intervention and also re-transmitted the appeals of other "free" Hungarian stations. On the 5th, Radio "Rakoczi" appealed to the International Red Cross for medical supplies. On the 6th, a Russian armored unit stopped on the outskirts of the town and asked for the surrender of the insurgents. The commanding officer, with an AVH interpreter, was escorted into the town and met the leaders of the Revolutionary Council. It was pointed out to him that the insurgents were not "fascists" or "capitalist agents" but principally workers, many of whom had been staunch supporters of the Communist Party. To convince him of this he was asked to hear two card-bearing members of the Party from the crowd which was assembled outside. These men explained that they had been taught to believe that the Soviet Union defended human rights and was the liberator of the peoples. They declared they wanted now to be free of Soviet intervention and had demanded the abolition of the AVH. When the Soviet officer stated that he had to carry out his orders, the two Communist freedom fighters tore up their Party cards and threw them at his feet. The Soviet Commander withdrew, stating that he would take no action against Dunapentele until he received new orders. Nevertheless, the next day--7 November--the Soviet forces attacked the town from three directions using a large armored force, self-propelled guns and tactical air force. The battle lasted all day, but the freedom fighters held strongly organized positions and were able to withstand the onslaught. By the evening of 8 November, the ammunition had been exhausted and most of the fighters were ordered to go into hiding. Some 300 men with side arms managed to escape during the night. They continued armed resistance in the countryside until 11 November when it was decided to disperse, as any further resistance appeared to be futile. It was reported that during the fighting in Dunapentele the factories did not suffer as much as the living quarters of the population, where considerable damage was done by bombing. The freedom fighters lost

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240 men during the fighting; 12 tanks and eight armored cars of the Soviet forces were destroyed. Witnesses stated before the U.N. Special Committee that the purpose of the workers' resistance in Dunapentele was to demonstrate that all Hungarians wanted to see their country freed from external domination. Witnesses were emphatic in pointing out that, irrespective of creed or party affiliation, the factory workers, with the officers and men of the garrison, were entirely united in their objectives and that throughout the period 25 October to 8 November no one, except the members of the AVH, dissented from the policies of the Revolutionary Council.

In the county of Veszprem, northwest of Lake Balaton, the Revolutionary Council, having consolidated its position by 26 October, concerned itself principally with political and administrative matters, as military questions appeared to be less pressing. There had been no fighting in the county with Soviet troops during the first intervention except at Varpalota, where the miners, in attacking the AVH, had also killed three Soviet political advisers. However, the Veszprem Revolutionary Council assisted in the formulation of a coordinated policy with the other Transdanubian provincial councils, for the purpose of creating a military command to protect Transdanubia in case of a second military intervention. Its first act was to purge from its membership four of the five officers who had been originally elected, on suspicion of maintaining contacts with the Soviet forces; it elected instead a soldier and the head of the County Police, thus setting up, according to the testimony received, a Council which was truly representative of all sections of the population of the province. The next three days were devoted to political negotiations for the resumption of work and for the organization of the National Guard. By Saturday, 3 November, however, the systematic build-up of the Soviet forces within the county had become so apparent that the National Guard, consisting of students, workers and soldiers, made hasty preparations in the city of Veszprem in anticipation of a Soviet attack. This attack came at 5 a.m. the next morning. For two and a half days the National Guard, besieged in the old city of Veszprem, fought against greatly superior Soviet forces which had launched the attack from three directions.⁴² By midday of 6 November, the ammunition of the insurgents was exhausted. About 40 Hungarians and possibly an equal number of Russians had lost their lives. The battle caused considerable destruction in the city, including damage to buildings of historical and artistic significance. Most of the insurgents were able to escape and attempted to hide their side arms. However, by the evening Soviet trucks were being loaded with students seized from their homes and taken to unknown destinations. According to the evidence, by 1 December none of these students had been returned. At the end of the battle, it was reported that some Soviet troops, in a spirit of revenge, entered the University buildings and destroyed the chemical equipment in the laboratory.

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At Miskolc, the university and industrial city of northeast Hungary, military action during the second Soviet intervention differed in some respects from that in western Hungary. This no doubt can be attributed to the presence in the area of Soviet troops who were moving constantly in and out of the city, since Miskolc is on one of the arterial roads between Budapest and the northeastern frontiers. The presence of the Soviet troops tended to make it impossible for the insurgents to organize a resistance plan based on the city itself. This same problem confronted the insurgents of other cities in eastern Hungary and, as there was no time for organized resistance in the countryside, armed resistance in eastern Hungary did not endure as long as in Pecs, Dunaújváros and Veszprém. The passage of troops through the city in the early morning of Sunday, 4 November, was not unusual, and the attack against the University buildings, one of the principal centers of the uprising in the city, was to some extent a surprise. The students fought for about one hour with whatever weapons had been given them. Several students were killed and the Soviet troops also suffered a number of casualties. The Committee was told that, when the fighting was over, many students were seized by the Soviet troops and taken to an unknown destination. On the other hand, troops of the National Guard, who were fighting through the day in Miskolc and the Hejcsaba district, retreated towards the Bükk mountains. In the city itself fighting went on until the afternoon when the Revolutionary Council of Borsod County was obliged to capitulate.

From various sources of information, including radio reports emanating from both the "free" stations within Hungary and from those coming under the control of the Soviet forces, it is possible to conclude that the Soviet troops during the night of 3 to 4 November advanced in a forced march from Dunaújváros and possibly Baja towards Kaposvár and Nagykanizsa which were captured with little or no resistance. From Szombathely northwards there was fighting throughout the day of 4 November. Battles took place in the north at Győr, on the Győr-Sopron road and on the Győr-Hegyeshalom road against parachute troops and forces crossing the Czechoslovakian border possibly through Rajka. The Hungarian force at Győr, reportedly 14,000 strong, was one of the last to capitulate.⁴³ At Komárom on the Danube, Hungarian military units with freedom fighters fought throughout the day against powerful Soviet units attacking from Hungarian territory and from Czechoslovakia across the Danube bridge.⁴⁴ At Tatabánya, the miners fought with weapons which they had received from the Army. Tatabánya was reported still in the hands of the rebels as of 8 November.⁴⁵ At Szekesfehérvár, the Hungarian military garrison, after breaking through the Soviet encirclement, moved to positions in the Vertes mountains, while others proceeded southwest towards the Bakony mountains. There they established bases for guerrilla operations against Soviet troop movements along the highways connecting Budapest with western Hungary. The students of the Zrínyi Military Academy of Budapest and the Budapest armored brigade fought valiantly in the Matra mountains against an armored division. The information regarding the crossing of the Danube by Soviet troops at other points east of Komárom is considered unreliable in view of the fact that for a period of more than 10 days various Hungarian units were able to move from the northeast between the Bükk and Matra mountains across the Danube to the southwestern chain of the Vertes mountains.

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The fighting around the Danubian military centers of Szolnok, Kecskemét and Kalocsa is illustrative of the Soviet control exercised over the Hungarian Army. These three garrisons were, throughout the period of the revolution, under the command of pro-Soviet officers. As the strength of the Soviet troops was increasing from 1 November, the Hungarian garrisons were unable to assist the local National Guard as other garrisons had been able to do. At the outbreak of hostilities on 4 November, the barracks at Szolnok were surrounded and the Soviet tanks inflicted many casualties on the Hungarian troops who were taken by surprise. At Kecskemét and Kalocsa there was no fighting in the town, but a number of officers and men were able to break through the encirclement, and for many days fought with the freedom fighters in the Danubian plain, inflicting damage on the Soviet forces and supplies moving on the highways.

According to a press account Major General Béla Király, one of the military leaders of the revolt, when it became evident that Budapest could not be held, led a force of 400 men and eight tanks across the Danube to Liberty Hill to the west of Budapest. The tiny force hit at Soviet units as they came in to reinforce the garrison in the city. After four days of attempting to organize guerrilla resistance, General Király and his men moved to the old castle at Nagy-Kövacs about 10 miles west of the capital. For days the general and his men were pushed from village to village in the Vertes Mountains. They would be given food and shelter by the peasants only to be discovered within a few hours and forced to flee again. As the party neared the border, they broke up into small groups and set out separately for the frontier.⁴⁶

Other localities where insurgents offered notable resistance were Vac,⁴⁷ Szombathely,⁴⁸ Szolnok,⁴⁹ Mosonmagyaróvár,⁵⁰ and Sopron.⁵¹

d. Control of Key Facilities

One of the first measures taken by the Soviets to strengthen their position in Hungary was the unobtrusive seizure of as many airfields as possible and the gradual neutralization of airfields where the Hungarian Air Force was deployed. The following list indicates the status of Hungarian airfields prior to the preparatory Soviet maneuvers for the second intervention.

Airfields under Soviet control from the outset of the uprising:

Ferihegy (Budapest)	
Budaörs (Budapest)	
Tokol (Budapest)	
Szentkirályszabadja	(between Veszprém and Lake Balaton)
Kecskemét	
Szolnok	

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Airfields apparently under revolutionary control prior to the second Soviet intervention:

Papa
Szekesfehervar
Kaspovar
Kiskunlachaza
Kalocsa
Kunmadaras

The airfields controlled by the Soviets gave them, from the beginning of the uprising, a tight ring of air control immediately around Budapest itself and an outer control ring at about a 100-kilometer depth. Before the second intervention was underway practically all of the airfields were under Soviet control, and the Hungarian Air Force was unable to assist the insurgents.

During the last days of October the Soviet troops moving outward from Budapest and inward from the eastern frontier--purportedly to facilitate the negotiated withdrawal--seem to have converged at strategic locations along the main arterial road system in a crescent about 150 kms. from Budapest stretching from Gyongyos and Hatvan in the north on the Budapest-Miskolc highway, then through Cegléd and Szolnok on the Budapest-Debrecen highway, and Kecskemet on the Budapest-Szeged highway, to Dunafoldvar which lies on the western bank of the Danube.⁵² In Transdanubia before 31 October, this military consolidation was not as extensive as in the Danubian plain except at Szekesfehervar, to which some of the Budapest troops had been withdrawn. However, this region too was subsequently benefitted by the rapid buildup, as indicated by the reported appearance of a fresh unit at Dombóvár, 20 kms. north of Pecs.⁵³ Zahony, the frontier station on the Transcarpathian border, was the principal entry point of new troops, but, at the same time, troops were deployed along most of the roads leading into Hungary from the Ukrainian SSR and Rumania as well as from Slovakia--possibly as far east as Esztergom (north of Budapest) to Rajka (north of Magyaróvár)--whence they crossed the Danube bridge at Komárom on 3 November.⁵⁴ The Soviet Army used also the main railroad line passing through Zahony. They seized the railway stations at Zahony, Kiskovárd, and Nyíregyháza during 1 and 2 November, and some armed

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clashes occurred between Hungarian railway workers and Soviet troops. The eastern lines were commandeered by the Soviet military command, and from 2 November the Hungarian railways could not operate between Szolnok and Nyíregyháza.⁵⁵ Eventually on the main lines the railroads actually had to be operated by Soviet personnel and the trains were protected against saboteurs and guerrillas by Soviet armed guards. The secondary lines were apparently in a chaotic state.⁵⁶

Various media of telecommunications, both fixed wire and radio, played significant roles in the uprising. The following is a list of locations of Free Radios known to have operated during the revolution:⁵⁷

Budapest ("Kossuth")
Budapest ("Roka")⁵⁸
Győr
Győr ("Petöfi")
Miskolc (Radio of Workers' Council of County Borsod)
Szolnok ("Damjanich")
Debrecen
Dunapentele
Eger
Kaposvár ("Rakoczi")
Szeged ("Szechenyi")
Szombathely
Szekesfehervar ("Vorosmarty")
Nyiregyhaza (?) (Radio of the Workers' Council
of the County of Szabolcs-Szatmar)
Pecs⁵⁹

Free stations whose locations have not been definitely established were:⁶⁰

"Rajk"
"Csokonay" (possibly at Győr)⁶¹

It is possible that these latter were alternate or popular names for one or the other of those listed above. In addition, there were amateur and military shortwave sets which broadcast at one time or another during the fighting.⁶² The role of radio communication in the fight of the insurgents cannot be overemphasized; the "Free Radio" became one of the primary symbols of the fight for freedom and its emissions were charged with drama and emotion that stirred the conscience of the world. A fight for the control of the radio transmitter was the key action in several localities. Within

* Transmitting from Dunapentele after 4 November 1956.

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Budapest for instance it may be noted that whatever organized resistance may have been planned against the second Soviet intervention had as a whole ceased by eight o'clock on the first morning of the Soviet attack, that is, shortly after the radio station had been taken over by the Soviet troops.⁶³ At the same time, there are indications that from the standpoint of accurate and reliable communications within the country the internal radios had their definite limitations and that in reality much of the news of events was supplied by radios outside the country. It is not within the province of this report to assess the highly controversial question of whether and to what degree Radio Free Europe encouraged the revolt, either by the language or tone of its broadcasts. For the purposes of Special Forces planning, however, it is important to note that Radio Free Europe, as well as other external radios, were looked to by the insurgent groups in various parts of the country for a running account of events and hence probably constituted an essential link between regional activities which were otherwise largely uncoordinated much as Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) did in the 1953 uprising in East Germany.⁶⁴ On the whole information is still inadequate to evaluate the tactical importance of radio to the conduct of guerilla activity during the uprising. By the evening of 3 November, by which time highways and railways were practically sealed off by the Soviets, communications, according to the United Nations report, were limited to telephone.⁶⁵ Another report identified the closed circuit railroad telephone network as one of the most important distributors of news throughout the country, especially concerning developments in the various cities.⁶⁶

e. Post-Revolt Resistance

In the wake of the uprising the administration of the country had to be taken over by the Soviet military forces for all practical purposes. No segment of the population showed that it was prepared to assist the Soviet-sponsored government except individual members of the former AVH, a few senior officers of the Hungarian Army, and a small number of former

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Communist Party officials. In some provincial centers, where the fighting had been centered, the Revolutionary Councils were permitted to continue their functions, with certain changes in personnel, under the over-all supervision of the Soviet Command. In other centers, however, all Revolutionary Committees were abolished by military order.⁶⁷ Resistance continued in the form of persistent strikes, deputations with demands that were from the outset unacceptable, passive demonstrations, manifestoes, and the intermittent appearance of guerillas.⁶⁸ The Soviets took over the control of the nerve centers of the country, such as broadcasting stations, telephone exchanges, road transport, and the principal railway lines.⁶⁹ The Soviet Military Command adopted stringent measures--individual arrests of persons suspected of leadership in the resistance, mass arrests, and deportations. No accurate figures of the numbers of Hungarian citizens deported are available, but these probably run into thousands. By January 1957, some of these had been returned to Hungary, but it would appear that a considerable number still remain in the USSR.⁷⁰ The passive resistance of the workers, notably in the form of widespread strikes, proved particularly crippling to the efforts of the regime and constituted the people's main weapon against it.⁷¹

After the installation of Janos Kadar as Prime Minister, the workers, the peasants, the intellectuals, and the young people continued to speak through the organizations which had spoken for them during the Revolution. The Kadar regime was hostile to the recognition of these organizations as representatives of the people. The gestures of conciliation, the discussions of enlargement of the government, the seeming concessions to demands in various fields appear in retrospect as a sparring for time to grow in strength and to pick off these organizations one by one. The Workers' Councils, which continued to press demands in behalf of the working class and the nation as a whole, gradually saw their power broken as a result of arrests of their leaders, the infiltration of Party members into key posts, the abolition of all Councils above the

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factory level, and the application of capital punishment to strike activities. Sharing the burden of carrying on the negotiations with the government--but to a lesser degree of effectiveness--was the Writers' Union which received the backing of journalists, artists, and other leaders of the nation's cultural life; but these efforts proved vain as the repression prevailed.⁷² Repressive measures were also employed against the non-Communist political parties and their representatives. The Social Democratic Party, which had emerged again at the end of October for a few days of independence, was liquidated by the Communist Party, whose spokesman declared its existence to be a danger to the Hungarian state. The press has regressed to the pre-revolutionary level. Newspapermen have been officially reminded that the Minister of the Interior is looking over their shoulder as they write. Yet the allegiance which the government is able to command from the intellectuals is so meager that it has had to disband their organizations.⁷³

Legislative and police measures have been strategically employed to break the resistance of the people. A decree of 8 December abolished the Revolutionary Committees and Councils. A decree-law dated 14 December prohibited public meetings and parades unless authorized by the police. On 20 December the government announced the establishment of a State Information Office, which was to exercise supervision over the press and information services. The arrest of members of the executive committee of the Students' Association, of several young university professors, and of a large number of journalists and writers was followed by suspension of the activities of the Writers' Union on 17 January and of the activities of the Journalists' Association on 19 January. At the end of January, the National Council of Free Trade Unions met and revoked the decision taken by the Hungarian unions during the revolutionary period to withdraw from the World Federation of Trade Unions. On 29 January Kadar declared that under the dictatorship of the proletariat the right to strike served no useful purpose. A decree-law of 24 March, made retroactive to 1 October 1956, provided that all appointments, transfers or dismissals affecting posts of any importance in

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the Roman Catholic Church and the Reformed (Calvinist) and Evangelical (Lutheran) Churches, as well as those concerning dignitaries of the Jewish faith, would be subject to approval by the Praesidium. On 6 February a decree-law was issued which increased the penalties for encouraging or assisting persons attempting to cross the frontier illegally. Persons failing to inform the authorities of such offenses were themselves made liable to imprisonment for terms of as much as two years.

After the second Soviet intervention and the rapid crushing of the primary strongholds of the insurgents in the larger Hungarian towns, the opposition of the Hungarian people took the form of passive resistance spearheaded by the workers under the direction of the Workers' Councils, and of guerilla warfare conducted primarily in the mountainous regions. In the larger town and industrial areas numerous clashes continued to occur between the populace, who retained many of the arms seized during the revolt, and the police forces of the Kadar regime backed up by Soviet troops. (According to a Kadar government spokesman, about 20,000 arms got into the hands of unwarranted persons in Borsod County during the revolt.⁷⁴) The peak of this type of opposition occurred in connection with the intensification during the first part of December of the general strike which the Workers' Councils used as their main weapon in conducting negotiations with the Kadar government. During this period clashes took place in Budapest itself and in other towns throughout the country--notably in the industrial or mining towns of Pecs, Tatabanya, Salgotarjan, Beckescaba, Magyarovar, and Miskolc and its adjacent Borsod industrial area.⁷⁵ At this juncture the government, in a final move to wipe out the resistance, decreed the dissolution of regional Workers' Councils, the imposition of martial law, and the summary execution of persons found possessing weapons.⁷⁶ Although as late as mid-December the Workers' Councils and insurgents were reported to be in control in many towns and villages outside the larger provincial cities⁷⁷ and although some isolated, if serious, clashes notably in

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Budapest occurred in early 1957,⁷⁸ armed resistance of the workers and townspeople was largely broken by the first of the year.

Because of the constriction of communications channels by the Kadar regime the true extent of post-revolt armed guerilla activity in the mountains and countryside cannot be stated with any certainty, but the piecing together of bits of information reveals that this type of opposition continued to be a serious problem for the regime for several weeks after the main fighting was ended and there are indications that guerilla remnants were holding out in the hills well into 1957. At the time of the breakup of the overt armed resistance forces by the heavy onslaught of Soviet troops it was reported that many of the rebels, who had withdrawn to the mountains, notably the Bakony forests and the area around Miskolc, and to the swamps between the Danube and Drava Rivers near the Yugoslav frontier, hoped to wage guerilla warfare from these vantage points.⁷⁹ Available reports indicate that the guerillas operated in most of the mountainous areas of Hungary throughout November, with some remaining active until almost the end of December. It is apparent from press reports that the most significant rebel groups were located in the Bukk Mountains, adjacent to the industrial town of Miskolc, the Bakony Mountains north of Lake Balaton, and in the Mecsek Mountains north of the mining town of Pecs.⁸⁰ Press notices reported partisan control around 20 November of the territory north of a line extending from Vac, through Hatvan, Gyongyos, and north of Miskolc to the Czechoslovak border--an area which takes in the Borzsony and Matra Mountains,⁸¹ battling around the 28th of November between Soviet troops and some 1500 students of Sarospatak College in the Hegyalja forest in the extreme northwest of the country near the Soviet border;⁸² the straddling around December by rebel forces of the Hungarian-Rumanian border near Oradea,⁸³ and the encirclement by Soviet troops around 11 December of freedom fighters in the hills at Harmashatarhegy about 20 miles northwest of Budapest--⁸⁴ presumably in the Pilis Mountains.

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Individual and largely unrelated bits of information may be included here to indicate the type of guerilla activity that has occurred. Resistance groups issued leaflets in November protesting deportations to the USSR.⁸⁵ Freedom fighters, immediately after the uprising, engaged in liberating, usually after heavy fighting, intended deportees to the Soviet Union from freight cars en route to the eastern frontier.⁸⁶ According to an official government announcement of 8 June 1957, a former captain of the police of County Heves and four accomplices were arrested and charged with planning to carry large quantities of arms and ammunition after 4 November with a view to organizing resistance against Soviet troops in the Bukk Mountains.⁸⁷ One report, dated December 1956, indicated the survival of some 500 partisans in the Bakony Mountains and an unspecified number in the Pilis Mountains, including, according to unconfirmed information, a battalion of Soviet soldiers.⁸⁸ During demonstrations and fighting in Miskolc on December 11 and 12, 1956, partisans were reported on the Avas Hill⁸⁹ which overlooks the town and which is on the eastern fringe of the Bukk Mountain range. The future compilation of detailed regional reports will undoubtedly show that such guerilla remnants engaged in hit-and-run and sabotage activities were widespread during the first couple of months after the revolution.

As of March 1957 resistance groups were reportedly still in existence in mountainous areas of the countryside but appeared to be dispersing under the attack of Soviet troops. Most of the partisans who evaded a general roundup in the Pilis Mountain area in mid-February joined the Csepel and Pecs movements (see below) as liaison men, although a group of 300 or 400--including some students with a small number of armored vehicles--remained in the area. It allegedly still had contact with a Vertes Mountain group which was gradually being forced by supply shortages to dissolve.⁹⁰

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According to a summary of resistance activities dated March 1957 an underground movement, apparently organized on a national basis and centered among the workers on Csepel Island, the miners in Pecs, and military personnel in Debrecen had been in the process of formation since December 1956. These three groups, organized into small cells, were apparently in regular communication. The underground's first objective after completing establishment of a communications network was the organization of strikes to exercise moral and economic pressure on the Kadar government. It was reported that the Budapest Central Workers' Council, dissolved by the regime in early December, had been reorganized and expanded underground and that it had facilities for publication of a covert paper, a radio transmitter for use under emergency conditions, and a stock of arms. In the period prior to 15 March, the underground centers were reported to be extending their communications system to include less well-organized university and army groups, at a time when the regime was moving against alleged "armed revolutionaries." Aside from the organized movement, uncoordinated underground activity reportedly was in existence around Budapest, harassing Hungarian police patrols and Soviet barracks in an attempt to provoke Soviet fire.⁹¹

It is quite likely that the regime is still troubled by organized resistance activities and, in consideration of the opportunities afforded by the revolution for conspiratorial organization and for the acquisition of arms, will continue to be for some time to come. In a speech on February 3, 1957, Kadar, warning against an outbreak of a new rebellion in March, said that rebel activity was proceeding dangerously on two fronts, the villages and the schools.⁹² He did not make it clear whether active resistance was meant but it was apparent that the rural areas were considered extremely hostile to the regime.

With the passing months of 1957 the regime accelerated its pace of reversing the political gains of the revolution and of liquidating the insurgent leaders. The end of the period of deceitful negotiation and of lip-service to the class and institutional achievements of the revolution

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was clearly signaled by the government's manifesto of January 6, 1957, enunciating the re-installation of the Communist Party as the leading force in the state and the intention to use iron discipline to effect conformity to its decisions. This was followed by a national roundup of revolutionary elements from all classes of society, notably students and intellectuals. Other indications of reaction which appeared in early February included the re-introduction of Russian as a compulsory language in the schools, the gradual repudiation of the promise to restore religious instruction, the replacement of the wage system in industry with the old piece-work system, the installation of armed factory guards to maintain "working discipline," and the apparent invitation to the Party followers of Rakosi to join the new Communist Party.⁹³ Further wholesale arrests were reported during mid-March.⁹⁴ In the latter part of March the government issued an order banishing "dangerous citizens" and placing them under police supervision; those banished could choose their new residence, except places specified in the warrant of expulsion, and had to move there within 15 days.⁹⁵ At the end of May a new wave of arrests was reported underway.⁹⁶ Unofficial sources have indicated that as of the end of May 1957 the number of Hungarians in prison, excluding those in concentration camps, was approximately 22,000 and the number of executions more than 300.⁹⁷

The latest manifestation of the drive prior to the termination of this report was a wave of arrests, the victims of which Gyorgy Marosan, Minister of State, identified as "those in whom foreign supporters of our counter-revolution put their hopes."⁹⁸ This drive, the magnitude of which was estimated to vary between 1500 to 10,000 arrestees, was directed not only against persons believed to have had some connection with the uprising but also against persons with known anti-regime backgrounds or inclinations. Hungarian police claimed to have smashed 40 groups accused of espionage and subversion. One group allegedly included several former big landlords and factory owners, who allegedly plotted


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with Cardinal Mindszenty to restore capitalism to Hungary.⁹⁹ Successive arrests within a period of a few days of groups of Catholic clergymen,¹⁰⁰ of leading members of suppressed political parties,¹⁰¹ and of a number of officers of Hungary's pro-German army of World War II,¹⁰² strongly argue that the regime is going beyond the actual participants in the 1956 uprising and striking at the persons who are symbols of anti-Communist aims. At the same time the possibility cannot be dismissed that some element of truth inheres in the Kadar government's charges and that the leaders of these suppressed and persecuted groups did actually seize the opportunity afforded by the uprising to conspire at least towards the rehabilitation of the forces or institutions which they represent and perhaps towards the re-establishment of the old order. Certainly the groups affected by the arrests were among the principal targets of the regime when it first took over after World War II.

Thus at mid-1957 and the cut-off date of this report the Kadar regime was still engaged in a punitive drive against the participants in the 1956 uprising and was apparently taking advantage of the suppression to strike at its long-standing institutional and class antagonists. An evaluation of the regime's persecution of its traditional opponents, as well as the pinpointing of future localized resistance activities, will enhance the understanding of the resistance potential among the various classes of the population and of their degrees of adaptability to the requirements of Special Forces activities. It is unlikely, however, that anything in the near future will provide as clear an insight into the resistance attitudes and capabilities of the Hungarian people as that which can be derived from the uprising of 1956 and its immediate aftermath.



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3. Resistance Potential

a. General Characteristics of the 1956 Uprising

Perhaps the most important lesson of the Revolt is that the enslaved peoples of the Soviet empire suffer no illusions about the nature of Communist totalitarianism, that they are quite specific about their grievances against it, and will not support it in an eventual showdown. Their resistance is ready and waiting; it does not have to be built up. The most widespread and unanimous demand of the Hungarian people as a whole and of the various revolutionary committees and petitions was the withdrawal of Soviet troops, not necessarily because the latter were hated on personal ground but because they were the symbol of Soviet domination and exploitation of a decade's duration. The rapid development of the ten-day revolt showed beyond a doubt that the Communist regime and the totalitarian Communist system in Hungary and in all probability in the other satellite countries cannot survive except with the backing of Soviet force. At the same time any assessment of the readiness of the people to turn upon the regime must take into account the all-pervading fear of denunciation and retaliation which has always been one of Communism's most potent and deliberate weapons--precisely the weapon of terror--and which only a few short months after the uninhibited actions of the uprising has once more gripped the popular spirit.¹⁰³

The uprising, which lasted only a few days and hence lent itself to practically no opportunity for nation-wide resistance organization, is nonetheless instructive as to the spontaneity and speed with which the population can be marshalled for resistance purposes. Despite the fact that the revolutionary leaders were unable--and to some extent unwilling, in order not to provoke the Soviets--to draw up any concerted plan of action, such phenomena as the formation of a National Guard, the imparting of military training to some workers,¹⁰⁴ and particularly the successful guerilla tactics carried on in the mountains, demonstrate a high adaptability to the requirements of popular defense. While the

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success of such military ventures must in important measure be attributed to the help and experience derived from Army deserters, it is a feature of the revolt that the insurgents generally mistrusted the regular military organs of command and preferred to keep the command in civilian hands.¹⁰⁵

Although unanimity and a widespread spirit of generous cooperation emerged as the most notable characteristic of the national conduct during the revolution, certain phenomena of it, although difficult to interpret with the still limited intelligence available at the completion date of this report, indicate some diversity of opinion and objectives among the various participating elements of the population. Many revolutionary councils showed a marked distrust of the government of Imre Nagy, largely no doubt because of its slow development of a firm policy but conceivably too because of its Communist, although national, character. A similar distrust of the military establishment was indicated by the insistence of individual insurgent groups on reporting to and receiving instructions directly from the trusted Minister of Defense of the revolutionary government.¹⁰⁶ Perhaps the most significant indication of diversity in the development of the revolution was the extremely radical demands initially made by some elements of the Transdanubian National Council situated at Gyor, namely that the Nagy government be ousted, that an appeal be made to the West for military help, and that war be declared on the USSR. A study of the political aspects of the revolt suggests that Gyor, one of the leading centers of the revolt, was one of the more radical centers of activity.¹⁰⁷ In contrast, one report alleges that the 2500 inhabitants of the village of Hernad, despite their knowledgeability of events derived from Radio Free Europe and Radio Kossuth, made no attempt to participate in the revolution, retaining their Communist council and contributing practically nothing when the rebels tried to collect food supplies.¹⁰⁸ Several scattered and seemingly insignificant notes of discordance during the course of the uprising lead to the conclusion that regional population diversity remains one of the most important factors in Special Forces operational planning.

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While the uprising showed the demands of the people to be based on simple principles of justice and freedom, it was made very evident in the demands of the various groups that such economic and institutional gains as land reform, the public ownership of mines, factories, and means of production, and the organizations created for the working class will not be surrendered in favor of a return to the old order. Leaders of the revolution seem also to have closed the door on the return of emigre political forces, at least as far as their re-accession to political power is concerned. Ferenc Nagy, a leading peasant leader in the pre-Communist period and one of the most prominent figures in the Hungarian emigration, attempted to contact the resistance forces at the frontier but was ordered to leave by the Austrian government.¹⁰⁹ Some 600 young Hungarian emigres from Austria, Germany, France, and Belgium were reported to have come to Vienna during the uprising with the intention of joining the rebels but to have been denied entry into Hungary.¹¹⁰

That there is wide popular feeling in favor of socialistic predilections is clearly demonstrated by the articulate expression of them throughout the revolutionary period and during the subsequent months of the Kadar regime's stalling tactics. Thus at meetings with Kadar after the revolution workers' councils, still pressing revolutionary demands, made clear that they adhered strictly to socialism and the social ownership of the means of production.¹¹¹ To what extent these expressions advanced by those segments of the population which have the greatest access to the media of public opinion and whose leadership has developed during the Communist decade in a milieu of socialist forms and symbols, actually represent the convictions of the majority of the people or to what extent they would prevail in a free society and economy cannot be determined at this time. Whether the actual exercise of individual initiative and the enjoyment of individually-earned compensation would erode the practice of socialism is also a matter of

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question. The revolutionary government composed of Communists, Social Democrats, Independent Smallholders, and the Petofi (former National Peasant) Party agreed to retain from Communist achievements everything which could be used in a free, democratic, and socialist country and specifically that the reforms affecting ownership of the land and industrial undertakings would not be disturbed; but even during the short life of the coalition disagreement on some issues were noted between the Socialists and the peasant parties.¹¹²

Specific information about class participation in the armed aspect of the uprising is very limited and relates mostly to the fighting in Budapest during the first phase of hostilities against the Soviet occupier. It is quite probable, however, that greater detail about this aspect of the uprising would only confirm the general agreement of witnesses to the episode that people of all ages and occupations showed remarkable unity of purpose during the combat.¹¹³ The brunt of the fighting in Budapest was borne by the younger segment of the population, although there were many instances of participation by middle-aged or elderly people.¹¹⁴ The workers provided the numerical majority of the freedom fighters but the contribution of the students to the fighting was also in the first order of importance.¹¹⁵ According to the testimony of a limited number of escapees to the West who had been deported to the USSR immediately after the uprising and subsequently returned to Hungary, the majority of the deportees were soldiers and freedom fighters, mostly young workers and students.¹¹⁶ Even young boys participated in the fighting and readily learned to make effective use of the rifles which came into their possession.¹¹⁷ The peasants lent aid and assistance by supplying the fighters in Budapest at little or no cost.¹¹⁸ Witnesses of the fighting at Dmápetele observed how the factory workers, with the Hungarian officers and men of the local garrison, were entirely united, irrespective of party or religious affiliation.¹¹⁹ One of the very few reports on the specific role of minorities during the revolution refers to the aid sent to the fighters

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of Budapest by the Swabians (ethnic Germans) living in the neighborhood of the city.¹²⁰ The ordinary police sympathized with the insurgents, giving them weapons or fighting at their side. Certain units of the Hungarian Army fought as such on the side of the insurgents,¹²¹ and there was no single instance on record of Hungarian troops fighting on the Soviet side against their fellow countrymen.¹²² The Army as a whole disintegrated from the start of the uprising. Whenever they could, soldiers handed over weapons and ammunition to their fighting compatriots and, in very many cases, deserted, individually or in groups, to their ranks. However, in general, the senior officers were pro-Soviet and the insurgents mistrusted them.

There is evidence that some of the Russian soldiers disliked the task assigned to them. During the first intervention Soviet troops, many of whom had long been stationed in Hungary, were reported to have given a total of 35 to 40 tanks to the freedom fighters and in general were reluctant to engage them, while in the second intervention Soviet troops, many of Asiatic origin, acted with much greater ruthlessness.¹²³ Soviet soldiers who had spent time in Hungary had often established friendly relations with the people, many of whom could talk to them in Russian. There were a number of cases of fraternization with the Hungarians,¹²⁴ and there seemed to be little personal animosity towards the Soviet soldiers.¹²⁵ They seemed to be affected by the suppression of a civilian population including women, children, and elderly people. According to one report, troops of Ukrainian origin stationed in Mór (4722N-1812E), who had always been quite popular with the population there, sided with the rebels in the early days of the revolt and after the suppression joined rebel groups in the Bakony area, taking their equipment with them.¹²⁶ Press reports dated November and December 1957 alleged the desertion of Soviet troops during the early post-revolt period, many of whom joined the Hungarian guerillas.¹²⁷ A few claims that Soviet soldiers had chosen freedom in Austria were reported

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in the Austrian press.¹²⁸ It has also been alleged that some Soviet troops sought asylum in Yugoslavia.¹²⁹ In general, there are strong indications that some Soviet officers and soldiers fought and died on the Hungarian side during the uprising¹³⁰ and, furthermore, it is possible that some Soviet troops joined the rebels during the post-revolt period.

Other indications bearing upon group participation in the uprising include the rumors that foreign students had participated in the revolutionary events. A low-level source mentions, for instance, proceedings undertaken around April 1957 against Korean students in Budapest accused of having joined the freedom fighters.¹³¹

This broad outline of the varying degree of class and group participation in the armed resistance, derived largely from observations concerning the fighting in Budapest during the first Soviet intervention, may be presumed to be valid with respect to the larger and more widespread action begun when the Soviet troops intervened a second time to crush the revolution. In all probability the peasants played a somewhat larger role in the fighting in the provinces than indicated above, especially as the insurgents retreated from their urban strongholds into the countryside or the mountains. The workers, both factory hands and miners, and the students, significantly strengthened by the soldiery, continued, however, to bear the brunt of the fighting to the very end.

According to an official Hungarian source (the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (*Statistikai Szemle*) Issue No. 11-12, Vol. XXXIV, November-December 1956), the number of people who died in the fighting can be estimated at some 1800-2000 in Budapest and 2500-3000 in the whole country. Among those who died in the fighting between 23 October and 30 November and whose deaths had been registered up to 1 January 1957, 84 per cent were men and 16 per cent women. More than one-fifth of these people were under 20 years of age, 28 per cent were between 20 and 29 years, 15 per cent between 30 and 39, and 15 per cent between 40 and 49. In the provinces

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the greatest number of deaths in the fighting occurred in the counties of Pest, Gyor-Sopron, Fejer, and Bacs-Kiskun.¹³²

According to Premier Kadar in a speech before the National Assembly in early May 1957, some 170,000 young people had fled the country. About that time the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees put the total number of refugees to Austria and Yugoslavia at 193,216.¹³³ The large number of youths among the revolutionary dead and more particularly the extremely high percentage of them among the post-revolt fugitives from the country has undoubtedly resulted in a considerable reduction in the reservoir of potential resistance fighters available in the immediate future, although the generally rebellious post-revolt attitude of the youth remaining in Hungary is a clear indication of a still tremendous resistance potential that can be utilized advantageously for Special Forces purposes. Moreover the youth as well as members of the other classes who have fled the country represent a knowledgeable group which could supply Special Forces planners with valuable information about their former localities. The presence, in the United States, of many of these refugees also poses the possibility of their selective incorporation into Special Forces units.

At the cut-off date of this report, it was still impossible to delineate clearly the role played in the uprising by the religious organizations of Hungary. Throughout the post-World War II period the clergy, mainly that of the Catholic Church, has constituted perhaps the most consistent force of opposition against the Communist regime to be found in the whole country. Church resistance, however, has not been characterized by violence but by efforts to maintain the spirit of the faithful and to preserve the physical and moral integrity of church organization. Although it is apparent that this cautious and conservative attitude was evidenced also during the uprising, recent allegations by the Kadar regime of connections between church personnel, especially Cardinal Mindszenty, and some of the revolutionary activities

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that occurred pose the possibility that the role of churchmen was more significant than available information has so far indicated.

Although, as already indicated, all segments of the population of Hungary participated in the revolt and were of one mind in their determination to bring a decade of foreign-sponsored totalitarian oppression to an end, it is noteworthy that the urban areas were the well-spring of revolutionary organization and military action. In large measure the lesser significance of the rural areas was due to the lack of opportunity which the short duration and logistical complexity of the events entailed; and there can be no doubt that, in a more protracted struggle in which the elements of leadership, organization, and supply would be better developed, the rural population and the countryside would play a more important, if not a paramount role in the resistance. Nevertheless the urban character of the uprising, both in its military and political aspects, project important propositions concerning the future conduct of guerilla operations in Hungary as well as in other East European satellites. A decade of Communist domination in the satellites has clearly altered the sociological face of the satellite nations, projecting the urban class, especially the workers, into the ascendancy over the rural population. As a result, in both Poland and Hungary, the ferment and initiative of resistance proceeded from the cities. This development has been a cardinal disappointment to the Communist regimes, which had placed in these classes their best hope for the future. In their efforts to establish their regime on a popular base, the Communists in Hungary, as part and parcel of their industrialization program, created a strong proletarian class, giving it through the trade unions--however theoretical their actual power--the structural framework of class organization and unity and the psychological buildup to convince them of their class primacy. At the same time they created a new intelligentsia and student class, instilling them with ideological concepts designed to cut this group off from Hungary's pre-World War II national traditions and values. During the post-Stalin period these well-indoctrinated classes of

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society openly turned their critical faculties upon the actual situation in which they found themselves and began to demand the fulfillment of promises, political, cultural, and economic, which the Communist regime did not and--in view of its actual totalitarian rationale--could not fulfill. Thus it was the intellectual class, principally the writers, which sowed the seed of revolt; it was the students who organized the demonstrations and drew up the first article of demands; and it was the workers who, after the AVH turned the demonstrations into violence, bore the brunt of civilian participation in the fighting.

During the revolt, when the cities and towns, where the primary resistance was organized, became untenable because of superior Soviet forces and fire power, the insurgents escaped in some instances to the countryside but more notably to the mountains where because of available suitabilities for guerilla warfare they were able to carry on the fight for a while longer. This course of action is highly indicative of the probable pattern of action in a future war in which the citizens of Hungary would seek their liberation through an outside power. If in a war local security controls would cease or loosen numerous urban dwellers would exploit the opportunity to retreat to the open country or mountains where conditions for guerilla warfare are more favorable. They would then provide a highly valuable reservoir of military potential for Special Forces seeking to organize local resistance. That Special Forces will inevitably have to deal with both urban and rural classes is particularly apparent in the case of Hungary, a small, topographically uniform, and densely populated country where no region is really distant from another and where smaller towns and villages form a thickly settled population belt between the larger urban areas.

Although adequate information about the regional details of the armed resistance of the uprising is lacking, it is apparent that it took place in two phases, together lasting only a short time after the second Soviet intervention: initial resistance in several large cities and towns and,

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secondly, the retreat from these centers into the plains and mountains for last-ditch stands. Major resistance centers were: Pecs, a mining center in the southwest; Dunapentele (Sztalinvaros), a central Hungarian industrial town on the Danube; Veszprem, one of the chief cities of Transdanubia (western Hungary); Miskolc, a university and industrial city of northeast Hungary; Gyor, headquarters of the Radical Transdanubian National Council, and elsewhere in Gyor-Sopron county; Komarom county, notably Tatabanya and Komarom; Szombathely; Szekesfehervar; Szolnok; and Vac.

While the foregoing listing of resistance centers cannot be considered comprehensive, it is nevertheless, on a broad regional basis, indicative of the location of the most significant armed resistance actions of the uprising outside of Budapest. To some extent the location of the fighting was determined by Soviet logistics and the disposition of insurgent forces towards the western escape avenues; hence it may not be concluded that areas of little or no armed resistance signify the complete absence of resistance potential on the part of the local populations. Except for significant action in the northernmost counties, relatively little fighting occurred east of the Danube, although note must be made of such actions as the breakout of military personnel from the surrounded garrisons of Kecskemet and Kalocsa who joined freedom fighters in the Danubian plain, inflicting damage on the Soviet forces and supplies moving on the highways. Except for the notable action in the Pecs vicinity of southwestern Hungary, the fighting throughout the whole southern half of the country was extremely limited as compared to the north. Reports of more radical demands from the Revolutionary Councils of the western part of Hungary than from those of the eastern part may be indicative of a greater degree of resistance potential in this area. This region is characterized by a lower percentage of industrial and urban population and a higher percentage of Catholics. It has been subjected to a lesser degree of industrialization under the Communist regime than the east of Hungary.

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As mentioned earlier, the almost automatic withdrawal to the nearest mountains of the insurgents besieged in the cities and towns stands out as a notable phenomenon of the uprising in Hungary. It is of special interest to Special Forces planning, as the mountainous regions, discussed later in this study, are basically the ones from which guerilla warfare could be carried on with some success in Hungary. Map A shows that the few mountainous regions in otherwise flat Hungary were almost all utilized by the insurgents. The low, discontinuous, and topographically varying system of mountains arching crescent-shaped from the northeast borders of Hungary with the USSR to the southwestern corner of the country provided the last retreats for the insurgent forces. The Bukk, Matra, Vertes, Bakony, and Mecsek Mountains all became the scene of guerilla fighting in the final days of the Soviet counterattack. The groups in the Mecsek Mountains were able to continue the fight for some three weeks and then escape across the border to Yugoslavia. For more than 10 days various Hungarian units were able to move from the northeast between the Bukk and Matra Mountains across the Danube to the southwestern chain of the Vertes Mountains. During the first couple months after the second Soviet intervention the most active rebel groups appeared to be those operating in the Bukk, Bakony, and Mecsek Mountains. Partisans in the Pilis and Vertes Mountains were reported to be surviving, but diminishing because of supply shortages and Soviet attrition, as of mid-March 1957.

Irrespective of the tremendous Soviet force brought to bear to disperse the guerillas in the mountainous areas and of the lack of any outside assistance to them, the limited nature of the cover and concealment afforded by the terrain features of Hungary made extremely difficult any extended operations. In a future war the area of Hungary considered by itself cannot be counted on as highly conducive to guerilla-type activities. On the other hand, a more favorable role might be found for Hungary if it is considered in conjunction with the physical features

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of cover and terrain in nearby cross-border areas in Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

The logistical and military aspects of the uprising clearly highlighted the close relationship between the conduct of resistance and the importance of communication facilities. The move of the Soviets at the very outset of the uprising to secure such key facilities as bridges, highway and railroad lines and junctions, and airfields rendered resistance hopeless. A study of their tactics during this episode documents the high importance of such structures to a war effort and at the same time highlights their potential value and suitability to interdiction activity of Special Forces. The important roles of the Free Radios both as instruments of communication and symbols of the rebel cause suggest the possible importance of evaluating radio equipment and sites, particularly of powerful transmitters, as Special Forces objectives. Internal radio broadcasting, however, proved to have serious limitations as a medium of accurate and comprehensive news coverage. The importance of outside communication facilities was evidenced by the reported reliance of the different fighting groups on such broadcasts as Radio Free Europe for information about activities and situations outside their respective localities.¹³⁵ The use of telephones, including apparently the closed railroad circuit, proved highly important in the course of the revolution. The highly individualist nature of the insurgent military operations during the uprising--in large measure dictated by the lack of opportunity to coordinate and by a lack of trust in the regular military hierarchy of officers--may be noted as a characteristic of guerilla warfare that Special Forces will inevitably encounter because of the nature of their operations.

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b. Peasants

Prior to World War II Hungary was predominantly an agricultural country and approximately 55 per cent of the population belonged to the peasant class.¹³⁶ On the eve of World War II less than one per cent of owners of land possessed almost 50 per cent of the arable land. The agricultural population of Hungary included a rural proletariat of more than three million persons, consisting of estate servants, landless agricultural laborers, dwarfholders, and tenants. Under the 1945 land reform enacted by the coalition government about four and a half million acres of arable land were distributed among 660,000 peasant families. Holdings of less than 20 acres, which in the 1930s amounted to only about one-third of the arable land of the country, now constituted about 65 per cent. Imre Nagy, then Minister of Agriculture, gained some personal popularity as a result of his role in the reform,¹³⁷ which gave the peasants a vital interest in resisting the subsequent collectivization drive of the Communist regime.

Under Communist domination, agriculture has deteriorated so sharply that as a result of the over-investment of resources and manpower in a massive industrialization program in some post-war years Hungary has had to import grain. Heavy drafts upon the agricultural population to provide the manpower for industrialization have reduced the agricultural population, and as a result of other requirements of the whole Communist program in Hungary the peasantry is no longer a numerical majority in the country. As of 1955, some 45 per cent of the population was dependent on agriculture for a livelihood.¹³⁸ A notable percentage of those who left the farms were youths. The disastrous effects of the heavy industry drive of the early 1950s were recognized by Imre Nagy when he first became Premier in July 1953. He tried to implement a program giving priority first to consumer goods, while also permitting the peasants to leave the collectives. However, after Nagy's forced "resignation" in April 1955, these "soft" policies were tightened up once more.¹³⁹

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At the end of 1955 as a result of a collectivization drive which reached a momentum reminiscent of the pre-New Course period, 1949-1952, the collectivized landholdings amounted to about 85 per cent of the level prevailing before the withdrawals and dissolutions of 1953-1954. Thus from a 1954 low point of 18 per cent of the total arable land, the collectivized sector (known as "producers' cooperatives") reached 22.4 per cent by the end of October as compared to the peak of 26 per cent reached in 1953. This gain plus the estimated 12.5 per cent of arable land in state farms--a total of 35 per cent--lent optimism to state planners who set the 1960 goal for the socialized sector at 50 per cent. It should be noted, however, that, although the arable landholdings of the "cooperatives" at the end of 1955 stood at only about 200,000 hectares below the highest figure (i.e., 1,404,000 hectares) recorded before the withdrawals of 1953-1954, the number of households and their membership remained well below the peak status (i.e., 239,000 households and 300,000 members as against 340,000 households and 515,000 members).¹⁴⁰

Although the main intellectual ferment of the uprising proceeded from the urban areas, there was no lack of dissatisfaction in the countryside. In the periodical Beke es Szabadsag (Peace and Freedom), 9 and 16 May 1956, the Stalin prize-winner, Tamas Aczel, described the profound spirit of distrust of the regime which he encountered among the peasants. One source tells how the Irodalmi Ujsag, the Writers' Union's literary review which was a primary organ of criticism against the regime prior to the revolt, was sold out even in the country districts.¹⁴¹

The participation of the peasant in the Revolution, especially in the fighting aspect of it, was a relatively minor contribution. It must be assumed that this inactivity was, to some extent, apparent only, in that the rural areas were not as systematically and completely reported on as the urban areas, and the complete story of the peasant in the Revolution is yet to be told. It has also been suggested that the peasant with his customary reserve sensed a futility and misdirection in the Revolution that made him hesitate.¹⁴² One report alleged that no one in the village of Hernad, a village of 2,500

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inhabitants, attempted to participate in the Revolution and that when the rebels tried to collect food supplies, the local farmers contributed practically nothing.¹⁴³ But in the main the lesser role of the peasant was due to the lack of time, of opportunity, of arms, and, to some extent, of know-how to engage in the fight. In many villages the Revolution did not advance very far beyond the setting up of councils. Against such negative factors must be counted the absorption from the farms during the Communist decade of large numbers of the village youth who in their urban situation, together with the soldiers from peasant families, did indeed fight in the Revolution.¹⁴⁴ That the majority of the farmers backed the Revolution was evidenced by the fact that they did support the rebels in whatever way they could;¹⁴⁵ that they supplied food, especially to the rebels in Budapest, at little or no profit;¹⁴⁶ and that the strong passive resistance of the workers during the early period after the revolt was supported by passive resistance on the part of the peasants.¹⁴⁷ In early December it was reported that "farmers' guards" set up all over Hungary had engaged in clashes with the Kadar militia, had taken over responsibility for public order, and had made common cause with the workers' councils against the militia.¹⁴⁸ Later the same month it was reported that farmers' councils openly controlled affairs in most Hungarian villages and covertly where the police had been installed.¹⁴⁹ On the whole there is little doubt that given the opportunity, equipment, and the psychological incentives--which factors were available to the urban rebels--the peasants would have carried their share of the fighting.¹⁵⁰

The peasantry emerged from the Revolution with virtually the only gains achieved by the nation. Kadar has so far retained the earlier agricultural concessions, namely the abolition of the hated system of forced crop deliveries, a significant increase in the prices paid for agricultural products, which have been raised an average of 35 per cent, and the outback in forced collectivization. In the wake of the revolt

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the number of collectives dropped from 3,954 to 1,469. According to governmental authorities, 1,103 collectives were re-formed during the spring of 1957, but the remaining loss of membership still amounts to 10 per cent and the actual acreage regained was only 300,000 acres as compared to 1,200,000 acres taken out.¹⁵¹

The comparatively good fortune of the peasantry may seem somewhat ironical in view of the relatively minor role played by that class in the actual fighting of the uprising; however, their gain is by no means a token of Communist affection for their class. It is rather a recognition--which was likewise made in Poland--of the virtual failure of socialized agriculture as practiced by the Communist regime to provide a decent level of food consumption for the nation. Although in its manifesto of 6 January 1957 the Kadar regime did not insist on the reconstitution of the collectives which were dissolved during and immediately after the revolt, it stated that socialization of agriculture, including the machine stations, would be continued and that collective farms would play an important role.¹⁵² During the Party Congress of 27-29 June 1951 Kadar observed that "when peasant opinion settles down, it may be hoped that--after the recent setback, and after two or three years have passed--there will again be a favorable atmosphere for the development of the collectivization movement."¹⁵³ The official maintenance of the theory of collectivization and of a still considerable socialized sector of agriculture provides the framework for the suppression of private farming whenever the situation permits. As a result of increased prices paid by the state for livestock, notably pigs, the farmers were reported at the beginning of January 1957 as being better off than they had been for years; but at the same time, the state was deducting back taxes from the purchase price of the animals and the farmers were having a difficult time finding consumers' goods to buy with their money.¹⁵⁴ Among the reported manifestations of strictures upon the farmers since the revolt are the exorbitant charges levied for cattle taken out of the collectives and the concentrated campaign by the regime to collect taxes and tax arrears.¹⁵⁵ Although

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"full freedom of peasant production and marketing" has been promised by the regime, a new system of state contractual bulk-buying at "free state prices" limits the freedom somewhat.¹⁵⁶ The true meaning of the new privilege of the peasants of selling their bread grain to private purchasers (doubtlessly at prices higher than paid by the state) was brought in question by Radio Budapest on 22 June 1957, when it urged peasants as a civic obligation to sell their surplus grain to state buying agencies.¹⁵⁷

The long-term survival of peasant gains, therefore, is by no means taken for granted, and many in Hungary are dubious that the Kadar regime will permit such an "anti-socialist" situation to remain once its power is fully consolidated and agricultural production has reached a higher level. Even in the unlikely case that the peasants will be allowed to retain indefinitely some measure of control over their own production activities the Communist way of life is so alien to their cultural, social, and religious traditions that they will continue to remain the most uniformly anti-Communist element of the population.

As for actual participation in guerilla units in event of war, the Hungarian peasants, who, like all peasants are not easily separated from their land, and who, unlike the peasantry of the more mountainous regions of Eastern Europe, have no particular tradition of violence, may not prove to be as easily stirred to action or as amenable to training in irregular warfare as members of the urban society. What are more important factors, however, in their slow response are their relative lack of closely-knit organizations and of effective political leadership, their dispersion among relatively small communities, and, hence, their inability to generate a "strength-in-numbers" atmosphere which is frequently the medium of revolution. In Hungary the peasantry, especially in Transdanubia, is mostly Catholic and takes a large measure of their leadership from their priests, whose counsel is often that of caution but whose anti-Communism is the stoutest in the nation. In the event of war, therefore, outside agencies seeking to enlist the aid of the

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peasantry will find the local priest an indispensable contact. Trustworthiness and intimate knowledge of the countryside and of remote regions are qualities of the Hungarian peasant which, coupled with what can be expected to be a rather general willingness in the long run to support and participate in indigenous guerilla activities, make this group appear of great potential value to Special Forces operations. Their actual value would be increased considerably if the members of this group are, in individual operations, strengthened by the moral and tangible support of other, especially urban, segments of the population.

c. Industrial Workers

Since World War II the industrial labor force of Hungary has increased from about 320,000 (1939) to about 1,600,000 (1956).¹⁵⁸ The latter figure includes workers in factories, mines, building construction, and transportation. Except for skilled workers, the industrial class in pre-Communist Hungary represented an economically and socially depressed class. Union activity was hampered by police pressure and cheap seasonal labor from the villages tended to keep industrial wages low.¹⁵⁹ The post-war buildup of the industrial force necessitated by the ambitious industrial expansion plans of the Communist regime was accomplished to a large extent by the recruitment, often forcibly undertaken, from among the non-industrial sectors of the population, notably the peasantry. In accordance with the political and social doctrines of Marxism, the workers as a class were elevated to a position of supremacy in the social structure of the nation; but as individuals their standards of living and working conditions were if anything inferior to those prevailing in the pre-war period,¹⁶⁰ and their efforts to achieve some voice in the management of industry and some measure of actual control of their trade unions were largely futile. The relaxation of controls which ensued after Stalin's death and Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin prompted the leaders of the working class to formulate their grievances and agitate for their alleviation. In late October 1956 the workers were among the first to join the students in publishing demands upon the regime.

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During the revolt the workers were not only the backbone of the insurgents' fighting force once the battle was joined but, also, organized in their Workers' Councils, equally important with the over-all territorial Revolutionary Committees in the political work of the uprising. Moreover, they emerged from the revolution as the organs of representation which most enjoyed the confidence of the whole people and the demands they presented to the Kadar government reflected this nation-wide responsibility. The strength of the workers and, hence, the recognition accorded their revolutionary councils by the Kadar government derived from their key role in the economy and the advanced state of their organizations. The experience gained in their previous organizational activity encouraged by the Communists for both practical and ideological reasons qualified them to deal with the Kadar government on its own grounds. The government was forced to negotiate with the Councils because they constituted the only force capable of bringing about the resumption of work.

In the weeks following the Soviet suppression of the revolution, the Councils sought to fortify their position as masters of the factories by taking over managerial functions in relation to the organization of production as well as the direction of work itself, but as the regime consolidated itself through the instrumentality of Soviet troops, police terror, and arrests of leading revolutionaries, the power of the Workers' Councils was gradually abridged. Strikes and other outbursts of disorder were matched by ever-increasing severity on the part of the regime. A decree of 21 November provided that the Councils should play an economic role as organs of "worker self-management" but prohibited them from taking over functions performed by factory directors or Party-controlled trade union committees. The seriousness of this setback to the aspirations of the workers which this development entailed was signified by their call for a 48-hour strike on the following day.

The question of the degree of workers' control in the management of the economy has emerged from the satellite upheavals of 1956 as one of the

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most controversial issues in the Communist world. The demand on the part of the workers for a substantive measure of control, independent of Party supervision, provides a fresh illustration of the inherent contradiction in the concept of "one-Party democracy." Even the Gomulka regime in Poland, which undertook an apparently bona fide experiment in limited democracy and economic decentralization, had not after almost a full year been able to give the workers any real voice in management. It is unlikely that the Kadar regime is either willing or able to devise a method of worker control.

In protest against further arrests of leaders of the Workers' Councils and the outlawing of the Budapest Central Workers' Council, which had become spokesman for the entire country, and all Councils above the factory level, a general strike was initiated on December 12. Gradually, however, the workers were faced with the realization of the futility of their efforts and of the need to return to work.

Another important demand which Kadar rebuffed was the abolition of Party organs within the factories--a measure which the Councils had enforced during the revolution. Shortly after the accession of the Kadar government Party cells were once more forcibly insinuated into the factories but since the workers could not be compelled to join the Party, Party membership grew very slowly and the Hungarian Press reported that there was no proper contact between Party officials and the workers.¹⁶¹ The reluctance of workers to join the Party prevailed in the face of widespread dismissals as part of the rationalization drive throughout the economy and in spite of the apparent application of a political reliability standard in deciding who would be retained.¹⁶²

For a short while after the accession of the Kadar government spokesmen for the National Council of Free Trade Unions (formerly the National Council of Trade Unions) continued to reflect some of the ideas adopted during the revolution, such as the independence of the trade unions from the government and Party and the substantive role of the Workers' Councils in the management of enterprise. However, with the passing months they

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began to veer to the Kadar line, declaring the primacy of the trade unions over the Workers' Councils and finally condemning the October Revolution.¹⁶³

In January 1957 it was announced that the directors of enterprises were to be appointed by the state and to be personally responsible for the economic management of the factories.¹⁶⁴ On January 13, 1957, strikes and every effective form of opposition were made liable to punishment by death.¹⁶⁵ On January 28 Kadar guaranteed the "autonomy" of trade unions but insisted that they could not be independent of the Party.¹⁶⁶ The whittling-away of their powers and the increased police and Party activity among them during the first part of 1957 prompted a number of the Workers' Councils to resign and resulted further in the flare-up of new demonstrations and in an increasing severity of punishment for strike activities.¹⁶⁷ By May 1957 the campaign to entrench the Party cells within the factories was well underway, and government representatives began to question the very usefulness of the Workers' Councils.¹⁶⁸ At the end of June 1957 a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry stated that the Workers' Councils formed during the uprising had been "dissolved voluntarily" in a majority of enterprises and that in others they existed "in name only." Where they still existed their role was no different from that of the trade unions.¹⁶⁹ (Communist trade unions are an arm of the state and perform no independent functions on behalf of the workers.)

The most significant aspect of the workers' conduct during and after the uprising was their complete lack of responsibility towards their vanguard role in the advancement and preservation of the proletarian dictatorship. When the first serious crisis in the public order developed, they turned their strength against the regime and quickly constituted the strongest fighting element of the insurgent forces. Through the articulate demands of their leaders and the rapid organization and effective functioning of their Revolutionary Councils, they enunciated, along with the students and the intelligentsia, the ideological basis of the national

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uprising. They showed a determination unprecedented in the Communist world to achieve in actual practice the rights and prerogatives of the working class which Marxist doctrine has historically proclaimed for them. Perhaps more important, in the immediate circumstance, than their political role--since the nation needed very little prompting as to its objectives--was the leading role of the workers in the actual fighting of the insurgent forces. Thus the workers whom the regime had counted on to perform the primary economic functions of the nation and to provide a strong measure of internal security through the instrumentality of factory guards, workers' militia, etc., became its most serious class liability. The Communist regime must reckon with the distinct likelihood that in the event of war this class, because of its occupation in the factories and mines and its residence in urban centers, will prove to be the most dangerous element in the whole country.

The attitude of the workers and their leading role in the short-lived guerilla warfare during the uprising constitute, therefore, important factors in Special Forces planning. In the event of war many industrial workers and other urban elements will take advantage of the defects in security controls to flee to the countryside and especially to the mountains and in this way become available to Special Forces units seeking to organize guerilla movements. Such a likelihood is enhanced by the small geographical area of Hungary and the close ties between the urban and rural populations resulting from the absorption of many rural youths into the industrial economy. The demands aired by the workers during the recent uprising and the allegiance to certain socialist principles and achievements which these demands reflect make it imperative, however, that any program of appeal to the working class to join resistance forces must imply no bias to the political and economic gains by the workers under the Communist regime, for many of these gains are credited by the workers to socialism rather than to the Moscow-dominated Communist regime.

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d. Youth

The post-Stalin process of liberalization which was set in motion in 1953 under the relatively enlightened regime of Imre Nagy was after a brief interlude of repression by Rakosi given its final momentum by the anti-Stalinist policies set forth by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The vanguard of criticism were the intellectuals, notably the Writers' Union, and, only slightly less important, the youth. During the late spring of 1956, young intellectuals, belonging to the League of Working Youth (DISZ), the Communist youth federation, established the Petofi Club. It became one of the primary springboards of the revolt.¹⁷⁰

Recognizing the temper of the students of the country, the DISZ made efforts to correct long-standing grievances, such as the discriminatory policy against middle-class youth in high school and college admissions, but the remedy was brought forward too late.¹⁷¹ Both high school and college students rejected the Party plans for an improved DISZ and pushed for its dissolution or, at least, total reorganization. Such proposals were voiced in October at meetings of the Petofi Club, and students at DISZ meetings drew up a program which in its specific content was limited to the academic field but which at the same time implied criticism of basic political tenets. Even the high school students, at a so-called "parliament" which opened on October 19th, drew up resolutions criticizing the educational policy of the regime.¹⁷²

The revolutionary developments in Poland towards the end of October evoked particularly great excitement among the students in Hungary and prompted demands for specific changes. On 19 October the Minister of Education had announced certain concessions, such as the discontinuation of compulsory Russian-language study. On 20 October the students of the university town of Szeged set up a League of Hungarian University and College Students Associations (MEFESZ). A meeting called for 22 October by the Executive Committee of DISZ at the Building Industry Technological

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University in Budapest in order to discuss strictly student demands and to head off the new organization quickly evolved into an open debate of the big political problems of the day, especially the question of Soviet occupation. Out of the meeting there emerged a sixteen-point program, which became the most influential document of the uprising. Efforts to have it broadcast on 23 October led to an altercation between the crowd in front of the Radio Building and members of the AVH, who set off the uprising by firing the first shots.¹⁷³

The Sixteen Points of the students included requests which appealed to the mass of the people. In addition to such broad demands as the withdrawal of Soviet troops, free elections, the punishment of the Rakosi clique, economic concessions to workers and peasants, and freedom of opinion and expression, the document made such specific requests as the elevation of Imre Nagy to government leadership, the punishment of Mihaly Farkas, former Minister of Defense and notorious terrorist, the investigation of the USSR's exploitation of Hungary's uranium deposits, the replacement of the Stalin monument in Budapest by a memorial to the freedom fighters of the 1848 revolution, the reintroduction of the old Kossuth coat-of-arms, and the expression of sympathy with the Polish national independence movement.¹⁷⁴

Thus the academic youth--children of the working class and products of a Communist education--played the leading part, together with the intelligentsia, in formulating the ideological basis of the uprising and in organizing the demonstrations that erupted into a revolt. This emphasis on youth was characteristic of the uprising throughout. They took their places in the various regional revolutionary councils and formed functional councils of their own. It was the younger generation, first the young workers, then the students and soldiers, who played the most prominent part in the fighting. While the largest part of the fighting force was apparently furnished by the workers, the participation of the students in the street-fighting of Budapest and in the guerilla bands which retreated to the mountains was of primary

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importance. The high percentages of youth among the revolutionary dead, as well as among the exiles, is ample testimony to their vanguard role.

After the uprising the various revolutionary councils of students and youth were quickly suppressed, although the Revolutionary Council of Hungarian Intellectuals in which the Petofi Club and the MEFESZ were represented continued until its dissolution to make representations in behalf of the whole country and to engage in fruitless discussions with the Kadar government.¹⁷⁵ As late as 6 January 1957 the League of Hungarian University and College Students (MEFESZ) at a meeting held in Budapest drafted a program which endorsed the "socialist order" but did not abandon the revolutionary ideas proclaimed by the students on 23 October. The police broke up the meeting and eight student leaders were reportedly arrested.¹⁷⁶ In February 1957 the Party established the League of Communist Youth (KISZ) to balance the influence of MEFESZ, to replace the old League of Working Youth (DISZ), and to win back both the academic and working youth to the Communist cause. It was apparent in the early months of 1957 that KISZ was making only slow headway in its membership buildup and that the revolutionary attitudes of the academic youth continued to disturb the regime. The government announced, upon the reopening of the University of Budapest in February 1957, that Marxist-Leninist education, as well as the teaching of Russian--would go on in the schools and that the universities would be closed again at the first sign of any disturbance.¹⁷⁷ The postponement of the reopening of the universities until the end of February was deemed the consequence of the strong resistance of the university students.¹⁷⁸ Kadar in his speech to the National Assembly on 11 May 1957 observed that the youth of the country were infected with too much idealism, their conduct and attitudes being attributable to an emotional and sentimental view of socialism and democracy.¹⁷⁹

The second Soviet intervention and the crushing of open rebellion did not destroy the revolutionary spirit of the youth. In late January

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1957 demonstrations occurred in schools all over Hungary. Some students appeared wearing cockades, such as had been carried by demonstrators in Budapest on the first day of the revolt.¹⁸⁰ In early February 1957 the Minister of Education complained that a number of students and professors were continuing their strike activities at the universities and a warning was issued that the universities would be closed if disturbances continued. At the same time the government disclosed that the homes of students of Budapest University had been searched and that large quantities of arms, ammunition, and "counter-revolutionary" literature had been seized.¹⁸¹ Of an estimated 17,000 persons reported to have been deported to the Soviet Union in the wake of the uprising--most of whom presumably have been returned--80 per cent were said to have been of student age.¹⁸² According to Kadar in a speech before the National Assembly on 11 May 1957 some 170,000 young people emigrated from the country. (As of April 30th, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the total number of refugees to Austria and Yugoslavia amounted to 193,216.)¹⁸³ On the whole there is abundant evidence that the rebellious attitudes and activities of the youth of Hungary will be one of the regime's most difficult problems for a long time to come.¹⁸⁴

The leading role played by the youth of Hungary in fomenting and executing the rebellion during October-November 1956 provided the world with specific insight into the mentality and resistance potential of the Communist-indoctrinated youth of Eastern Europe. In the first place the episode revealed beyond any question that the very segment of the population which had been exposed exclusively to the Communist way of life was the most important instrument in overthrowing it. Youth shared the ideological leadership with the intelligentsia but that the revolt was primarily an affair of the youth was everywhere recognized. The revolt also showed that the youth of the nation--students, workers, and soldiers--, in the event that Hungary becomes engaged in an international war, can be expected to be the most eager to fight the oppressor of their country. This conclusion seems to be valid

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in spite of the fact that many of the most daring freedom fighters among the younger generation have left Hungary or lost their lives during the uprising. In consideration of the stubborn post-revolt resistance of the youth who remained there is every indication that the vacuum will not long remain unfilled.

e. The "Intelligentsia" and Press

As in the other satellite countries of Eastern Europe in the slowly developing atmosphere of democratization after Stalin's death, the intelligentsia in Hungary along with the student class supplied the ideological ferment. In the broadest sense the intelligentsia includes teachers and other members of the professional class, scientists, and creative artists of all categories, but the most important segments from the standpoint of influencing the uprising of October-November 1956 have been the writers and journalists. With the accession of Imre Nagy in the summer of 1953 sharp criticism of Communist reality began to appear in print, particularly in the literary journals. In effect, though not in administration, the Party's press monopoly was broken. In the early spring of 1955 Rakosi ousted his rival from the Premiership, but conformity in cultural fields could not be enforced without the use of Stalinist terror, then officially rejected by the new Kremlin leaders. In fact the new stringent line provoked Rakosi's opponents to renewed daring and the intellectuals, many of them Party members, were in the forefront of the struggle.¹⁸⁵

The most important expression of the revolutionary aims behind the October-November 1956 uprising is to be found in the manifestoes of the intellectual groups, as well as those of the students.¹⁸⁶ The Proclamation of the Hungarian Writers' Union of 23 October called for an independent national policy based on the principles of socialism; international relations on the basis of equality (notably with the USSR); worker participation in factory management and the establishment of bona fide trade unions; abolition of forcible methods of collectivization and of

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forced deliveries to the state; the removal of the Rakosi clique from a position of influence in the state and, at the same time, vigilance against counter-revolutionary attempts and aspirations; and the institution of a free electoral system.¹⁸⁷ In other manifestoes and in a number of articles and memoranda the writers put forward their demands for artistic freedom.¹⁸⁸

After the suppression of the rebellion the Writers' Union played an important role in negotiations between the people and the government. In the circumstances this group and the even more important Workers' Councils tended to subordinate their own class interests to the national demands. The ability of the intellectuals to carry on passive resistance in an atmosphere of repression was in considerable measure due to their mastery of subtlety and innuendo.¹⁸⁹ The Revolutionary Council of Hungarian Intellectuals¹⁹⁰ issued, in late November, a manifesto signed by 110 leading personalities in the cultural life of Hungary identifying themselves with the cause of the revolutionists, while at the same time taking a stand against the restoration of the pre-Communist social order. After this organization was dissolved the Writers' Union carried on, and many writers were arrested as the weeks passed. Finally on 21 April, 1957, the Writers' Union was dissolved. Shortly before the Minister of Agriculture had said in a speech that the majority of Hungarian writers had chosen the path of treason.

In retrospect, it was the press which during the revolutionary period between October 23 and November 4 supplied the direction, prodding, and inspiration which Imre Nagy failed to give. During this period took place the transformation of even the chief Party paper *Szabad Nep* into an official daily of the Nagy government, the ouster of Rakosi Stalinists from editorial staffs in established papers, and the dedication of scores of Hungary's best writers, including many Communists, to the national revolutionary cause.¹⁹¹ After 4 November 1956 the newspapers born in the revolt were immediately suppressed; yet the status quo ante could not be reimposed nor has it been reimposed up to the cut-off date of this report. The change

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in the press is largely one of tone and emphasis rather than of ideology--for freedom of political discussion is once more impossible. In general the press as of mid-1957 is in a transitional stage; it has little in common with the product of the revolutionary interlude, but neither is it comparable to journalism of the Rakosi era. Those writers who were at the center of the vortex are now dead, abroad, in prison, or engaged in an undeclared literary strike.

Although at the beginning of June 1957 Hungary was still experiencing seemingly a "liberalization" of culture amid stern repression in other spheres, a cutback in intellectual freedom was presaged at that time by the enthusiastic response in Parliament to a speech by a university lecturer calling for the re-establishment of rigid Communist control over Hungarian education, art, and science.¹⁹² The probability of stringent measures was further substantiated by the announcement on 4 August 1957 made by the Minister of Culture, Gyula Kallai, of an all-out campaign to break the intellectual resistance against the regime. According to the broadcast of the announcement, "new aggressions" by certain intellectual groups have forced the government to take several hard administrative measures against some of the leading reactionaries, including artists and writers. Two days previously the Hungarian news agency M.T.I. reported the replacement of six top leaders in Hungarian university life, including the rector of Budapest Technical University, as well as the heads of other universities in the capital and in the cities of Pecs and Debrecen.¹⁹³

The value of the service of the intellectuals to the people of Hungary in sparking revolutionary ideas is incalculable and their attack upon the Party was one of the most important setbacks suffered by the regime and by the whole Communist system. From the standpoint of resistance potential, the writers, journalists, teachers, artists, scientists, and other elements of the intelligentsia have a less direct bearing upon the actual operations of Special Forces than that of most

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other segments of society. The importance of the intelligentsia is to be found in the influence they exert upon the masses through propaganda media. Since intellectuals are moulders of opinion and tend to develop their attitudes more autonomously than other classes, it is difficult to formulate any generalization about their prospective reaction to appeals for assistance or participation in actual resistance activities. Their readiness to criticize the excesses of Stalinist rule in Hungary once the first strains of liberalization appeared under the New Course leadership of Imre Nagy and their refusal to back down from their critical positions even after Rakosi regained control are clear indications of their basic dissatisfaction with Soviet-imposed Communism and of their willingness and ability to express their attitudes even at considerable personal risk. Their forthright presentation of the national grievances and their cardinal role in the ideological direction of the uprising left no doubt that a significant segment of the intelligentsia will, in the event of a future conflict, identify themselves with the national interests of Hungary and will provide leadership in many phases of resistance against the Soviet Union and a Soviet-oriented Hungarian regime. Their comparatively wide knowledge of events, personalities, and attitudes on a national as well as a local basis could prove to be highly useful assets to Special Forces operating on Hungarian soil. The group as a whole has not been able to avoid involvement with the Communist regime--it is in fact largely a post-World War II Communist-created class--and many of its members were forced to give at least nominal assent to the existing order, if only to gain a livelihood. As the revolutionary manifestoes clearly indicated, many of them--probably a greater proportion than in other classes--have become convinced of the desirability of some sort of a socialistic society in Hungary. While refuting Soviet Communism as it is decreed from Moscow, they may prefer their own brand of Hungarian Socialism to the social and economic systems of the West. The utilization of members of this group within the limited framework of Special Forces planning and operations can,

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therefore, be effected only on an individual basis and with consideration for the complex features of national pride and sensitivity. If the support of members of the intelligentsia could be gained, especially on the local level, they could prove valuable in promoting cooperation with Special Forces among the indigenous population and in prompting the latter to undertake resistance activities of its own.

f. The Communist Party

The history of the Communist Party in Hungary during the post-Stalin period is characterized by intra-Party strife and instability. Party morale in the weeks prior to the uprising was at a low ebb. In response to orders from high Party echelons, reports were submitted by district organizations after they had debated recent Party resolutions concerning policy changes in the direction of liberalization. The Party presidium was shocked by the results. The reports showed general dissatisfaction with the light treatment accorded such Party leaders as Mihaly Farkas, former Minister of Defense, who were charged with criminal actions, with the "window-dressing" quality of the democratization process, and with the application of amnesty and rehabilitation to only those purged Party members who could be of propaganda value to the regime. The reports identified the main errors of the old regime as irresponsibility and impunity, insincerity in both political and economic affairs, and the habit of lying. These reports were said to have convinced the Party leaders that there were only two ways to re-establish Party unity--either to break with the past through a widespread and radical reform of such tactics or to revert to the Stalinist system of fear and terror.¹⁹⁴

One of the most noteworthy casualties of the uprising of October-November 1956 was the Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party itself, which was dissolved on 28 October. The depth of the Party's trouble in its relationship to the nation was best illustrated by the demands of the Workers' Councils that no Party organization would again be authorized

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in the factories.¹⁹⁵ Communist leaders who set about reforming it as the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party formed a Preparation Committee for this purpose but all of these with the exception of Kadar have been considered enemies of the state following the second Soviet intervention. Because of the defection of many Party members during the uprising, Kadar was hard-pressed to reassemble the rank-and-file of the Party to deploy it in key positions. Functionaries who had not sided with the revolution were reinstated and former members of the AVH were utilized to fill many vacancies, but so many of the former officials had broken away during the uprising that many essential posts had to remain vacant. In the industrial town of Dunapentele, for example, with the exception of the AVH and one or two Army officers, everyone had sided with the uprising. Evidence indicates that Borsod County (Miskolc area) was administered independently up to January 1957 with few, if any, ties with the central government.¹⁹⁶

The hopes of the revolutionaries that a readjustment of the political power situation of Hungary would occur as a result of the clear manifestation during the uprising of the popular antagonism against one-party control were dispelled by the comprehensive manifesto of the Kadar government's aims and principles issued on January 6, 1957. The pronouncement was, in effect, a constitutional document. Seeming concessions to the revolution included the condemnation of the Stalinist methods employed by Matyas Rakosi and Erno Gero (pre-revolutionary heads of the Communist Party), the abolition of exaggerated centralism in economic affairs, and the promise of implementation of socialism in Hungary according to the specific needs of the country. But the substantially unreconstructed concept of Communist Party monopoly of political affairs was signalled by the condemnation of petty bourgeois masking as Marxists, by the designation of the party of the working class--the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party--as the leading force in the state, and by the identification of the Peoples Front under the direction of the Party as the organ of unification of all democratic factors. In short, the Kadar regime dismissed as unacceptable the theory of the revolutionary spokesmen

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that a socialist state could be developed through the instrumentality of a multi-party system. The revolution and all its concepts were thus summarily outlawed and the Communist Party which had all but disappeared during the revolution as a vital political force, was revived.

The circumstances and difficulties attending the rebuilding of the Party during the first months after the suppression of the uprising hold out few prospects for real Party unity in the near future. Kadar experienced great difficulty in enlisting a new Party hierarchy. Many top Communists snubbed him; he gained some support from collaborationists among former non-Communist leaders, notably Istvan Dobi and Erno Mihalyfi, formerly of the Smallholders Party, and Sandor Ronai and Gyorgy Marosan, formerly of the Social Democratic Party.¹⁹⁷ The recruitment of fellow-travellers and crypto-Communists was no doubt deemed advantageous in that it afforded some basis for presenting a "popular front."¹⁹⁸ Another device for building up membership was the "promise" that Party members would not be dismissed from their jobs in the course of the "rationalization" drive throughout the economy.¹⁹⁹ Although Kadar in February 1957 read out of the Party "forever"²⁰⁰ former Premier Imre Nagy and his followers, as well as Matyas Rakosi and Erno Gero and some of their Stalinist disciples, factions in the Party soon became painfully evident. To many Kadar seemed to be in the same middle position, occupied by Gomulka in Poland, between Stalinists and revisionists. By April many former leading Stalinists were reported back in Budapest and many were getting back their old jobs.²⁰¹ In May the Party's weakness and lack of confidence was signified by the postponement for two years of the parliamentary election due in 1956.²⁰² As the time approached for the opening in late June of the first congress of the post-revolt Communist Party, the struggle for power in the top levels of the Party became more evident. Kadar lashed out against both the revisionists and Stalinists in attempts to seal Party unity. Marosan, a Minister of State, complained that the Party was being undermined by intrigue and personal

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quarrels; he insisted that the fight was not really over principles but over jobs.²⁰³ This observation puts the finger on one of the great weaknesses of the reconstituted Party as well as of the pre-revolt Party, namely opportunism. The suggestion is probably true that a considerable proportion of the new Party members have joined for pecuniary reasons and could not be relied upon by the government in an emergency.²⁰⁴ The Stalinists were attacked for their scheming to regain positions of power, whereas the revisionists were accused of attempting to perpetuate some of the ideas that led to the uprising.²⁰⁵ Setting the tone for the Party Congress of 27-29 June 1957, the main Party organ, *Nepszabadsag*, called for the "complete liquidation of revisionist, class-betraying, anti-Party opinions."²⁰⁶

Noting that the Party had enlisted only 350,000 members (as compared to the pre-revolt membership of 800,000), Kadar stressed at the congress the necessity of more intensive recruitment among the country's 1,900,000 trade union members. Of the total Party membership at that time 57.9 per cent were workers, 16.7 per cent peasants, 6.9 per cent intellectuals, and the remainder other categories. Most of the members--85.2 per cent--had been in the pre-revolt Party.²⁰⁷ If the January 1957 trend in the class composition of the Party has prevailed,²⁰⁸ a large portion of the "workers" referred to above may have been "white collar" employees. In March 1957 the regime organ *Szegedi Néplap* admitted that although 65 per cent of Party members in Szeged were of worker or peasant origin, only 25 to 27 per cent of the membership were factory workers and that the relatively high percentage of white-collar workers, some of whom were "careerists," was unsound. This disproportion indicated a lack of real revolutionary spirit.²⁰⁹ As of mid-1957, the hard core, or elite, of the Party was estimated by one source to number about 15,000 persons.²¹⁰

The revolt demonstrated that the Communist Party of Hungary had no significant mass base whatsoever. At best the rank-and-file of the membership proved to be Communists of a nationalist persuasion but inimical to Soviet control and hence to the over-all aims of the Communist world

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conspiracy. Many Party members threw in their lot with the Revolutionary Councils and were often maintained by the latter in positions of importance; many were distrusted and were ousted from their positions. But no matter what their fate Communist Party members as a whole did not resist the insurgents and did not assist the Soviets in their repressive actions. It is apparent that many Communists sympathized with the insurgents without joining their fight. Thus, according to one source, the Communist leaders in Szombathely would have joined the freedom fighters had they not been afraid of being liquidated in the event of the victory of the insurgents.²¹¹

Underlying the phenomenon of Party breakdown there appeared to be, among other causes, a serious disillusionment among the rank-and-file with the immoral conduct of Party and government affairs which had characterized the regime's ten-year tenure of power. That Communist Party members should reveal such a sensitivity about moral values is a phenomenon of considerable significance to any resistance potential estimate.

At the cut-off date of this report, the new Party was still in the throes of organizing its leadership and building up its membership. Any assessment of the status of factionalism within the Party must be largely conjectural. Nevertheless, the uprising revealed the existence of leaders who favored a nationalist road to socialism; the failure of the revolution, however, has probably relegated them as a group into the background. Some of them may have been retained in high positions--Kadar himself showed the makings of a nationalist--but they cannot for the present air their opinions within the Party or the country. With the eventual relaxation of the Soviet occupation and the stabilization of the country as a whole, leaders with nationalist tendencies may find it feasible to press their objectives once more. At present it is more likely that the revisionism deplored by the Kadar regime is being manifested at the lower levels of the Party but especially by elements outside the Party. The Stalinists or "Rakosists" in the Party are not as roundly condemned as the revisionists,²¹² and since the liquidation of the uprising was actually a

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Stalinist solution, since the Stalinists can be trusted to do the job for Moscow, and since Kadar must get experienced support where he can, their prospects for the immediate future are brighter than those of the nationalists. The activity of the Stalinists, probably even at the top level of the hierarchy, seems to be signified by the feverish jockeying for positions which Kadar has been deploring. If the struggle for power gets under full way, Kadar and his collaborators, whose Party strength is an unknown quantity, may find themselves not only out of power but out of contention for it.

The scrambling for jobs has provided empirical evidence of the rank opportunism which has long been considered by many outside observers as a fundamental and potentially fatal flaw of political groups governing without legitimate opposition. This phenomenon documents the gradual but convincing indications coming to light since the death of Stalin that the Communist system is devoid of any real strength based on the fidelity of its Party members and that it is racked with personal intrigues for power, position, and privilege. Kadar's admission of this problem so soon in the life of the new Party seems to dispel any hope that it could be built into an elite membership that would be motivated by loyalty and devotion to the Party for its own sake.

So far the Party membership has achieved only a very weak representation among the workers and the youth, the classes on which it traditionally depends for its mass base, and its strength among the peasants is probably very low. As time goes on, the harsh exigencies of making a livelihood in a Communist-favored economy will probably induce many, including those former Communists who are still holding out, to take out membership once more and the numerical strength of the Party may well reach its pre-revolt level. It is possible that the new regime in Hungary will utilize the lessons of the revolt to screen its members, particularly its cadres, more carefully or at least to assign key functions with greater care than in the past.²¹³ In the immediate future, however, it is apparent that opportunists and even known participants in the uprising will be found in the Party ranks.

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After the spectacle of a complete and overnight breakup of the Party under the tension of the rebellion, it seems highly unlikely that the rank-and-file Party members can be counted on in the event of war to support a Soviet-oriented regime. This generalization, however, is made at a very early stage in the reconstitution of the Party and future developments must be consulted to ascertain the specific characteristics and composition of its membership. It must be assumed, in any event, that many Communists, especially in the early stages of a war, will act loyally to the Party and the state, and hence Special Forces operating in Hungary should avoid indiscriminate contact with Party members until such time as their individual attitudes can be evaluated. As a rule the true character of Communists is well known to the population of the community in which they reside. The acceptance by the insurgents during the rebellion of many Party members into the Revolutionary Councils is a case in point. Because of their special knowledgeability of civic affairs the utilization of individual, carefully screened Party members who would be acceptable to their countrymen will be of high value for Special Forces purposes. The apparent fear on the part of some Communists during the uprising that they would be liquidated if the revolution were victorious and, hence, their failure to join the insurgents, points up the necessity of assurances that indiscriminate punishment will not be meted out to Communists in the event of the overthrow of the Communist regime.

g. Non-Communist Parties

Aside from the quick and universal formation of the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils at the beginning of the uprising, the strong survival of political factionalism among the people, even after ten years of enforced standardization and indoctrination, was evidenced by the rebirth and inclusion in the revolutionary governments of the historic political parties and the establishment of numerous minor parties and specialized organizations.²¹⁴ The three major non-Communist

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parties, namely the Independent Smallholders, the Petofi (formerly the National Peasants) Party, and the Social Democrats, had in the elections of 1945 won 245, 69, and 23 seats respectively of a total of 409, with the Communists gaining 70. During their short-lived re-emergence these parties quickly built up their following once more. By 3 November 1956 these parties had groups reconstituted in most of the 23 districts of Budapest, as well as in cities in the various provinces of Hungary. Other smaller parties were re-established, i.e., the Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Peoples' Party, and the Hungarian Independent Party. In addition, the Hungarian Revolutionary Youth Party was established and the existence of the Hungarian Conservative Party, which functioned "for ten years in illegality" was announced.

Although all the major parties avowed to champion the real gains made under the Communist regime and disavowed any return to the "era of aristocrats, bankers, capitalists, and estate-owners," they expressed views that augured the establishment of a democratic system of government and a national re-espousal of Western values. Spokesmen for the Smallholders insisted on the freedom for the peasants to be private landowners or to join cooperatives. Even during the short period of revival two political lines within this party seemed to be developing: a conservative group oriented around pre-World War II principles and a progressive group willing to implement post-World War II political developments.²¹⁵ During its short-lived revival the Petofi Party, which had taken shape prior to World War II around a group of young intellectuals espousing socialist principles and representing the interests of the agricultural laborers, stressed the right of private property and of free production and marketing, while at the same time pointing out the necessity for peasant cooperatives. The revived and re-named party drew heavily on the intelligentsia for its leadership.²¹⁶ The specific mention by these two peasant parties as well as by a re-established minor party, the Christian Democratic Party, of the need to revive Christian morality and institutions signifies the strong survival of

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traditional values and of the influence of the Christian churches as realistic factors to be reckoned with in assessing the resistance potential of the Hungarian people. The Social Democratic Party, which traditionally has drawn its strength from among the working class, branded as a lie the claim that the Communist regime had governed since 1949 in the name of the workers and advocated strongly during its short revival the establishment of democratic socialist practice in Hungary.

The interlude of freedom turned the spotlight on Party leaders who had sold out to the Communists after World War II. For example, the left-wing Social Democratic leaders who had supported "fusion" with the Communists were refused admittance to the party during its short period of revival.

Thus it is evident from the swift re-formation of the non-Communist parties that the ten years of Communist oppression and Marxist indoctrination had not dispelled the considerable interest of the Hungarian people in the operation of a true party system. If anything, it may be said the Communist experience had only broadened the popular interest in politics.

The political parties, having no such lever as that of the Workers' Councils, i.e., control over the economy of the nation, were treated more summarily by Kadar in early post-revolt negotiations concerning the possibility of a coalition government. Kadar kept talking about the incorporation into the government of those parties which agreed to work according to socialist principles but, despite agreement of the non-Communist parties on this point and their averred recognition of the Communist Party as an indispensable element of political life, nothing came of it. On 8 December the Hungarian Socialist Workers (Communist) Party adopted a resolution making it clear that it had no intention of sharing power with any other party and reaffirming the merger of the Communist and Social Democratic parties in 1948 as a basis of present policy.²¹⁷ At the beginning of 1957 Kadar continued to pose the

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possibility of the inclusion of two of the non-Communist parties in the government but indicated that the Social Democratic Party would be liquidated because there was no need for it in Hungary (i.e., it competed with the Communist Party for the workers' allegiance). Kadar's willingness to negotiate with the non-Communist parties was apparently only a delaying tactic, approved by the Soviet occupation authorities and prompted by the desirability of a gradual weakening of the revolutionary opposition while the regime regained its balance.

At the beginning of August 1957 the Kadar regime arrested 12 leaders of certain right-wing parties that came to the fore during the uprising. The parties involved were identified as the Hungarian Freedom Party, the Christian Hungarian Party, the Christian Front, the Hungarian Democratic Union, and the Democratic People's Party.²¹⁸ It is difficult to assess the true significance of these arrests, since they followed in the immediate wake of a roundup by the Kadar regime of a large number of enemies of the state, designed apparently largely for propaganda purposes and as a precautionary measure. However, the movement of the regime against these right-wing groups throws light upon the strong survival of traditional political attitudes in Hungary and the deep concern of the regime about their potential influence.

The rapid revival of the non-Communist parties is one of the most significant factors of resistance potential revealed by the Hungarian uprising. Prior to this, the suppression of these parties and the persecution of their leaders were generally deemed to have practically destroyed their vitality and public support. From the standpoint of Special Forces planning, it is now apparent that non-Communist party leaders, in the event of a crisis in the present totalitarian system, will recapture a considerable measure of their former authority and influence at both the national and local levels. In the advanced state of war, especially, when the nature and course of its conduct will be more and more affected by expectations of liberation and political readjustments, Special Forces seeking to enlist the assistance of

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the indigenous population would be greatly aided if they would possess reliable intelligence on the political problems of the areas where they operate. The dissatisfaction of large elements of the population of Eastern Europe with the handling of the political aspects of guerilla warfare in their areas during World War II strengthens the likelihood that their willingness to fight in a future war will depend upon a clear understanding of who the enemy is and upon assurances of non-interference in their post-war political affairs. The uprising showed that the Social Democrats and the peasant parties--the Smallholders and the National Peasants (Petofi)--all command significant popular following in Hungary. At the same time the organization of a number of parties which stressed the importance of a specifically Christian political philosophy indicated the strong survival of sentiment in favor of conservatism and tradition. While the clear-cut opposition against Communism of the major peasant party and of the conservative parties represents a massive and relatively uncomplicated resistance potential factor, it is apparent that the Social Democrats, despite their historic susceptibility to Communist coalitional overtures, may be looked upon by the regime as its most dangerous party opponent, since its strength, like that of the Communists, is largely oriented around the working class. The predominant participation of the workers in the actual fighting of the uprising and the expressed interest of all the major parties in preserving many post-World War II socialistic achievements, necessitate a careful appreciation in Special Forces planning of the key role that the Social Democratic forces will play in the fostering of resistance and in any future political settlement.

h. Church and State

The strong religious allegiances of the population of Hungary account for the fact that the churches play a significant part in the country's resistance history and rank high as a positive resistance potential factor. The Roman Catholic Church is the most important, but the Protestant churches represent a sizeable minority. The 1940 statistics

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concerning the religious denominations--which must be used since no comparable post-World War II figures have been published--show a picture of their relative strengths which is still reasonably accurate.²¹⁹

Denomination	Number of Adherents	Per cent of Total Population
Roman Catholic	6,120,000	65.6
Greek Catholic (Uniate)	233,672	2.5
Reformed (Calvinist)	1,935,000	20.8
Evangelical (Lutheran)	557,000	6.0
Greek Orthodox	38,300	0.4
Baptists	17,917	0.2
Jews	400,380	4.3
Unitarians	8,465	0.1
Others	5,515	0.1

In the geographical distribution of denominations in Hungary the most important characteristic is that the greatest concentration of Roman Catholics is in Western Hungary and that of the Protestants in Eastern Hungary. The Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church has one diocese in Hungary whose center is Hajdudorog in northeast Hungary.²²⁰ Small numbers of Greek Orthodox are concentrated near the Hungarian-Rumanian border.²²¹ As a result of the decimation of their ranks during World War II, the total Jewish population is only about half of its pre-war total. The greatest concentration of Jews is in Budapest, with insignificant numbers in other cities.²²² The center of the Reformed (Calvinist) Church is Debrecen.²²³ According to one report Bekescsaba on the Rumanian frontier is the center of the Evangelical Church.²²⁴

Available information is inadequate to present a more accurate picture of the regional distribution of the various religious groups in Hungary. In addition to the centers of concentration noted above, members of some of the religious groups, especially of the Catholic and Protestant, will be found elsewhere in the country. This is particularly true of Catholics, who constitute approximately 65 per cent of the population. Protestants, who are concentrated in the east, are at the same time to be found in the western part of the country, e.g., Evangelicals in the counties of Pest, Fejer, Komarom, Vas, and Veszprem²²⁵ and Calvinists in Nagykanizsa.²²⁶

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Beginning in 1948 the churches of Hungary were subjected to persecution through measures commonly used by Communist regimes everywhere. These measures included the nationalization without compensation of larger landed properties; the confiscation of church schools and the virtual abolition of religious instruction in the schools; the dissolution of a large number of national and local charitable, cultural, and economic associations under religious auspices; the abolition of many ecclesiastical holidays; the forcible extraction from the clergy of an oath of loyalty to the government; the disbandment of Roman Catholic religious orders; the subjection of appointments of bishops and prelates to government approval with retroactive effect; the establishment of a crypto-Communist "Movement of Peace Priests" within the Roman Catholic Church; and the abolition of the exemption of clergymen and seminarians from military service.²²⁷ In addition to these measures, which provided the "legal" framework for the destruction of the churches, anti-religious propaganda, intense police terrorism, brutal treatment of the clergy, and discrimination against the steadfast among the laity were employed by the regime to break the religious spirit and traditions of the people.²²⁸

Despite the struggle put up by the religious and lay officials of the Protestant churches, notably Bishop Laszlo Ravasz of the Reformed (Calvinist) Church and Bishop Lajos Ordas of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, these religious bodies, together with the Unitarian Church, capitulated rather easily to the regime's demands and had signed agreements with the state by the end of 1948.²²⁹ The arrest, conviction, and subsequent detention of Cardinal Mindszenty, the Primate of the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary, which, because of its ideological and numerical strength, was the primary target of the regime's anti-religious campaign, not only failed to demoralize the forces of religion but created a symbol which strengthened all segments of national opposition. It was not until mid-1950, after almost two additional years of fierce struggle that an agreement, much more severe than that extracted from the Protestant churches,

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was concluded with the Roman Catholic Bench of Bishops and signed by Archbishop Jozsef Groesz, acting Primate during the detention of Cardinal Mindszenty. The real intentions of the regime were signified by its dissolution of the Catholic religious orders a few days after the conclusion of the agreement; the continued resistance of the Church was signified by Archbishop Groesz's arrest barely ten months later.²³⁰ The failure of the regime was subsequently signified by the limited success of the "patriotic priest" movement, the toning down of the campaign against the Church during the "New Course" period (1953-1954) under the government leadership of Imre Nagy, further easements in favor of the Church in 1956 after a new period (1955) of intensified persecution under the leadership of Matyas Rakosi, and finally the popular acclaim accorded during the uprising of October-November 1956 to the persecuted leading Church dignitaries, notably to Cardinal Mindszenty.

The efforts of the people during the uprising of October-November 1956 to restore the leading churchmen in Hungary signified the failure of the regime to undermine their reputation or the principles of hierarchical succession. Cardinal Mindszenty was released from detention by the insurgents and restored to his see, but a few days later at the beginning of the second Soviet intervention he sought sanctuary in the United States Legation in Budapest. Bishop Lajos Ordass, Primate of the Evangelical Church, was, on 6 October 1956, cleared by the Supreme Court of Hungary of the charges for which he was convicted in 1948 and was fully reinstated in his ecclesiastical position during the uprising, although he subsequently disclaimed having taken any part in it.²³¹ Bishop Laszlo Ravasz was reported to have become editor-in-chief of a Reformed (Calvinist) weekly during the revolt.²³² No other information about him is available but it is possible that he was restored to the leadership of the Reformed Church and, like the restored head of the Evangelical Church, has so far retained his post under the Kadar regime.

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Details are lacking about the role during the revolt of the Catholic clergy. The material so far available does not reveal that the clergy assumed prominent positions in the leadership organs of the revolution. To some extent this apparent quiescence of the clergy may be ascribed to the fact that the peasantry, among whom they wield the preponderance of their influence, did not become involved in the ten-day rebellion to the same extent as the urban classes. On the other hand, the repression campaign of the Kadar regime, which suddenly increased in intensity during July and August 1957, suggests the possibility that the clergy may have played a larger, if relatively inconspicuous, role than presently known. A few reports of arrests of local priests after the revolt also indicate this possibility.²³³

Even though the specific role of the clergy in the various regions of the uprising in Hungary cannot be determined at this time, the continued influence of the Catholic Church in Hungary and the importance of Cardinal Mindszenty as a national symbol of opposition to Communism were amply demonstrated. His release from detention had been one of the specific demands in some of the revolutionary manifestoes and his return during the uprising was acclaimed by the whole nation. The possibility that Mindszenty might even play an active political role was evidenced by the demand of Zoltan Tidly, head of the Smallholders Party, that he be included in the new government as the only man who could unite the country politically,²³⁴ and by the Cardinal's own demurrer that he would make no decision about his political role until he had had time to inform himself of the situation.²³⁵ He did speak out strongly in favor of the revolution, calling upon the United Nations to save Hungary²³⁶ and branding the Kadar government as a Soviet imposition.²³⁷ In a speech made during the uprising he called for the recognition of the right of "private ownership" but only to the extent that it is "rightly and justly limited by social interests,"²³⁷ and at the time of the second Soviet intervention he denied that the fight for freedom had been aimed

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at the restoration of the pre-war political system.²³⁹ The Kadar regime has subsequently singled him out more than any other person as the provocateur of the bloody revolt, alleging that he advocated a return to the old economic system of landed estates and private industrial ownership, that the "Northyite" leaders of the counter-revolutionary forces wanted to thrust him into prominence as a man above parties, and that such counter-revolutionary groups as the Catholic People's Party, the Democratic People's Party, the Sacred Heart of Jesus Association, and the Christian Youth Party were projections of his personality and influence.²⁴⁰ Advertisements of the Hungarian government's "White Book" on the revolution displayed a portrait of the Cardinal, suggesting his prime responsibility for the episode.²⁴¹

The January 6, 1957, manifesto of the Kadar government, while guaranteeing freedom to the churches and religious instruction in the schools, made it clear that they were not to oppose the principles of the one-Party state.²⁴² A decree of 23 March 1957 stated that while religious instruction would be permitted during limited sessions in the schools, the full vigor of the law would be applied against those who tried to exploit this right for political purposes.²⁴³ In the succeeding months subtle obstacles have reportedly been placed against the conduct of religious education.²⁴⁴ Another decree of the same date called for government approval of church appointments made since the beginning of October 1956 and in the future.²⁴⁵ In February 1957 the Kadar regime accused Mindszenty of having ordered the dismissal from their duties of 18 priests who had been cooperating with the regime, including apparently members of the "National Peace Committee of Catholic Priests" (so-called "patriotic priests") and implied that he was attempting to discredit Catholic members of parliament.²⁴⁶ This development was presumably connected with the Vatican's excommunication during that month of Father Richard Horvath, vice-president of the Peace Committee, and its threat of similar action against other "peace priests" who continued to hold church posts given them by the regime

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without ecclesiastical sanction.²⁴⁷ As of mid-1957 Kadar maintained that he favored the revival of religious education, to be given at the option of the parents, but at the same time made it clear that the church was subordinate to the state.

At the beginning of August 1957, the regime struck out at the church, arresting a number of priests who allegedly had formed a large-scale "counter-revolutionary" organization during the uprising of 1956 with headquarters in the Central Theological Seminary in Budapest. The charge specified that during the uprising they had, at the behest of Cardinal Mindszenty, looted the Religious Affairs Office, and further that they printed and distributed large quantities of leaflets and propaganda material in centers of the uprising and that they maintained close contact with the rebels, conducted "personal agitation among the rebels," supplying them with food, and helping them to hide out after the revolt. The Ministry of Interior announcement added that "some church leaders were aware of the large-scale organization."²⁴⁸ These arrests came in the immediate wake of a late July roundup by the Kadar regime of a large number--estimated between 1,500 and 10,000--of alleged enemies of the state, whose arrests seem not to be related in all cases to the uprising of 1956 but designed to isolate potential enemies of the Communist regime and to minimize the possibility of a new outbreak.²⁴⁹ Together with the concurrent arrest of a number of right-wing leaders of minor political parties formed during the uprising and the alleged conspiratorial connection of some of them with Cardinal Mindszenty,²⁵⁰ these events indicate the continuing strong role of the Church in perpetuating the hostility of the Hungarian people against Communism and at the same time attests to the regime's substantial fear of the Church's influence and of the resistance potential of its organization.

At present the Hungarian hierarchy, under the leadership of Archbishop Jozsef Groesz, has been following a conciliatory policy towards the regime. It has formed an organization called "Opus Pacis" (Work of Peace) to

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cooperate with the Communist-organized "peace movement."²⁵¹ It was subsequently reported that the National Peace Committee of Catholic Priests expressed satisfaction with the new organization and hence decided to suspend its own activities.²⁵² In spite of this uneasy truce it can be expected that the deep-rooted antagonisms between the Communist regime and the Church will flare up again. The revelation by a regime spokesman in early September 1957 that the Bishops of Veszprem and Vac had been banished from their sees is the most recent indication of this probability.

In the event of future war the local Catholic clergy, especially in the rural areas, will afford Special Forces knowledgeable and trustworthy allies in their efforts to rally popular support to resistance undertakings. Pro-regime priests will be found in some localities, but the fact that they are generally known as such to the local populace²⁵³ will facilitate avoidance of them.

Although a wide diversity of convictions with respect to the social and political values of Communist ideology and institutions will be found among the Protestant clergymen, a decade of tyranny, capped by a bloody suppression of the national uprising of 1956, has probably left among them few hopes that Communism could be either accommodated or even tolerated, and hence many of them, perhaps the majority, especially in the rural areas, will prove sympathetic to active anti-regime endeavors and many may be willing to take the risks entailed in cooperation with Special Forces. Contacts among them, which should be made by Special Forces on an individually selected basis if possible, will yield valuable information.

1. Military and Security Forces

The conduct and attitudes of the Army, Air Force, and the various police forces during the uprising of October-November 1956 have been discussed in the previous sections dealing with the armed resistance and the political organizations of the insurgents. The reorganizational problems and estimated strength of these groups since the revolt are noted in Part III of this report.

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It is important, however, to summarize here the resistance potential aspects of these groups as they affect over-all Special Forces evaluations of the human element in Hungary.

(1) Security Forces:

With the notorious exception of the AVH the security forces of the regime, whether the Civil Police or Border Guards, either sided with the revolutionaries or did little to oppose them.

The United Nations Special Committee on Hungary has well defined the AVH through the most forceful technique of definition possible--description. The full impact of the following passage will best be derived if it be remembered that the U.N. report in question was lauded throughout the free world as a marvel of balance and dispassionateness.

The Committee was deeply shocked by what it learned from witnesses who told of the sufferings inflicted on the Hungarian people by the AVH. It was struck by the extent of the abuses that could be perpetrated by a police force without control and thus all-powerful, pitiless and unabashed by any shameful act. It realized that the existence of such a body, whose secret power affected every phase of public and private life, prevented the enjoyment of all human rights and perverted the functioning of every independent institution.

. . . . Nominally entrusted with the investigation of offences against the security of the State, the AVH devoted itself to the defence of the regime and more particularly of those who were in power. Granted unlimited freedom of action by the regime, it increased the number of its officers and planted its spies and informers everywhere. Through them it penetrated into offices and factories, into apartment houses and schools, into diplomatic posts and into the courts. Its uniformed police guarded important public buildings, and its plain clothes police mingled with the crowds. Acting without any outside supervision of any kind, its members became a privileged group with important material advantages. Separated from the rest of the population by a wall of hate, they became a state within the State and a group apart, dedicated to control of the people by terrorism and oppression. During the days of October and November, the horrified revolutionaries discovered in the AVH headquarters files containing "black-lists" with information and reports on almost every inhabitant of the country, countless recordings of telephone and private conversations, and also "perfected" types of torture chambers. . .

At the beginning of the October Revolution, it was the members of the AVH who first tried to put down the insurrection with machine-guns and their usual methods of terror and torture. The people's vengeance was turned against them, and it knew no bounds. Their former victims and the children of their victims committed atrocities in their turn. There were

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lynchings, hangings and shootings, and the pleas of the provisional leaders, who were trying to restore law and order, were often ignored. Many members of the AVH found sanctuary in refuges offered them by the revolutionary organizations pending trial according to regular judicial procedure.²⁵⁴

The conduct of the Security, or political, Police (the AVH) during the uprising and that of the people towards them, provided conclusive proof that the Communist-sponsored totalitarian dictatorships of Eastern Europe are founded upon a class of men whose conduct, character, and reputation are so perverted as to make them capable of flouting not only the traditions and loyalties of the society from which they have sprung but of attempting to destroy the dignity of human nature itself. More precisely, the basic character and principles of the actual governing forces of the discredited Soviet-oriented Hungarian state cannot, by-and-large, be distinguished from the conduct of its brutal security arm, no more than the ruling forces of Nazi Germany could disassociate themselves from the SS atrocities of World War II. The brutality which the members of the AVH had visited upon the people for the purpose of promoting and enforcing the Communist order recoiled with a vengeance upon them as the mobs with unfailing primitive instincts of justice turned upon their ten-year provoker. Thus the fury of the mobs advertised to the world the most powerful elemental resistance potential available against the Communist system--its foundation upon an unnatural and criminal treatment of humanity.

(2) Army:

One of the most important lessons of the uprising both from the standpoint of the Soviets and the West was the refusal of the rank-and-file of the Hungarian Army--drawn chiefly from the worker and peasant classes--to fight for a foreign power against their own people. Virtually the whole Hungarian Army wherever it was able lost no time in helping or joining the insurgents during the uprising. It is not known that any unit of the Hungarian Army fought against the insurgents or aided the Soviet cause. Most of the higher-echelon officers apparently remained true to their commissions,

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but some of the latter did defect and one of them, Colonel Maleter, emerged from the revolution as one of its most tragic heroes. Many lower-echelon officers, their pro-Soviet indoctrination notwithstanding, sided with the uprising. Surprising to the Communists was the joining of the fight by the cadets of the military academies of Budapest. About 800 such cadets from the Petofi Military Academy in Budapest joined the first demonstration on October 23 and the students of the Zrinyi Military Academy of Budapest, together with the Budapest armored brigade, fought valiantly in the Matra Mountains against an armored division.²⁵⁵

At the time of the second Soviet intervention particular efforts were exercised by the Soviet military command to bring under its control the Hungarian Officer Corps, as it had been demonstrated that pro-Soviet indoctrination had not prevented many of the officers from siding with the nationalist uprising. Some of the deportees to the USSR were officers. Orders requiring the armed forces to report to their units were quickly countermanded by the order demobilizing a considerable part of the standing Army, as it was realized by the Soviets that the Army had disintegrated.²⁵⁶ Because of the status of the Army, the Soviets demanded that state security forces be so organized as to provide a more effective political control over the contemporary opposition and any subversive movements that might develop in the future.²⁵⁷ It was estimated that perhaps 80 per cent of the Hungarian officers were separated from the forces either as a result of their participation with the insurgents or for their unwillingness to sign a post-revolt declaration of loyalty.²⁵⁸

Unless the Army is reduced to the size and status of a mercenary force, it will probably be a liability to the Soviets in the event of war. The uprising would indicate that in the event of war ways and means to defect could be found by the troops, although probably with greater difficulty than in the uprising. Significant too for Special

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Forces planning is the facility with which the soldiery, when their units disintegrated, joined insurgent bands, some of which were under civilian command. The testimony of an escapee to the effect that many officers were reluctant to join the revolution without assurances of retention in their positions in the event of victory and that because of such misgivings the national anti-aircraft command joined the revolutionaries without enthusiasm²⁵⁹ points up the range of problems, political as well as military, which Special Forces units will encounter in its contacts with various elements of potential guerilla material in the event of war.

j. Minority Elements

In contrast to conditions which obtain in other countries of the Soviet orbit, the racial minorities of modern Hungary are so few in total number that they do not constitute a significant item in the over-all resistance picture. The Germans, Jews, Yugoslavs, Slovaks, Gypsies, Rumanians, and other minority elements together represent only five per cent of the Hungarian population and, for the most part, are so widely scattered and disorganized that they have little capability of concerted opposition to the regime. During the 1956 revolution there was no recorded instance of minority participation en bloc on either the Communist or anti-Communist side except in the case of the Jews who (for reasons explained later in this section) were found in relatively large numbers in both camps. At the same time, it should be recognized that most, if not all, of the minority groups in Hungary have reason to detest the present Communist regime. In part this reaction stems from the patriotic and anti-Communist sentiments which are shared by the entire Hungarian population; in part also, from grievances which may be peculiar to an individual minority. Special Forces teams operating in Hungary may be able to capitalize on these grievances and, on a limited and localized scale, derive assistance from members of various minority groups.

The numerical strength of the minorities in Hungary, according to official U.S. estimates based upon the 1949 Hungarian census, is less than

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500,000 persons. The comparative strengths of the individual minorities, both in relation to each other and the dominant Hungarian (Magyar) element, are assessed in the following table:²⁶⁰

Population of Hungary in 1949
According to Mother Tongue
(in thousands)

Nationality	Number	Per cent of Total Popn.
Hungarians (Magyar)	8,721.0	94.75
Germans	252.0	2.74
Jews	130.0	1.41
Yugoslavs	26.0	0.28
Slovaks	25.0	0.27
Gypsies	19.0	0.21
Rumanians	18.0	0.20
Other	13.0	0.14
	9,204.0	100.00

The Germans, who form the largest single minority in Hungary, are most numerous in four counties immediately west of the Danube (Baranya, Tolna, Fejer, and Veszprem), in the southeastern county of Bacs-Kiskun, and in the western outskirts of Budapest. Eighty per cent or more of the Jews are concentrated in Budapest, while the Yugoslavs, Slovaks, and Rumanians are mostly found in small enclaves near the northwestern, western, and southern frontier. The Gypsies occupy no fixed place of abode and are scattered throughout the country.

Particular information of interest to Special Forces planners on individual minority groups in Hungary may be summarized as follows:

(1) Germans:

The estimated 252,000 Germans (often called Swabians) in Hungary are nearly all descended from colonists who entered the country during the 18th century, although some persons trace their ancestry back to German settlers who moved eastward as early as the 11th and 12th centuries. Their character has been much the same as German colonists in other parts of Eastern Europe. Sober, industrious, and almost impervious to cultural assimilation by the surrounding Magyar population, they have maintained a distinctive German identity and have built up a standard of

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living superior to most of their neighbors. Prior to World War II most of the Germans in Hungary were agriculturalists. There was also a thriving business community and a skilled industrial force, mostly consisting of coal miners.

Until 1945 the German population in Hungary was almost twice its present strength, numbering nearly 500,000 persons. In that year the Hungarian government, largely at Russian insistence, began a mass deportation of ethnic Germans to Germany on the grounds of alleged or proven Nazi sympathies during World War II. It is estimated that upwards of 200,000 Germans were expelled in this manner, while another 25,000 left Hungary voluntarily or were carried off by the Soviet occupation authorities for forced labor in the USSR. As a consequence of the deportations, many one-time German districts in Hungary entirely lost their German character and were resettled by Magyars from other parts of Hungary and from Hungarian colonies in Czechoslovakia.²⁶¹ Another factor which helped to weaken the German influence in Hungary were the arbitrary relocations of population and labor force instituted by the Communist regime shortly after World War II. Thousands of Germans were uprooted from lands they had tilled for centuries and were either scattered through other agricultural areas of the country or were assigned to mining and other industrial enterprises. The Communist regime continued these persecutions and harassments of the German minority until early 1949, at which time a halt was called to the deportations and a more benevolent attitude towards the remaining Germans was adopted. In recent years the position of the German minority in Hungary has steadily improved: it is now guaranteed equal rights with all other Hungarian citizens, is allowed to have special schools with instruction in both the Magyar and German languages, and has been encouraged to form cultural societies of its own.²⁶²

At the present time the largest concentration of Germans in Hungary appears to be located in Baranya county, where several score all-German

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mining villages are established at various points in the Mecsek Mountain range. Next in importance as centers of German settlement appear to be the counties of Bacs-Kiskun, Pest, Tolna, and Veszprem, where there are scattered German communities. The once important German settlements in northwest Hungary, however, have nearly all been cleared of their former German inhabitants as a result of the deportations of 1945-1948 and later evacuations of political unreliaables from the frontier zone. West and southwest of Budapest the surviving German population has apparently become much intermingled in recent years with its Hungarian neighbors and, according to one reliable source, has endeavored to play down its German identity in order to avoid unwelcome prominence and possible interference by the Communist authorities.²⁶³

Very little information is available concerning the current attitudes of the German minority towards the Hungarian Communist regime. It may be presumed that a greater resistance potential exists among the German communities which retain a strong consciousness of their national identity (e.g., the mining villages) than among those which have become diluted by admixture with Magyar elements (e.g., in the vicinity of Budapest). Again, the opportunities for assistance to Special Forces appear greater in all-German communities where there is a strong sense of group cohesiveness than in mixed German-Magyar settlements where there is greater likelihood of mutual suspicion and betrayal. But in either case it does not appear that the Germans in Hungary will be likely to range themselves openly behind a Special Forces overture until the prospects of victory are fairly well assured. They have already learned through the bitter experiences of 1945-1948 the penalties of collaboration with a foreign liberation force, and they probably realize that their best protection in Hungary is to avoid political controversy and the least appearance of disloyalty to the established regime. However much the Germans in Hungary may sympathize with Special Forces operations, the aid which they may give will in all probability be cautious,

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furtive, and extremely limited in scope. It is beyond the province of this study to determine whether or not Special Forces operations in regions of German settlement could be aided by the utilization of carefully selected Germans deported from Hungary since 1945 and now residing in West Germany.*

(2) Jews

Official Hungarian statistics of 1953-1954 place the number of Jews (i.e., persons professing the Jewish faith) within the country at anywhere between 100,000 and 130,000. These figures represent a sharp decline from the more than 400,000 Jews who were congregated in the present-day territory of Hungary prior to 1939. The discrepancy is largely explained by the pogroms instituted under the German occupancy of Hungary in 1944, in which about 220,000 Jews are believed to have perished, and by the post-World War II emigration of about 50,000 Jews to various countries of the free world.²⁶⁴ Of the Jews still remaining in Hungary, the great majority (between 80,000 and 100,000) live in Budapest.²⁶⁵

Most Hungarian Jews are active in business, the professions, and government service. Relatively few seem to be engaged in agriculture or as industrial laborers. According to one source, the number of male Jews in Hungary between the ages of 16 and 55 is considerably below the normal statistical average because of the persecution suffered under Hitler.²⁶⁶ If this report is true, the military and labor force potential of the Jews in Hungary is correspondingly reduced.

Under Communist rule the Hungarian Jews have come to occupy a somewhat ambiguous position. The "traditionalist" Jews who still frequent the synagogues and seek to carry on Jewish philanthropic and cultural activities have been subjected to repeated repression by the government. So also have been the real or suspected agents of Zionism. On the other hand, the "progressive" Jews who are willing to cast off the religious and

* Cf. Georgetown University Research Project (under contract to A.C. of S., I.), Project 9457, German Expellees and Refugees: Organizations and Leaders, 12 September 1955 (S).

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cultural allegiances of their forefathers have found a ready haven in the Communist Party. Some of the most powerful Communist leaders in post-World War II Hungary (e.g., Matyas Rakosi and Erno Gero) are of Jewish origin, and many reports confirm that, despite recent realignments in the Hungarian Communist leadership, Jews continue to occupy a disproportionately high percentage of Party and government posts. This circumstance has contributed powerfully to the popular dislike of the Communist dictatorship, and one of the most striking features of the recent resistance history of Hungary has been the upsurge of anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic demonstrations.²⁶⁷

Events during the October rebellion of 1956 served to illustrate still further the divided political allegiance existing in the Hungarian Jewish community. One U.S. Jewish spokesman, apparently well-informed, has claimed that some 25,000 Jews in Hungary joined in the revolt against Communism.²⁶⁸ Another source, also well-informed, claims that 16,000 Jews were among the great tide of Hungarian refugees which crossed the frontier and found haven in Austria.²⁶⁹ Granted these allegations are true, the question remains as to what part was taken in the rebellion by the remaining 100,000 or more Jews in Hungary. No conclusive answer is possible, but the available information suggests that while many of these Jews took no action either for or against the government, a large percentage actively supported the Kadar regime and the Soviet intervention. In this connection it may be noted that the hated Hungarian secret police (AVH), which remained loyal to the Communist Party throughout the rebellion and was the principal target of revolutionary fury, is believed to have been staffed in considerable measure by Jewish personnel.²⁷⁰

Under present conditions existing in Hungary, both the resistance potential of the Hungarian Jews and their possible utility to Special Forces appear to be exceptionally poor. A large proportion, possibly the majority, of the Jewish population is apparently loyal to the Kadar regime either through conviction or desire to live in peace. Of the Jews

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who sympathized with or aided the recent revolt, it seems likely that many have been badly shaken by the anti-Semitic outbursts of the revolutionaries and now ask themselves whether the position of the Jews in a liberated Hungary would be any better than under a Communist government. It should also be recognized that any overt attempt by Special Forces to enlist the support of the Jewish minority would almost certainly arouse the instant antagonism and suspicion of the dominant Magyar population on whom any successful liberation venture must be based.

(3) Yugoslavs:

Although a semi-official Yugoslav source has recently claimed that as many as 130,000 Yugoslavs are now resident in Hungary, it would appear that the U.S. estimate of 26,000 is much closer to the real situation. These 26,000 may be further subdivided into approximately 8,000 Croats, 3,000 Serbs, 2,000 Slovenes, and 13,000 Bunjevacs (Catholic Serbians). Virtually all these persons are concentrated in the western and southwestern areas of Hungary near the Yugoslav border except for an undisclosed number who were removed from the frontier zone in 1950 as a security measure and were resettled elsewhere.²⁷¹

Practically all the Yugoslavs in Hungary are peasants with little political consciousness or resistance potential. A good proportion, perhaps half, have been considerably Magyarized either of their own volition or because of the cultural assimilation fostered by various Hungarian governments during the course of the present century. Because of their small numbers and engulfment by a vastly superior Hungarian population, it is not likely that the Yugoslavs in Hungary would venture openly to assist a Special Forces mission, but it seems probable that many of them harbor resentments against the Communist regime which would dispose them to give covert aid where possible to a U.S.-sponsored liberation venture.

(4) Slovaks:

The estimated 25,000 Slovaks in Hungary are less than a third of the nearly 100,000 Slovaks who were present on Hungarian soil as

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of May 1946. In that month more than 60,000 Slovaks resident in Hungary took advantage of a Hungarian-Czechoslovak population exchange agreement and opted for resettlement in Czechoslovakia. The remaining 25,000 apparently passed up the opportunity to emigrate, presumably because they preferred to live in Hungary or saw no prospect of better conditions in Czechoslovakia.

Most of the Slovaks in Hungary are farmers and are scattered north and northwest of Budapest, often in fairly close proximity to the Czechoslovak border. A few Slovaks may also be found in the Csongrad and Bekes counties of the southeast. Judging from the scanty information available, it appears that the Slovak minority in Hungary does not represent a very likely source either of resistance potential or of aid to Special Forces.

(5) Gypsies:

The estimated 19,000 Gypsies in Hungary are distributed widely throughout the country and apparently represent an outcast group which the Communist regime has alternately persecuted and tolerated. The Gypsies are usually employed during the summer as farmhands on the state farms (sovkhozes) and eke out their living during the remainder of the year at handicrafts and odd jobs.²⁷² Because of their mobility and familiarity with broad areas of the country, the Gypsies represent a source of potential utility to Special Forces, but their characteristic instability and lack of political consciousness may make them very unreliable adjuncts.

(6) Rumanians:

Practically all the 18,000 Rumanians in Hungary are found in the southeastern counties of Bekes and Hajdu-Bihar, near the Rumanian border. Nothing is known of their political attitudes, and it is probable that they are in the main a peaceable group anxious to avoid entanglements with the regime. Their resistance potential is

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negligible, and such assistance as they might extend to Special Forces would be extremely limited.

(7) Others:

Small clusters of several other national minorities can be found on Hungarian soil, of whom the most numerous are probably the Ruthenians who numbered 4,500 persons in 1941. The potential utility of these persons to Special Forces may be considered negligible.

k. Cross-Border Hungarian Minorities

Demands for a revision of the post-World War I Treaty of Trianon, by which Hungary lost about 71 per cent of its former territory and 63 per cent of its earlier population, have been a focal point of nationalist agitation ever since. During World War II, with the concurrence of Germany, it reincorporated those portions of its lost territory where the largest ethnic Hungarian populations resided (see Map B), but as a result of the post-World War II settlement in Eastern Europe these territories were once again alienated.

The estimated post-World War II total of the ethnic Hungarian population in the various countries on Hungary's borders is about 3,000,000 persons, distributed as follows (see Map B):


Czechoslovakia	610,000 ²⁷³
(chiefly southern Slovakia)	
Rumania	1,500,000 ²⁷⁴
(chiefly Transylvania)	
Transcarpathian Ukraine	320,000 ²⁷⁵
(chiefly in the extreme southwest border area and the town of Beregovo)	
Yugoslavia	496,000 ²⁷⁶
(chiefly in the Serbian province of Vojvodina, with much smaller groups in Croatia and Slovenia)	

Although the Communist regime of Hungary, in line with Soviet minority and boundary policies, has consistently suppressed revisionist feelings, it recognized as a matter of fact that the issue is not dead. The August 1955 issue of Propagandista singled out among other nationalist heresies the

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effort, which could be linked to Imre Nagy's "rightist deviation," to divert attention from "socialist building" by exploiting the "closed issue" of Hungary's frontiers. It justified the restriction of Hungary's territory after World War II as deserved punishment for its Axis collaboration and called for the development of "socialist" rather than "national" patriotism. It likewise urged upon the Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia and Rumania that they also adopt a "socialist patriotism" and to consider these countries as their true "fatherland."²⁷⁷

If Special Forces operational plans for Hungary, where cover and concealment factors are very limited, should provide for the utilization of the more favorable terrain ringing its borders, some of the Hungarian minority elements in these regions would probably prove to be useful allies in the conduct of guerilla activity. Since the revisionist attitudes of these minorities differ in the various regions concerned, their utilization by Special Forces would have to be preceded by an evaluation of these groups in each specific area.



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PART II

GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS AFFECTING RESISTANCE
 AND
 SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

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1. Size and Location¹

Hungary occupies an area of 35,912 square miles bisected by the Danube River. Her western border with Austria, approximately 124 miles long, is formed in part by mountainous outliers of the Alps. In the northwest the boundary crosses the Ferto Tava (Neusiedler See) and the Kis Alföld (Little Plain) to the Danube River, which forms part of the border with Czechoslovakia. The boundary follows the Danube for approximately 93 miles. It merges with the Tpoly River, a tributary of the Danube, following it for a distance, and then proceeds between the lower ranges of the Western Carpathian Mountains. In the east and south, the boundary crosses the Nagy Alföld (Great Plain), portions of which are located in the neighboring USSR, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The border with the USSR is about 50 miles long; with Rumania it stretches over 186 miles. The boundary with Yugoslavia crosses the Nagy Alföld for over 124 miles. Then it is aligned with the Drava River for about 93 miles and the Mira River for about 62 miles. Except for the river barriers and mountains, Hungary's borders offer no natural defenses against invasion. Major river valleys cutting through the mountainous border areas provide natural routes of communication with Austria and Czechoslovakia.

2. Terrain

The hills, low mountains, and expanses of steppe are shown on Map C. Sixty per cent of the country is lowland. The mountains, while steep-sloped in places, can be crossed by foot travelers. Thus relief offers few obstacles to the foot traveler, whether in the border areas or in the interior. The flat, open plains, while favorable for large-scale ground and air operations, are less suitable for Special Forces operations and guerilla activities. Forest cover and relief in the mountainous areas in the west and northeast offer more favorable sites for guerilla bases.

Drainage is the major deterrent to cross-country movement. The Danube and Tisza Rivers, dividing Hungary into Transdanubia (Dunantul),

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the Duna-Tisza area, and Tisza-tul, obstruct east-west movement. Moreover, many marshy areas and large floodplains along the rivers, navigation canals, and drainage and irrigation ditches obstruct vehicular traffic and impede foot travel through much of the lowland. The plains are located in the Kis Alföld in the northwest and in the Nagy Alföld, which comprises most of the area east of the Danube River. They are separated by a chain of low hills and mountains extending from the west of Lake Balaton to the area between the northeastern border and the Tisza River.

a. Kis Alföld (Little Plain)

From the northwestern border with Austria and Czechoslovakia, the Kis Alföld in Hungary extends southward to the Bakony Mountains, which form the southern watershed of the Rába River and which run along the northern shores of Lake Balaton. Moderately steep hills form the eastern and western borders of the plain. The eastern part of the plain is rolling country, while the northwest is flat and periodically marshy. Large areas of the plain, particularly those northwest of Győr, were formerly waterlogged but have been drained and reclaimed for agriculture.

b. Nagy Alföld (Great Plain)

The Great Plain is for the most part a low steppe with the Tisza River meandering sluggishly through the center of the region. Large parts are known as the puszta, a treeless expanse of steppe and pastureland. Some of these wastelands have been partially reclaimed through irrigation and afforestation, but there are still large areas of puszta, best exemplified by the Hortobágy. The present area of the Hortobágy, which is shown on Map C, covers some 60,000 hectares. Some of the reclaimed land is extremely fertile, while other sections have become wastes of alkali.

The portion of the plain east of the Tisza between Debrecen and the Maros River is covered with a layer of fertile black earth about 50 feet deep. It is dusty and hard in summer, with wide, deep cracks which may trip the foot traveler. During wet weather it becomes a heavy, sticky mud.

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In this area the skyline is unbroken. The Hármas Körös River and its tributaries flow sluggishly through the level land. Tiny round hillocks ten to thirty feet in height serve as house sites in the extensive flat tracts which are subject to flood.

Two large sand areas, shown on Map C, are located in the Nagy Alföld. One area lies between the Danube and the Tisza. The other area is in Nyírség, south of the great curve of the Tisza and northeast of Debrecen. Long lines of sand dunes stretch across these areas. These dunes are generally low, flat, sandy ridges five to ten miles long, one and one-half miles wide, and trend north-northwest to south-southeast. Some are as high as 50 feet, and may provide some measure of concealment from ground observation. The shifting sands of the dunes have been stabilized with crop cultivation and the planting of acacia trees. Broad hollows between dunes tend to be waterlogged. Many tiny salt or alkali lakes are thus impounded. Some of these lakes dry up during the intense heat of summer.

Extensive areas along the Danube and the Tisza, as well as along their larger tributaries, are subject to flood in spring and early summer when the snow melts in the mountains and when the break-up of the ice results in a jam at constricted sectors of the rivers. In the Tisza Basin, 34 per cent of the cultivated area, 47 per cent of the population, and 50 per cent of the road and railroad systems are subject to flood. Permanent and intermittent marshes and swamps line both rivers, imposing considerable impediment to movement. The rivers have deposited natural levees 20 feet or more above the adjacent plain. Dikes have been built along some sections of the rivers to contain the flooded areas. During wet weather these levees and dikes may be used as paths. In sectors of the larger rivers, the floodplains are bordered by discontinuous low bluffs of loess deposits. Vertical loess bluffs 30 to 50 feet high are common on the right, or west, bank of the Danube River. The right bank of the Danube is a continuous bluff between Budapest and Paks except at confluences of the river with its tributaries.

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c. Low Hills and Mountains

The few areas offering refuge and concealment for guerilla-type activities are located in the discontinuous northern highlands trending northeast to southwest across northern Hungary and in the Mecsek Mountains north of Pecs. The highlands from the Hegyalja to the Bakony Mountains and the Mecsek Mountains served as areas of refuge for the Hungarian freedom fighters during the uprising of 1956. Many Hungarians withdrew to the mountains from which they hoped to wage partisan warfare against the Russians.

In the west, the northern highlands are low and slope gently to rounded summits though mountains near the Austrian border are higher. Here isolated outliers of the Austrian and Styrian Alps rise to 975 feet. In the western border area, outliers of the Austrian Alps are 1,814 feet high near Sopron and 2,866 feet high west of Koszeg. From the hills of Zala County towards the northwest, both ruggedness of slope and altitude increases; a height of 3,296 feet is reached at Mt. Kékes in the Matra Mountains. West of Lake Balaton in the Zalaidomsag, summits of low hills are as high as 1,160 feet. North of the lake the Bakony Mountains, which are old peneplained hill ranges, rise from heights of 1,300 feet in the west to 1,950 and 2,275 feet in the east. The Vertes Mountains between the headwaters of the Gaja River and Tatabanya are approximately 1,560 feet high. To the north, between Tatabanya and the Danube River, the Gerecse Mountains reach 2,060 feet. Towards the east, mountain ranges rise to 1,814 feet in the Buda Mountains, 2,460 feet in the Pilis Mountains, 3,052 feet in the Borzsony Range, decline to 2,119 feet in the Cserhat Mountains, and attain the highest altitudes of 3,136 and 3,296 feet in the Matra Mountains. Altitudes are slightly lower towards the east in the Bukk and Hegyalja Mountains. The greatest elevation in the Bukk Mountains is 3,117 feet. In the Hegyalja Mountains, the elevation increases from 1,982 feet in the south to 2,912 feet at the northern border.

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
South of Lake Balaton the country is a rolling low plateau. It is intersected by parallel streams which afford natural north-south trending routes. Vast loess deposits make this area one of intensive agricultural pursuits. The erosion of loess surfaces results in narrow steep-walled valleys, small gullies, and shallow basins which pit the level surfaces. From the center of this plateau rise the Mecsek Mountains like a massive island. Elevations in the Mecseks reach 2,216 feet.

d. Lakes

Lake Balaton is the largest of three shallow lakes in Transdanubia. It is 48 miles long, approximately five miles wide, and has an average depth of 12 feet. Its northern shore is a cliff 650 to 975 feet high, where the Bakony Mountains overlook the south. Dense sedges and reeds grow along its southwestern tip.

Two smaller, shallower lakes are the Fertő Tava and the Velencei To. The former is a reedy frontier lake, most of which is in Austria. The average depth of water varies from six feet in the west to three feet in the east. Much of the lake is covered with reeds. Velencei To is six miles long and one to two miles wide. Its greatest depth is less than ten feet. At least 38 per cent of the Velencei To, mainly the southern part, is covered with dense reeds.

Ox-bow lakes prevail along the river courses, and several thousand small lakes are scattered throughout the poorly drained Nagy Alföld. Half of these are periodic shallow pools which dry up in late summer and early autumn. The largest of these is Fertő To, near Szeged. Its shallow waters dry up almost completely in summer.





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MAP D
TEMPERATURE (U)


Source: Gyorgy Markus, *Climate of Hungary*, Moscow, 1954, p. 66. (U)

Scale: 1:1,000,000

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3. Climate

Land-locked Hungary has a continental climate with long hot summers and with winters of intense cold alternating with mild spells. The climate is more inclement in the Nagy Alföld, for eastern Hungary enjoys little of the tempering influence of the Atlantic Ocean. Mild oceanic influences flow through the Vienna gap and fan over the Kis Alföld, sometimes reaching as far as Budapest. Generally the climate in Hungary is milder than that in countries of the same latitude to the east, for the Carpathian Mountains shelter Hungary from icy winter winds blowing out of the USSR.

a. Temperature

The temperature maps which follow this section show that the lower temperatures prevail in the mountainous areas throughout the year. During the winter and summer the greater extremes of temperature are located in eastern Hungary. There is great variability in annual and daily temperatures.

Absolute minimum temperatures below zero have been recorded at many stations throughout the country. In mountainous areas, absolute minimum temperatures of -4°F . at Kekes and -7°F . in the Pilis Mountains have been recorded. Temperatures are lower in the plains, with an extreme temperature of -29°F . at Kecskemet. The higher mountain temperatures are probably the result of temperature inversion. During the mild winter spells, maximum winter temperatures have reached 60°F . Then the ground may thaw, becoming slippery and muddy. When the melted snow and ice cannot penetrate the frozen subsoil, the ground becomes waterlogged and flooding may result.

The differences of climate between eastern and western Hungary can be seen again in Map E, which shows the number of days below freezing. Mountainous areas have the longest periods of temperatures below 32°F . Western Hungary has shorter periods below freezing than eastern Hungary. In January the mean temperatures are below freezing throughout the country.

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
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During the summer absolute maximum temperatures in the upper nineties and over 100°F. have been recorded at most stations. A high of 108°F. has been reached at Szeged.

Such extremes of winter and summer temperatures must be considered in the storage of food and medical supplies. Suitable clothing for below-freezing temperatures is necessary from December through February, and from May through October anti-insect items should be available.

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Sources: Andrew Roman, *Atlas of Central Europe*, edited by the Institute of Political Sciences, Count Pál Teleki Research Institute, Budapest-Balatontured, 1945 (U)
NIS 19, Hungary, Section 25, "Weather and Climate," March 1951, Fig. 25-46 (C)

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b. Precipitation

Map F shows the distribution and amount of the mean annual, winter and summer precipitation. There is more precipitation in Transdanubia, particularly in the western and southwestern sectors, than in the eastern half of the country. The mountains also receive greater amounts of precipitation, but the sheltered slopes of the Hegyalja Mountains are quite dry. Towards the east the amount of precipitation decreases. The driest area is the Middle Tisza Basin with less than 15 inches of precipitation in some years.

Most of the precipitation occurs in May and June in the form of summer thunderstorms. Winter precipitation frequently is snow. There is precipitation on an average of 110 to 140 days a year. These days are fairly evenly distributed except in the Nagy Alföld, where rainfall occurs mainly during occasional thunderstorms. Near the Drava River in the southwest there is a tendency towards a secondary maximum in late autumn caused by the Mediterranean influence.

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


MAP F
PRECIPITATION (U)

Sources: Andrew Ross, *Atlas of Central Europe*, ed. by the
Institute of Political Science, Great Polish Research
Institute, Budapest-Balatonfured, 1944, (U)

NIS 19, Hungary, Section 23, "Weather and Climate,"
March 1951, Figure 23-47. (C)

Sources: Georgy Markov, *Geography of Vojvodina*, Moscow, 1951,
p. 74, (U)

NIS 19, Hungary, Section 23, "Weather and Climate,"
March 1951, Figure 23-47. (C)



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c. Snowfall and Snow Cover

In the plains, where snowfall is lighter than elsewhere in Hungary, there may be 17 to 25 days a year when there is more than a trace of snowfall. In the mountains the period of snowfall is longer; 53 days of snowfall have been recorded at Kekes. The first fall may come in November or December; the last in March or early April.

The duration of snow cover varies between the mountains and plains as well as from year to year. Generally, the number of days of snow cover increases by approximately three for each hundred feet of altitude. With respect to annual variation, in some years there is no continuous snow cover for more than two weeks at a time. During mild winters there may be no snow cover at all in some places, but during severe winters continuous snow cover may remain for one to two months. The principal thaw usually occurs in March.

The depth of snow cover is also variable. The deepest cover occurs in February. On the plains the normal depth is about three to four inches, but in some years the average depth is 20 inches. In occasional years there may be none. Snowdrifts may impede movement for short periods.

d. Winds

At times the Nagy Alfold is swept by whirlwinds of sand in the summer and of snow in the winter. During the winter and the transition from winter to summer, kosava winds are likely to occur. These are strong southeast winds blowing particularly in the southeastern part of the lowland, picking up considerable quantities of sand and dust and whipping up large waves on the Tisza River. In their severest forms, kosava winds blow with gale force up to 60 miles per hour and freeze exposed flesh within a few minutes.

e. Visibility

Low-lying clouds in the mountains and fog near the numerous rivers and swamps make for poor visibility. The clouds usually lift during the forenoon but may descend again at night. Two mountain stations

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have recorded average annual cloud cover of about 115 days. However, there is much variation in visibility from place to place in the mountains. In the lowland heavy fog forms more frequently in the winter and is often widespread. It usually forms after clear, quiet nights when the air has a tendency to stagnate.

4. Natural Vegetation

Cover and concealment features of natural vegetation are limited and mainly seasonal. Major sources of such features are forests and tall marsh vegetation. Areas offering cover and concealment for Special Forces operations are more plentiful west of the Danube River, where 10 to 20 per cent of the total area is forested. East of the Danube, less than 10 per cent of the land is forested. With only 13.5 per cent of the total land in forests, Hungary ranks lowest among the east central European countries in both percentage of forest cover and amount of forests per capita. The forests are largely of the broadleaf deciduous type, thus limiting their suitability to seasons when trees are in leaf. Of the 1,253,000 hectares of forested land, only 80,000 hectares, or 6 per cent of the total forests, are coniferous.

As may be seen in Map G, the best and most extensive forest cover is located in the northern mountain region stretching southwestward from the Hegyalja Mountains near the Czechoslovak border to the Bakony Mountains north of Lake Balaton, and in the Mecsek Mountains north of Pecs. The northern mountain region varies in width from 13 to 28 miles. In the rolling hills of Transdanubia, forest cover is discontinuous and interspersed with cultivated land. In the plains regions, forest cover is sparse, for most of the land is in grain fields and pastures. Along the western boundary, strips have been cleared through many forests.

Beech and oak are the most common species of trees, although other species, including chestnut, are found in the forests. Black pine grows in isolated groves in the south and in a few small areas in northern Hungary. Beech usually grows where the higher elevations result in decreased temperature and increased precipitation. At lower elevations, where the climate

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In swampy areas and along rivers and lake shores, limited concealment can be found in the tall reeds and sedges. Some of the rushes, growing thick and fast, are well over six feet tall by June. During the uprising of 1956, the marshes near Yugoslavia between the Danube and Drava Rivers became an area of refuge for the Hungarian freedom fighters, who planned to use these swampy bases in their battle against the Russians.

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is warmer and dryer, oaks are dominant. Beech trees average 65 feet in height with trunks two to three feet in diameter. They grow four to 16 feet apart and, like coniferous woods, have very little undergrowth. Their dense canopy offers good concealment from air observation. Oak forests may offer better concealment from ground observation as they often have dense undergrowth of thorny bushes and brambles six to 12 feet high. Oak trees are larger in the northern mountain region than they are in the Mecsek Mountains and in the rest of Transdanubia. In the north they average 60 feet in height with trunks 1.5 feet in diameter, whereas in the south they are an average 40 feet in height with trunks one foot in diameter.

On the plains tree growth is limited to strips of woods along streams and rivers, scattered copses, and trees bordering roads and farms. Willow, ash, alder, and poplar with dense undergrowth grow along the rivers. Fairly good intermittent cover can be found in the trees and shrubs on the floodplain of the Danube from Budapest to Yugoslavia. Similar but less cover is available along the Tisza River. In the Nagy Alföld forest cover is extremely poor east of the Tisza. Nagykunság is one of the bleakest parts of the plain. Cover is slightly better between the Danube and the Tisza Rivers and in Nyírség where there are scattered groves of acacia, and to a lesser extent of oak, hornbeam, linden, and elm. Nyírség is the only part of the Nagy Alföld with forest soils and is fairly well covered with virgin forests and newly planted acacia trees. Remnants of ancient forests which once covered the Nagy Alföld are located near Csongrad, Debrecen and Kécskemet, but most of the trees on the plain are in protective belts and young forests of fast growing species, planted in an attempt at reforestation of cut-over land, afforestation on poor soils and shifting sand dunes, and prevention of floods along rivers. A five-year plan, announced in 1950 and based on a USSR model, involved a total of 93,500 hectares. It is not possible to estimate the progress of afforestation from available statistics.

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5. Land Utilization

Cultivated land occupies a prominent position in the land utilization pattern of Hungary. Sixty per cent of the total land area is under cultivation, 17 per cent in meadows and pastures, and four per cent is in gardens, orchards, and vineyards. As previously mentioned in the section on natural vegetation, 13.5 per cent of the total land area is in forests. The remainder of the country is in swamps, wasteland, and other land use such as urban areas. A more detailed regional breakdown of land use in Transdanubia, the Nagy Alföld, and the northeastern highlands is shown in Map H. In all regions the largest proportion of land is used for cultivated crops.

The predominance of open landscape limits the suitability of Hungary for guerilla warfare. Cultivated fields, pastures, meadows, and wastelands offer little or no concealment. Open landscape is most pronounced in the Nagy Alföld, especially in the two large areas of grassland not suitable for agriculture. These areas, located in central and northeastern Hungary, are shown on Map H. Elsewhere in the Nagy Alföld much of the land is in grain fields. Orchards and vineyards are located near the towns. The lower and wetter land, particularly near the rivers, is usually left in meadows.

In Transdanubia there is greater diversification in topography and land use. The landscape is not as monotonous as it is in the Nagy Alföld. Wide expanses of cultivated crops cover the lower hill slopes. Vineyards and orchards are located on south-facing slopes. At intermediate altitudes the farm lands are interspersed with the forests, and at higher altitudes forested land is predominant.

In mountainous areas cultivated land is located on valley floors. Vineyards and orchards cover slopes below 1,000 feet. The higher altitudes are covered with forests, rocky slopes, and pastures.

Open areas are located also along the western border where a strip approximately 150 feet wide has been cleared through the forest and

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cultivated areas. Fortification and military areas along the southern border are also devoid of crops.

As crop areas are well distributed in most of Hungary, grains, vegetables, and fresh fruits are readily available for food during the summer and early fall. During the fall harvest many of the vegetable crops are stacked in the fields before being stored for the winter in cellars located under most of the houses in the village. Grains, dried peas, beans and flour are usually stored in the loft above the main building or the adjoining barn. Produce from collective farms is not easily accessible as it is deposited in the villages in government storehouses which are locked. Although food can be found in crop areas and local concealment may be available in tall crops, farm laborers are frequently present in cultivated fields.


Local concealment for short periods of time may be available in vineyards, corn fields and orchards. The location of vineyards is shown in Map H. Major vineyard regions are on the south-facing slopes of mountains, in the Drava Valley and in the sand areas east of the Danube. Concealment in vineyards is best during the late summer and early autumn in the Hegyalja Mountain region. Vines are trained on poles only four to five feet high in most of Hungary, but in the Hegyalja Mountain region the poles are 12 feet or higher. The sharp poles on which the vines are trained make vineyards hazardous for paratroop landings. Map H also shows the areas in which corn is a predominant crop. Concealment in corn fields is best about the middle of August when corn reaches its maximum height of six to seven feet. Orchards are located on the plains near towns and on south-facing slopes of mountains. They are especially important around Kecskemet, Oegled and in the Hernad Valley. Other crops are too low to offer any concealment features. Wheat grows to three feet and rice to two and one-half feet.

The ditches and flooded fields in irrigated lands are obstacles to movement. In 1953, 44 per cent of the irrigated land was in rice, 35 per cent in meadows and pastures, and 21 per cent in forage crops. The area put under

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irrigation increased ten times between the period before World War II to 1953. The increase in irrigated acreage is still continuing. In 1954, 455,000 acres of land were under irrigation, and when the Tisza Dam and its irrigation system are completed, the total irrigated land will comprise two per cent of the present arable land.



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
6. Population *

The population of Hungary has increased steadily except for a decline during the Second World War. The rise in population resumed after 1950. According to the latest census of 1949, there were 9,287,000 inhabitants. In 1956 the estimated population was 9,861,314, or 106 persons per square kilometer.

a. Density

As may be seen in Map I, most of Hungary is well populated. The heaviest density is located in urban centers and industrial and mining areas, such as Budapest, Miskolc, Szekesfehervar, and Pecs. Densely populated areas are also located around agricultural towns in which industry has been recently established, as in Hodmezovasarhely. The mountain regions are not as well populated but the least populated areas are located in the uncultivated steppelands of the Nagy Alföld.

* Ethnic composition of the population is discussed in Part I.



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b. Occupational Composition

Since the end of World War II increasing industrialization caused a drift of the population away from the rural areas. In 1946, 51.8 per cent, or more than half of the population, was occupied in agricultural pursuits. Thereafter, the proportion of industrial workers increased. The number of industrial workers in 1949 exceeded the 1940 figure by 500,000. In 1954 it was estimated that the 1940 figure would be exceeded by a million. With increased emphasis on industrialization, Hungary has for the first time a shortage of manpower. Mechanization of agriculture through the establishment of machine tractor stations, of which there were 500 in 1955, freed some agricultural laborers for industry, but the transformation of the economy according to the five-year plan requires an additional 650,000 workers.

c. Urban-Rural Composition

There has been a trend toward urbanization for the last 100 years. From 1949 to 1954 the urban population of Hungary increased approximately four per cent. In 1954, 40 per cent of the population was classified as urban; 60 per cent as rural. Approximately one-half of the urban population is located in Budapest. The other half is distributed among some 50 or 60 other cities.

d. Settlement Pattern

In the Hungary of old, the only urban areas were Budapest, Pecs, Miskolc, and Szeged. Map J shows that in present-day Hungary a number of sizeable population centers are located east of the Danube where two-thirds of the population lives. In the west there are fewer urban areas as most of the people live in small villages which are well distributed throughout most of the region. In the east there are few small villages but many large towns with isolated farms known as tanyas scattered between them.

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(1) Urban Settlement:

Map J shows the overwhelming urban development of Budapest as compared to the rest of Hungary. It was estimated in 1955 that the population of Budapest was 1,757,000. Only two other cities have populations exceeding 100,000: Miskolc with 136,000 inhabitants and Debrecen with 113,000 inhabitants. Szeged, which formerly had a population of over 100,000, now has only 88,000 inhabitants. However, the "peasant cities" near Szeged, such as Hodmezovasarhely, are increasing in population with the advent of industrialization. Other "peasant cities" of the Nagy Alföld in which industrialization is taking place are Bekescsaba, Mako, and Gyula.

Industrialization is also affecting small rural villages in other parts of Hungary. An example of small rural villages which have become urban areas is Kazincbarcika in northern Hungary. It consisted originally of two rural communities with a population totaling 3,329 people, located in the Sajó Valley approximately 19 miles upstream from Miskolc. Industrialization and amalgamation of the two communities resulted in a population of approximately 12,000 people in 1953.

The table below shows the significant increase in population in cities where industry is being established or expanded. The various types of industries located in these cities are discussed in the section on economic vulnerabilities.

Population Increase in Selected Industrial Cities

	1949	1954
Kazincbarcika	5,059	11,819
Komló	4,609	17,540
Miskolc	109,146	135,780
Oroszlány	3,740	7,150
Dunapentele	4,069	27,472
Tata	13,199	16,223
Várpalota	11,065	15,970
Veszprém	18,229	22,640
Zalaegerszeg	15,159	16,900

(2) Rural Settlement:

Most villages in Hungary consist of a nucleus of inner settlements called the beltelek, surrounded by a periphery, or the kultelek. In


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the nucleus are clustered houses and small gardens while the periphery includes arable lands, meadows, pastures, vineyards, and forests. Transdanubian villages located in close proximity to each other have smaller areas of outer settlements than do the villages of the Nagy Alföld. The villages and towns of the plains have farmhouses along a main street which is several miles in length and wide enough for the movement of livestock. Villages in the mountains are usually composed of closely grouped houses along a single narrow, winding street. Often an old castle or fort located on a high hill overlooks the town.

Rural centers with populations over 10,000 are typical of the Nagy Alföld. The large population centers of the Nagy Alföld, while they may be called cities according to their population size, are actually rural in character according to their structure, function, and the occupational composition of their population. The only industries located in most of these cities are concerned with foodstuffs and offer only seasonal employment. Administration and trade offer employment to a negligible fraction of the labor force although each of these cities includes under its administrative control the restricted urban area of compact settlement as well as the sparsely settled tanya area.

A house on the tanya is usually a plain, single-story structure of dried mud or loam bricks with a thatch, shingle or tile roof. An open wood fence or earth wall keeps the livestock out. On the poorer tanys the animals may be housed under the same roof. The limits of each tanya are frequently marked by willow and acacia trees growing along ditches which assist drainage and restrict livestock.

Although the participation of farmers in collectivized agriculture has been encouraged, scarcely 20 per cent of the agricultural land was in collective farms in 1956. Twelve per cent of the agricultural land was in state farms. In 1955 some 260,000 farmers participated in collective farms.



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7. Rural Roads

The road network is not as well developed in Hungary as it is in most of Europe or in the United States. There are 19,000 square miles of motorable roads, giving Hungary a density of 55 miles per 100 square miles of area compared to a density of 254 miles in England and Wales. The density of roads is greatest in West Hungary and least in the flat floodplain of the Tisza River.

Seventy-one per cent of all roads are classified as third class, or as rural roads; 19 per cent as second class, or District roads; and 10 per cent as first class, or International roads. Rural roads vary in width from 6'7" to 11'6" and are built on light foundations with gravel or other loose surfacing. Few roads, approximately four per cent of the network in 1953, have all-weather surfacing. Thus the majority of Hungarian roads, mainly in the plains east of the Danube, become muddy and less trafficable during wet weather. With the spring thaw many become pot-holed and badly rutted.

In the Nagy Alföld roads fade out beyond the periphery of the populated centers and become tracks connecting the isolated tanyas. Cultivated crops and the flat land offer little hindrance to movement across the plain. In mountainous areas many cart tracks run through the woods and valleys. These are frequently used by villagers, farmers, and foresters. Many mountain trails, especially in popular holiday areas, connect the various villages and the major heights.

8. Cross-Country Movement

Drainage presents the greatest problem to cross-country movement in Hungary as is indicated in the factors of terrain and ground condition shown on Map K. The rivers, lakes, marshes and muddy ground restrict and hinder movement more than relief. Conditions are most favorable from May through October, when lakes and marshy areas shrink. Although the largest amount of precipitation occurs during summer, the ground usually dries

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within a day or two after heavy downpours. Drainage conditions are worst from mid-February through April when extensive flooding, swollen marshy areas, and the filling of periodic lakes occur.

The Danube, Tisza, and other large rivers channelize movement into directions parallel to their courses. They are too wide and deep to be forded. Movement on the clayey and silty floodplains and terraces of the rivers would be best from June through September when the ground is dry for all but five to seven days each month. Late February and early March, when spring thaws cause muddy ground and flooding, are the poorest months. The area subject to inundation may extend for six miles on either side of the river, and vast areas of stagnant water result from the floods. The floodplain of the Tisza is wider than that of the Danube. The eastern floodplain of the Danube is more extensive. High bluffs aligning the river limit the width of the western floodplain. The courses of the rivers change from time to time, so the floodplains are scarred by abandoned channels in the form of ox-bow lakes.

Each winter ice forms on nearly all the rivers and lasts from one to three months. Ice closes the Danube to river traffic. On the Tisza the ice can be crossed by vehicles. In early spring the ice crust begins to break up, causing the most serious floods, especially along the Danube River. The drifting ice jams on sandbanks and at narrow sections where there are river islands and clogs the river. Often these ice-jams are broken by bombing.

Ice of sufficient thickness to bear a man's weight also forms on Lake Balaton. It covers the lake from shore to shore during cold winters. On clear cold nights the ice contracts. Because it is frozen fast to stones and plants on the shore, sharp crackling develops farther out where the ice is weaker. The fissures which form may be six to ten feet deep. When rendered invisible by snow covering, these crevices are treacherous.

Loess covers the greater portion of the Nagy Alföld, the Kls Alföld, the low plateaus of Transdanubia, and the lower slopes of mountains.


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During winter the loess areas are frozen for about 20 days each month. In the intervening periods of thaw, the ground is waterlogged on the poorly drained plains. During these periods and other periods of wet weather the ground is muddy and foot movement is difficult.

In level irrigated plains, there is the additional hindrance of ditches and canals. Irrigation ditches, forming a dense network, may be spaced only 200 to 300 yards apart. The canals are more widely spaced and are generally over 25 feet wide. However, these obstacles may be crossed at the numerous floodgates spaced at close intervals.

In the two sand areas of the Duna-Tisza region and the Nyirseg, conditions for cross-country movement are best from December through February, for the sand is wet or frozen most of the time. Movement is possible in all directions. In spring and autumn movement on wet sand would still be feasible, but direction would be restricted by the flooded inter-dune depressions. In dry weather loose sand makes going difficult. Then areas which have been stabilized with grass and crop cultivation are more easily traversed.

Foot travel is possible throughout most of the mountainous areas, though there are steep, stony slopes and narrow valley floors. Flooding occurs locally where valleys are wider and swollen streams overflow their banks. Conditions for movement through these valleys are better from late spring to mid-autumn when the ground is dry. Rain and snow are generally heavier on the windward slopes of mountains, but snow cover usually does not hamper foot travel.



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9. Diseases

Endemic diseases of military significance are malaria, typhoid and dysentery. Malarious areas include the entire course of the Tisza River, the region east of the river, the Yugoslav border area between the Danube and Tisza Rivers, and Bakes and Zala Counties. Central and northern Hungary are free from malaria. The greatest incidence of the disease occurs between June and August. Typhoid, which is widespread among the rural population, is more prevalent in eastern Hungary. Its seasonal increase in incidence is related to the increase in the number of flies from July to December, although human carriers may also transmit the disease. The greatest incidence of dysentery occurs in rural areas in July and August. Of all European countries, dysentery is most prevalent in Hungary.

Other diseases of military significance are typhus, which may become epidemic during time of war, leptospirosis, which is endemic in the marshes of western Hungary, diphtheria, scarlet fever, and influenza.

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PART III

INTERNAL SECURITY FACTORS

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1. Introduction

One of the most critical problems confronting the Communist regime in Hungary is the re-establishment of effective security controls over a hostile population. This task is all the more formidable because the events of October 1956 involved the near total collapse of the native Hungarian security apparatus on which the government had heavily relied. Of the various military and para-military organizations entrusted with the defense of the country, only the hated Security Police (commonly known as the AVH) remained loyal to the regime. The Hungarian Army, Air Force, Border Guard, and Civil Police proved either unreliable or ineffectual when called into action against the rebels, and in the end the government had to rely almost entirely upon Soviet troops to suppress the revolution.

The first steps taken by the Kadar administration towards reconstituting a system of state security were of necessity on an ad hoc basis. Early in November 1956 so-called "R-Groups," consisting principally of members of the former AVH, were hastily gathered together in Budapest "to liquidate all criminal and looting elements and to protect the population." The "R-Groups" soon afterwards received the assistance of three Officer Police Regiments of 1,200 men each, manned by Army officers and trustworthy NCOs. The Budapest City Police was gradually revamped, and special Workers' Guards manned by Party stalwarts were established in the factories. The same means of control were apparently adopted in the provinces, except that the role of the Officer Police Regiments was filled by militia units of company size staffed by Army and Air Force personnel.¹

In proportion as its strength within the country deepened during December 1956 and the early months of 1957, the Kadar regime took steps towards establishing its security controls on a more permanent basis. In December the "R-Groups" were disbanded and replaced by a new Security Police organization (BACS) which is believed to stand in direct line of

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succession to the old AVH.² In February the Workers' Guards were reorganized on a regular militia basis, under centralized control from Budapest.³ The Border Guard, which had done little to obstruct the massive flow of refugees into Austria and Yugoslavia during the closing weeks of 1956, gradually purged itself of unreliable elements and resumed close surveillance of the frontier early in February 1957. Reorganization of the two military services, whose personnel had either been demobilized or transferred to duty in the Officer Police Regiments and provincial militia, proceeded much more slowly. The Army eventually reacquired personnel and resources which enabled it to receive the 1936 conscript class in the spring of 1957, and the Hungarian Air Force as of the present writing (August 1957) is reported to have recently concluded a full-scale reorganization.

Side by side with the revitalization of Hungary's security forces has gone the re-establishment and expansion of the country's penal system. No sooner had the Kadar government overcome all formal opposition within the country than it launched a series of arrests of persons implicated in anti-Communist activities. This process, which is not yet complete, has probably involved anywhere between 20,000 and 30,000 persons. To accommodate the great influx of prisoners, it is believed that many of Hungary's prisons and forced labor camps have been reopened or expanded. Another significant return to Stalinist penal controls in Hungary is instanced by a decree of March 1957 which revived the old system of internal deportations by empowering the police to expel persons from any part of the country in which their presence was considered detrimental to the public welfare.⁴

The over-all security picture in Hungary at the present time (August 1957) may therefore be defined as one in which the Communist regime has succeeded in reimposing a system of security controls comparable in almost every important respect to the system of controls which existed prior to the October revolution. The remainder of this section seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of the new controls, with particular reference to the part which each may play as a favorable or unfavorable factor in Special Forces

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planning. A brief note has also been added as to the role of the Soviet troops in Hungary as a deterrent to current resistance activity and as a potential security force in the event that Communist Hungary's own system of state security should once again break down.

2. Security Forces (Map L)

According to information now available, control of Hungary's security forces (including the military establishment) has been vested since February 1957 in separate Ministries of Interior and National Defense. Under the Ministry of Interior are the Security Police (BACS), Civil Police, Border Guard, and Workers' Guards. Under the Ministry of National Defense are the Army and the Air Force. The Ministry of National Defense presumably maintains close liaison with the Soviet troops now on occupation duty in Hungary.

The total strength of the Hungarian security forces at the present time (August 1957) is estimated at 155,000, as compared with a pre-revolt estimate of at least 260,000. Much of the difference between the two estimates is explained by the drastic reduction in the size of the Hungarian Army, which now numbers barely half of its estimated October 1956 strength of 150,000. Soviet forces now in Hungary are believed to total about 70,000 officers and men.

Map L attached to this section indicates the approximate location of the principal internal security forces--i.e., Security Police and Border Guards--now operating in Hungary. The areas of major Soviet troop concentration are also shown. For reasons noted in the text, Map L does not identify units of the Hungarian Civil Police, Workers' Guards, Army, and Air Force.

a. Security Police

The backbone of the Communist regime in both pre-revolt and post-revolt Hungary is the Security Police. Fragmentary information now at hand indicates that this vital role is now being filled by an organization known as the Security Group of the Ministry of Interior

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(Belugy Inizterium Allamvedelmi Csoport), commonly known as BACS.⁵ Very little is known about either the size of BACS or its organization. It is currently estimated to have a strength of approximately 10,000, nearly all of whom are trusted veterans of the Security Police organization (AVH) of pre-revolt Hungary. Assuming that BACS organization follows more or less the same general lines as its predecessor, it is probably divided into two principal sections: (1) a militarized uniformed police, with detachments in Budapest, provincial capitals (as indicated on Map L), and some smaller towns, and (2) a plainclothes political section. The uniformed BACS personnel are presumably concerned with guard duties and riot control; the political section presumably seeks to ferret out actual or potential enemies of the state.

Although the Kadar regime has repeatedly promised that the new Security Police will not repeat the "Stalinist excesses" of the AVH, there seems little prospect that BACS will abandon any of the extra-legal processes so conveniently employed by its predecessor. A special decree issued in December 1956 by the Hungarian government authorized the police to seize and hold without trial for six months any person who "endangers public order, security, production, and communications."⁶ Another decree, issued in January 1957 and so far as is known still unrepealed, places a ban on unauthorized public assembly and strikes and provides for summary court procedure without written indictment and a possible death penalty for all persons so accused.⁷ The show trials of a few score revolutionaries in Budapest during recent months have probably been intended as a smokescreen for the fact that since October 1956 anywhere between 20,000 and 30,000 Hungarians have reportedly been sent to prisons and labor camps administered by BACS.⁸

In its dealings with the civilian population BACS undoubtedly relies on techniques familiar to every secret police and fully described in the U.N. report on Hungary.⁹ As far as its present personnel and means allow, BACS may be presupposed to have an informant net which penetrates into the humblest walks of Hungarian life. Selected personnel may operate as agents provocateurs.

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The present small size of BACS is probably an indication of the organization's desire to retain only those personnel whose loyalty to the regime was tested and proved during the recent revolution. As conditions in Hungary grow more stable and conditions for BACS recruitment improve, it seems not unlikely that the Security Police may expand in size to its estimated pre-revolt strength of 20,000.

Because of the proven loyalty of Security Police to the Communist regime during the October revolution and the demonstrated hatred which the organization aroused among almost all sections of the Hungarian population, it may be expected that BACS personnel would almost uniformly resist any Special Forces mission with every means at their disposal. The experience of October-November 1956 has also indicated that even those BACS personnel who might wish to aid a Special Forces venture in Hungary would probably find the way barred to them because of popular distrust of their motives.

b. Civil Police

Prior to October 1956 the Civil Police (rendorseg) were estimated to number well in excess of 50,000, possibly even as high as 75,000.¹⁰ In view of the routine nature of its ordinary duties--e.g., crime prevention, registration of persons and property, traffic control, etc.--the Civil Police has probably not experienced any substantial alteration in its pre-revolution strength.

Civil Police detachments can be found in appropriate strengths at almost every populated point in Hungary and therefore are not delineated on Map L. One of the principal duties of the force in recent months has been the validation of all identity certificates issued to Hungarian citizens, a measure evidently designed to furnish the government with a thorough check on the whereabouts of persons suspected of anti-regime activity and persons who have been missing since the revolution. The validation was scheduled to be completed on 30 September 1957.¹¹

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The experience of October 1956 proved the unreliability of the Civil Police at a time of national crisis, since most of its personnel either joined the rebels outright, gave them access to police equipment and supplies, or refused to take effective action against them. During the present year the regime has undoubtedly made strenuous efforts to rid the police of disaffected elements, but it has been severely hampered by the fact that the relatively large size of the police force makes it necessary to recruit or retain personnel who are not members of the Communist Party and whose loyalty to the regime is at best lukewarm.

c. Border Guard

The Border Guard (Határőrség, sometimes known by the initials HO) is under the administration of the Ministry of Interior and has an estimated strength of 20,000 men. During the revolution it seems to have disintegrated as an effective force, losing many of its personnel through desertion and emigration to Austria and Yugoslavia. Beginning in November 1956 the Border Guard was gradually reorganized by the addition to its ranks of so-called "Kadar soldiers"--i.e., Party volunteers and reliable Army personnel who had sworn allegiance to the new Communist regime. Soviet troops also assisted for a short period with border control duties. By the end of January 1957 the reorganization of the Border Guard had progressed to the point where control of the frontier was once more assured and many of the "Kadar soldiers" could be released from duty.¹²

The functions of the Border Guard are purely regulatory: prevention of illegal border crossings in or out of Hungary, maintenance of proper security in the frontier zone, control and supervision of all traffic in the frontier zone and across the frontier. As shown on Map I, the Border Guard is reportedly divided into eleven district commands, each of which is directly responsible to Border Guard Headquarters in Budapest. Border Guard districts are smaller in size and more heavily manned along the Austrian and Yugoslav frontiers than in the regions of Hungary bordering on Czechoslovakia, the

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USSR, and Rumania.¹³ A Border Guard training school is reportedly now in operation at Szeged.

Of particular interest to Special Forces planners are the security controls maintained by the Border Guard in the frontier zone, which extends inward from Hungary's frontiers to a depth of about 20 kms., although it apparently is considerably deeper at some critical points along the Austrian and Yugoslav borders. The zone is subdivided into three sectors: (1) first sub-zone, extending about 500 meters in from the frontier line; (2) second sub-zone, extending about 10 kms. in from the first sub-zone; and, (3) third sub-zone, extending about 10 kms. in from the second sub-zone. Special permission from the police or Border Guard is required for entry into the frontier sub-zones by persons who are not normally resident or employed in the frontier area. Hungarian citizens who reside permanently in the second or third sub-zones have a declaration affixed to their identity documents attesting that fact.¹⁴ Such persons are also screened carefully for political reliability and, on occasion, are required to serve the Border Guard as volunteer auxiliaries and informants.

Controls along the frontier line itself vary considerably according to locality. Along the Czechoslovak, USSR, and Rumanian borders surveillance of the frontier line seems to be almost cursory and is apparently limited to the customary plowed strip and the use of roving and stationary patrols. Along the Austrian and Yugoslav borders the frontier zone which had previously been cleared of minefields and barbed wire entanglements during the summer of 1956, thus facilitating the exodus of refugees from Hungary during the period November 1956-January 1957, has now been completely refortified. This process, according to several sources, has involved the planting of an area approximately 40 meters deep behind the frontier line with trip flares, anti-personnel mines, barbed wire entanglements, plowed strips, and other detection devices.¹⁵

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Outside the narrow sector of responsibility assigned to it, the Border Guard has no military jurisdiction or competence. Its potential ability to obstruct a Special Forces mission is limited almost entirely to the frontier zone. Inasmuch as the Kadar government has apparently made determined efforts during the present year (1957) to weed out unreliable personnel from the Border Guard and replace them with persons whose loyalty to the regime seems assured, Special Forces would probably be well advised to avoid wherever possible both the frontier zone and contact with the Border Guard.

d. Workers' Guards

The Workers' Guards, which were first employed as a temporary means of security control in the troubled weeks which followed the October revolution, were subsequently placed on a permanent footing by a decree of the Kadar government issued in February 1957. The decree stated that the new organization would be charged with the task of "assisting the armed forces in defending the achievements of socialism, insuring the calm of the working people and the smoothness of production, and preventing attempts to restore counter-revolutionary elements." To coordinate the work of individual Workers' Guards units, a central headquarters was established in Budapest.

Membership in the Workers' Guards, according to the same decree, is entirely voluntary and is open to all workers, men and women, who are loyal to the socialist order.¹⁶ Members are given arms and are required to attend training for approximately two hours each week, but receive no pay for their services. This last provision has probably curtailed the effectiveness of the Workers' Guards to a considerable degree.

Very little information is available as to the present strength or distribution of the Workers' Guards. The decree of February 1957 contemplated that units of the new organization would be established in all industrial enterprises except those under the direct supervision and guard of the Security Police. According to a 4 March 1957 report by a correspondent of East German Radio there were 160 Workers' Guards units organized as of that

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date.¹⁷ A U.S. source who observed the May Day Parade of 1957 in Budapest estimated that about 3,000 Workers' Guard personnel were seen on the streets, either marching in parade or lining the parade route.¹⁸

e. Army

At the present writing (August 1957) the Hungarian Army is probably worthless to the Kadar regime as an instrument of internal security. Its morale is considered to be extremely low, and many of its officer and NCO personnel who remained faithful to the Communist cause are believed to have been siphoned off for duty with the Security Police and Border Guard. The fact that the Army now has an estimated strength of 75,000 is largely accounted for by the induction of the 1936 conscript class during the spring of 1957. The loyalty of these new recruits to the Communist government is doubtful and, in any case, they will not be ready for unit field training until the summer of 1958.

Reorganization of the Hungarian Army is now underway, but its outline and general direction are far from clear. According to a statement issued by the government in April 1957, the nucleus around which the High Command will build appears to be the three Officers Police Regiments (also known as the "Emergency Force") which were organized in Budapest during November 1956 and are apparently still in existence.¹⁹ Other Army units, mostly of undetermined size and nature, are gradually being re-formed at garrison points in the provinces, but present information is too fragmentary to warrant plotting of their locations on Map L.

f. Air Force

According to the best information now available the Hungarian Air Force, which numbered an estimated 12,000 officers and men as of October 1956, is now undergoing a thorough reorganization. As was the case with the Hungarian Army, the Air Force proved so unreliable to the regime during the October revolution that its present potential as an internal security force is negligible.

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
g. Soviet Occupation Forces

The dominant role in the present internal security picture of Hungary is occupied not by any agency of the Hungarian Communist government but by the Soviet occupation forces which are stationed on Hungarian soil. These forces, in the opinion of virtually every qualified foreign observer, represent the only effective lever which sustains the regime of Janos Kadar in power. Except for their presence and the concomitant fear of further reprisals by the Soviet Union, it seems almost certain that the Hungarian people would not hesitate to renew their rebellion against Communist tyranny and once more overwhelm the security forces of the puppet government.

At the present time the total number of Soviet troops in Hungary is estimated at 75,000, an increase of 200 per cent over their estimated pre-October 1956 strength. About 70,000 of these are Army personnel who are gathered into six understrength mechanized divisions, one anti-aircraft division, and attendant headquarters and support units. The approximate location and maneuvering area of each of the seven divisions in Hungary is indicated on Map L attached to this section. In addition to Army personnel there are about 5,000 Soviet Air Force personnel in Hungary, most of them concentrated at Budapest, Papa, Veszprem, and Debrecen, and an unknown number of Soviet MVD troops.

During the October revolution and the weeks immediately following the Soviet forces in Hungary, as noted earlier in this report, repeatedly intervened against the insurgents and the civilian population. More recently, however, the Soviet forces seem to have surrendered all dealings with the Hungarian people to the Kadar government and now appear to occupy the role of a garrison force whose functions are to defend Hungary from outside attack and to overawe would-be resistance elements within the country.

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3. Penal System (Map M)

At the outbreak of the 1956 revolution the old system of wholesale internment and/or deportation of political unreliaables in Hungary had greatly declined in importance as an instrument of Communist policy. In July 1953 the government of Imre Nagy had decreed the abolition of all internment camps and an early end to the forcible removal of political unreliaables from large cities and the frontier zone to penal areas elsewhere in the country. Implementation of the Nagy decree seems to have proceeded slowly but with a fair degree of effect. General indications are that by late 1956 the number of prisons and camps in Hungary housing political prisoners and forced laborers had shrunk to a dozen or less, while those persons who had the means and the desire to return to their former places of residence from deportation areas were generally given the necessary permission.

The October revolution and the period of unrest which followed seem to have convinced the Kadar regime that there was no alternative but to return to the sterner penal measures of the Stalin era. In this connection, however, it should first be noted that the much-publicized deportation of several thousand Hungarians to penal camps in the USSR which occurred during November and December 1956 was apparently the result of an arbitrary decision by the Soviet authorities which may or may not have been concerted with the Hungarian government. No deportations of Hungarians to the USSR have been reported since January 1957, and an unknown percentage of the deportees taken before that date were later handed back by the Soviet Army.²⁰ Estimates of the total number of Hungarians abducted into the USSR have ranged as high as 40,000-50,000 persons, but these figures appear to be based entirely on hearsay evidence and are probably excessive.²¹

The Kadar regime began its own series of large-scale arrests late in 1956 and in the early months of 1957. The principal targets were real or suspected revolutionaries, Army and police deserters, participants

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in the Workers' Councils which figured so prominently in the rebellion and its aftermath, student leaders, intellectuals, and political prisoners who had been liberated by revolutionary action. By the end of May 1957 it was reported that the number of arrested persons had exceeded 22,000, and the number has since been swelled by further police roundups during the summer of 1957.²² A punitive drive undertaken during late July and early August 1957 which was variously estimated to have affected between 1500 to 10,000 persons included apparently not only persons connected with the uprising but some with an anti-regime background, such as former landlords and factory owners, Catholic clergymen, leading members of suppressed political parties, and a number of officers of Hungary's pro-German army of World War II.²³ On 10 September 1957 the U.S. representative to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, presented a list of 1,768 persons against whom the regime had taken punitive action between November 1956 and August 1957 for alleged anti-regime activities during and after the October revolution. The list was drawn entirely from Hungarian Communist sources and did not include any individuals against whom proceedings had been taken but were not reported in the newspapers. "We have no way of knowing accurately how many of these there may be," Lodge declared, "although some reports indicate the number is in the tens of thousands."²⁴

Map M and the table attached to this section indicate the probable locations in Hungary where the great majority of political prisoners and forced laborers may now be held. Only two of the camps and prisons shown on the map (Kistarcsa prison in Budapest and the camp at Satoraljaújhely) have been positively identified on the basis of available information as housing persons arrested since the October revolution. The other camps and prisons have been included on the map either because they were previously reported as having continued in operation after the Nagy amnesty of 1953 and/or because they are in the nature of permanent installations and work sites which offer the best facilities for coping with a sudden influx of prisoners.²⁵

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Also shown on Map M are the important mining areas of Hungary and one extensive agricultural tract (Hortobagy) in which forced labor had been or was still being employed as of October 1956. The likelihood that many post-revolution prisoners have been put to work in the coal mines is enhanced by the January 1957 admission of the Communist Party newspaper, *Nepszabadsag*, to the effect that some 40,000 coal miners had left their jobs in the pits since the start of the revolution.²⁶ Inasmuch as many of the missing miners may be presumed to have fled from the country, or to be otherwise permanently lost to the industrial labor force, it seems highly probable that the Communist leaders of Hungary have resorted to the familiar expedient of using their political enemies as forced laborers in the mines.*

Another standard feature of Stalinist Hungary which has made its reappearance since the revolution has been the system of internal deportations of politically unreliable elements from the large cities, frontier zones, and other sensitive areas. A decree of March 1957, previously mentioned, has given the police discretionary power to expel persons from any part of the country where their continued presence is considered inimical to the state, public security, or the socialist order.²⁷ Although the decree goes on to state that the expelled persons may move to any other part of the country not mentioned in their warrant of expulsion, and further specifies that an expulsion order may not stand for more than six months without judicial review and in no case for longer than two years, it is doubtful that these provisions have done much to protect the personal security of any Hungarian citizen who attracts the unfavorable attention of the police. The decree of March 1957 seems rather to reiterate the familiar pattern of internal deportations in

* At the end of January 1957 the Hungarian regime claimed that the mine labor force had almost regained its pre-revolt level. Widespread unemployment outside the mines and liberal benefits accorded to miners were partly responsible for this recovery, but there is a strong suspicion that large numbers of forced laborers were also required.

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Hungary during the years 1947-1953 in which more than 150,000 persons are believed to have been uprooted from western and central Hungary and re-settled in concentration villages in the relatively underdeveloped eastern regions of the country.²⁸

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
PROBABLE LOCATIONS OF MAJOR CONCENTRATIONS
OF FORCED LABORERS AND POLITICAL PRISONERS IN HUNGARY
(See Map M)

Map No.	Location	Coordinates	Remarks
1.	Albertfalva	4726N-1902E	Permanent camp; probably produces building materials; reported capacity of 600 inmates.
2.	Balassagyarmat	4805N-1917E	Camp; reportedly used as a distribution center; capacity unknown.
3.	Bekescsaba	4639N-2105E	Camp; reportedly used as a distribution center; capacity unknown.
4.	Bekescsaba	4639N-2105E	Prison; capacity unknown.
5.	Budapest	4730N-1905E	Prison in Tolonchaz area; serves as permanent collection point; capacity unknown.
6.	Budapest	4730N-1905E	Prison in Gyujtofogaz area; serves as collection point; capacity unknown.
7.	Budapest	4730N-1905E	Prison in Kobanya area (13 Kozma Ut); serves as main collection point for secret police; capacity unknown.
8.	Budapest	4730N-1905E	Prison in Fo Utca area; serves as distribution center; capacity unknown.
9.	Cegled	4710N-1947E	Transit camp; capacity unknown.
10.) 11.) 12.) 13.)	Dunapentele	4658N-1855E	Four penal farms in Bernatkut area; number of inmates unknown.
14.	Dunapentele	4658N-1855E	Prison in Palhalma Pusztas area; reported capacity of 3,000.
15.	Elep	4732N-2118E	Camp; reportedly the largest in Hungary; houses unknown number of inmates who work on state farms in summer and road construction in winter.
16.	Jaszbereny	4730N-1955E	Camp; distribution center with workshop; capacity unknown.
17.	Kalocsa	4632N-1859E	Penal farm; capacity unknown.
18.	Kalocsa	4632N-1859E	Prison; reported capacity of 3,000.
19.	Kistarcsa	4732N-1916E	Major internment camp; reported capacity of 2,000-5,000.

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Map No.	Location	Coordinates	Remarks
20.	Mako	4613N-2029E	Transit camp; capacity unknown.
21.	Marianosztra	4752N-1852E	Distribution camp with workshop; capacity unknown.
22.	Marianosztra	4752N-1852E	Prison; reported capacity of 1,500.
23.	Nagyhalasz	4808N-2146E	Camp; reputedly for purged Party members; capacity unknown.
24.	Nyirad	4700N-1727E	Camp; reportedly holds 2,000 inmates engaged in labor in nearby bauxite mines.
25.	Satoraljaiújhegy	4824N-2139E	Distribution camp; capacity unknown.
26.	Satoraljaiújhegy	4824N-2139E	Prison; capacity unknown.
27.	Szeged	4615N-2009E	Distribution camp with workshop; capacity unknown.
28.	Szeged	4615N-2009E	Penal farm in Nagyfa area; number of inmates unknown.
29.	Szeged	4615N-2009E	Prison in Csillag area (Marx ter 13); reported capacity of 3,000.
30.	Szentes	4639N-2016E	Transit camp; capacity unknown.
31.	Szolnok	4710N-2011E	Camp; holds unknown number of inmates reportedly engaged in mining.
32.	Szuhakalio	4817N-2039E	Camp; holds unknown number of inmates reportedly engaged in mining.
33.	Tallya	4814N-2114E	Permanent camp; holds unknown number of inmates engaged in quarrying.
34.) 35.) 36.) 37.) 38.) 39.)	Tatabanya	4733N-1826E	Six camps; each holds 600-1,000 inmates engaged in coal mining.
40.	Vac	4746N-1908E	Prison; reported capacity of 4,000.
41.	Várpalota	4712N-1808E	Camp; holds unknown number of inmates engaged in coal mining.
42.	Vasárosnamény	4807N-2218E	Transit camp; capacity unknown.



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PART IV

ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES

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1. Introduction

Part IV of this report deals with those features of the Hungarian economy which are vulnerable to exploitation by Special Forces. The section does not attempt to repeat the basic information on the main characteristics of the Hungarian economy which is readily obtainable from standard intelligence reference sources. Rather, this part of the report is intended to supplement (by presenting more recent information than is available in some of the older reference sources) and adapt existing intelligence to the peculiar requirements of Special Forces operations planning. Wherever it has been found that basic intelligence reference materials provide adequate information for the purposes of Special Forces planning, only a summarization of the major findings of those materials are presented here and the reader is referred in the text to the relevant source(s). In those instances, however, where existing intelligence reference materials fail to meet the requirements of Special Forces or where reference materials have not been incorporated into unitary reports and studies, a more detailed presentation of the information is offered in this report.

It must be borne in mind that although it is necessary in a report limited to Hungary to consider the Hungarian economy in relation to the country's national frontiers, in the final analysis this economy must also be considered in relation to those of neighboring Russian satellite states and to the USSR proper. It is only by considering these relationships in their fullest extent that valid conclusions can be drawn concerning both the probable effect and the worth of Special Forces operations against the Hungarian economy as a whole or any part thereof. In other words, Hungary should not be regarded by Special Forces planners as an isolated entity. It is therefore necessary to refer to similar Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas studies on neighboring countries and in particular to those on the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, before making a final appraisal of the potentialities which Hungary presents for Special Forces operations.

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2. Transportationa. Introduction

In Hungary, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe and in the USSR, railroads are the backbone of the transportation system. Roads, although probably better developed and maintained than in such other satellites as Bulgaria and Rumania, are an inadequate substitute for the railroads. Navigable waterways and pipelines possess a greater degree of economic importance than roads but are not comparable, either strategically or economically, to the railroads as traffic carriers and routes of invasion and supply from the USSR to Southern Europe.

Budapest is the focal point of the Hungarian transportation system. The principal road and rail lines radiate from the capital. The city is also the most important Hungarian port (and one of the most important in Southeast Europe), as well as one of the terminal points for the pipeline which begins in the Zala County oilfields in the southwestern part of the country. As a point of convergence for the main transportation routes, Budapest is also a major bottleneck to through traffic. Rail transportation, especially to Transdanubia, Austria, and Western Yugoslavia, is restricted at this point to two bridge crossings over the Danube. It is significant that routes have been developed in recent years, reportedly at Russian insistence, which enable some traffic to by-pass this critical point of stricture in the country's transportation system.

The importance which the USSR attaches to Hungary as a transit route leading to South Central Europe, and, more concretely, the importance of the Hungarian roads and railroads as lines of supply and communication to Russian troops stationed in Hungary, was of course clearly demonstrated by the Hungarian rebellion in late 1956. In a future war, the interdiction of the major transportation media on which Russian forces in Hungary would rely for contact with the USSR proper, or those which would serve as invasion routes into Austria and Yugoslavia in a drive toward the Adriatic, would obviously be most disruptive of Russian military strategy.

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Although it is reasonably certain that in time of war railroads and roads, in that order, would be the dominant transportation media for the movement of war materiel in and through Hungary, it would be presumptuous to assert on the basis of present circumstances that the most important transport routes would of necessity be those which are such in peacetime. Obviously tactical and strategic considerations might necessitate the use of alternate or secondary routes as heavy traffic carriers. Furthermore, with respect to connections with routes in adjacent countries, currently inoperative links could in a number of instances be reopened by the removal of barriers or the relaying of short stretches of connecting railroad track on existing roadbeds. Where connections would be re-established only through the construction of bridges or replacement of structures destroyed in World War II and not replaced since that date, a greater amount of time would be required to open the routes to through traffic but the tasks would not be impossible. In this way, routes which are presently of minimal significance to the economy of Hungary would acquire very great importance. This importance would be based wholly on strategic considerations of the moment and it cannot be anticipated on the basis of the current economic importance of the route in question. On the other hand, it is probable that certain transportation routes, by their location, orientation, and ability to handle a large volume of traffic, would continue to be as important in time of war as they are in time of peace. One such route, for example, would be that which enters Hungary from the Ukraine at Zahony. It could be reasonably expected that the enemy would make every effort to keep this critical route open in time of war. Indeed, the success or failure of some of his operations might to a large extent depend upon the non-interdiction of it and other routes like it.

In evaluating the transportation system of Hungary and its potential value to the USSR in time of war, Special Forces operations planners must bear in mind that many variabilities would be introduced into the transportation picture in time of war and that factors of a type and magnitude

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which can not be readily anticipated might completely alter the following assessment of the vulnerability of Hungary's transportation system.

b. Railroads (See Map N)

(1) General:

The Hungarian railroad system is a web-shaped complex in which the principal lines converge on and pass through the urban industrial Budapest area. These main strands of the railroad net are linked together by numerous secondary lines, including some of narrow gauge, which act as feeders to the main lines from agricultural and mining areas. The network is relatively dense as compared to other satellite states and is evenly distributed. It is, however, susceptible of division into isolated parts by the destruction of bridges over the two large barriers to lateral movement in the country, the Danube and Tisza Rivers.

At the end of World War II, Hungary's railroads were in a state of extensive and heavy damage. Through traffic had been immobilized by the destruction of bridges over the Danube and Tisza Rivers and by the removal of important stretches of track. By 1948, bridge crossings had been rebuilt and tracks repaired to a sufficient extent to permit the railroads to function nationwide on an adequate though limited basis. During the period 1949-1954 reconstruction continued, especially with respect to the replacement of temporary bridges by permanent structures and the rebuilding of temporarily replaced stretches of track to permit operation at normal speeds throughout the length of the lines. At the same time, work was begun on improving the network through the double-tracking and electrification of some of the main lines, the conversion of secondary lines to higher capacity, the improvement of roadbeds, the replacement of light rails with heavier ones, and the laying of new lines to previously unserved areas. Much of the work of reconstruction and expansion was accomplished with Soviet assistance, and prime attention was devoted to lines servicing Russian troops in Hungary and Austria. Despite the considerable amount of progress that was made, there were still in 1955 some 172 places

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on the Hungarian lines where trains had to be slowed to negotiate temporary or semi-permanent bridges, and some major railroad bridges had not been replaced.¹ Although some of these were at border junction points with Yugoslav and Czechoslovakian railroads, others were on internal lines. One of the latter type, the railroad bridge over the Tisza on the line Kal-Kisujszallas, is now being reconstructed but is not scheduled to be opened to traffic before December 1957.²

The wartime destruction of physical structures on Hungarian rail lines had consequences of long-lasting duration. Even today traffic cannot be said to flow in its normal peacetime pattern. Though it may be true that the reorientation of Hungarian railroad traffic according to the political and strategic dictates of the Soviet orbit obviates the necessity of reconstructing some of the wartime damage, and that it is this factor more than the magnitude of the reconstruction task itself, that accounts for the delay in rebuilding some of the more vital structures, World War II nevertheless demonstrated that the destruction of key railroad structures in Hungary, and particularly bridges over the Danube, Tisza, Drava and Raba Rivers can isolate the Hungarian railroad system from those of neighboring states, and at the same time effectively break the country insofar as its major transport system is concerned into three or more segments.

The Hungarian railroad system has been integrated with that of the USSR. The principal point of integration in Hungary is at the transloading center of Zahony in northeast Hungary on the border of the Ukrainian SSR. Extensive facilities have been developed at Zahony which permit the rapid changing of axles and wheels of cars and locomotives from Russian broad gauge to European standard gauge and vice versa. Other facilities at Zahony are those for interchanging packaged and bulk freight, including pumping machinery for the transloading of oil and gasoline from tank cars. A recent report alleges that the Russian broad-gauge track which previously terminated at Zahony has been extended as far as Komoro (4818N-2206E) where a new oil loading station has been built.³

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International connections are also maintained with Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, but of some 50 border connections which Hungary had with neighboring states prior to World War II less than half that number are operative at present.⁴ For the remainder, either bridges have not been rebuilt or, for border control purposes, tracks have either been sealed off or dismantled for some distance inside the Hungarian frontier. Many of these connections could be re-established with a minimum of difficulty if necessary.

Rolling stock continues in short supply on the Hungarian railroads despite the fact that the Hungarian rolling stock industry exports its products in considerable quantity, principally to the USSR. As of 1955, for example, holdings of locomotives and freight cars were still short of the 1937 level for these items.⁵

Hungary has a well developed rail transportation equipment industry. Most of the industry is located in or near Budapest, including the MAVAG locomotive factory, GANZ wagon works, and Klement Gottwald electrical equipment factory in the city proper, and the Dunakeszi railroad car plant in Dunakeszi (4738N-1908E). The Gyongos (4747N-1956E) railroad equipment plant and Gyor (Wilhelm Pieck) wagon works in Gyor are also important producers. The Gyor works is reportedly slated for expansion. In addition to producing freight cars, including tank cars, the works is expected to begin production of diesel electric locomotives in the early future.⁶ Reliable production figures are not available, but it has been estimated that 200 main line locomotives and 7,000 freight cars were produced in 1956. If it were not for deliveries to the USSR the Hungarian rolling stock shortage would soon be alleviated.

The considerable increase in traffic volume which has accrued in recent years (an 80 per cent increase in the period 1949-1954) has been achieved as a result of the most intensive use possible for existing equipment and lines. Under such a program, maintenance work on rolling stock is inadequately carried out and freight cars are loaded well in

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excess of rated capacity and prescribed levels.⁷ Demands on the system are constantly increasing and improvements with respect to lines and rolling stock together with maximum utilization have not sufficed to keep pace with the even more rapid development of mining and heavy industry, which together account for the largest share of the traffic.

Right-of-way maintenance is also neglected with respect to the replacement of rails and sleepers which, on many stretches, are more than 40 years old.⁸ To some extent the neglect is due to an inadequate supply of replacement parts. However, track maintenance in Hungary is also complicated by a lack of mechanical equipment; most maintenance work is performed manually. A further limitation is encountered in the loss of labor during the good weather months of the summer to agricultural endeavors.

Of all the weaknesses of the Hungarian railroads, one of the greatest is the lack of adequate and constant supplies of coal. This vulnerability has been demonstrated many times in recent years. During the winter 1955-1956 rail service was drastically curtailed, reaching a virtual standstill in February 1956, mainly because of a shortage of locomotive fuel. In September 1956, well before the November uprising during which coal production ceased almost entirely, the Hungarian press announced that 600 passenger runs would be suspended during October because of the inadequacy of coal supplies.⁹ Following the November uprising the railroads (as well as other branches of the economy) were able to resume service only on the basis of imported coal supplies.¹⁰ It was also officially predicted that the coal supplies for 1957 would be 40 per cent less than in 1956.¹¹ Normally, a two-week reserve of coal is kept on hand for railroad operation, but under the present conditions of exhausted stocks and short supply coal is issued on a daily need basis.¹² It is evident that coal constitutes a vulnerability in the Hungarian railroad system of special importance to Special Forces. Primarily because coal is moved by rail from mining areas and points of importation to consuming centers, the destruction of carefully selected railroad targets could wreak

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havoc with the railroads as well as with those other elements in the national economy which are dependent upon unimpeded supplies of coal.

(2) Principal Routes

Two routes of almost equal importance extend from Budapest northeastward to the Ukraine and connect with Soviet broad gauge. The first of these runs via Cegled, Szolnok, Debrecen, and Nyiregyhaza to Zahony and Chop. The second leads from Budapest to Hatvan, Miskolc, Satoraljaiújhegy and then through a short stretch of Czech territory to the Czech transshipment center at Cierna nad Tisou and beyond that point to Chop.

The Budapest-Zahony line is double-tracked at least as far as Szolnok and is probably double-tracked from Debrecen to Zahony. Double-tracking between Debrecen and Zahony has been in progress for a number of years and was reliably reported in the final stages of completion in mid-1956.¹³ The stretch between Szolnok and Debrecen was originally double-tracked throughout, but the second track was removed in 1945. The second five-year plan (1956-1960) has as one of its objectives the restoration of the double track in this sector. At present, it is likely that a second track extends beyond Szolnok only as far as Karacag.

From Zahony, site of Hungary's major transshipment point between Russian broad gauge and European standard gauge, the standard gauge line is thought to continue across the border into the USSR at least as far as Chop. This line apparently is not separate from the broad gauge track between Zahony and Chop but is merely a third rail arrangement on the broad gauge track permitting the operation of standard gauge trains. The bridge spanning the Tisza at Zahony is a single-track, dual-gauge (i.e., three-rail) structure. The line is used as part of a circuit between Hungary and the USSR for the return of empty freight cars via Chop, the Czech-USSR transshipment point of Cierna nad Tisou, and the Czech-Hungarian border crossing at Satoraljaiújhegy. With the completion of double-tracking between Szolnok and Zahony the circular routing of trains through Chop and

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Czechoslovakia may no longer be necessary but the route will undoubtedly remain of prime importance for obvious strategic reasons.

Traffic along both lines from Budapest to Chop is very heavy and consists of Hungarian exports of railway rolling stock including locomotives, machinery, electrical equipment, busses, trucks, textiles, aluminum, alumina and bauxite, oil, uranium ore, and foodstuffs. Import traffic consists of cotton, coke, coal, iron ore, and non-ferrous minerals and metals. Cotton and iron ore undoubtedly originate in the USSR. Coke and coal, on the other hand, probably come from Poland or Czechoslovakia via the USSR. It is very probable that much of the coal, coke, and iron ore imports enter Hungary via Satoraljaiújhegy, the closest point to the Ozd-Khainchbarika-Mosgyor steel-making area. Soviet military traffic, including both troops and supplies, also accounts for a substantial portion of the total traffic on the lines.

On the northern portion of the circular route between Hungary and the USSR, the 60-km. section between Budapest and Hatvan has been electrified. Due to a shortage of electric locomotives, however, the use of electric traction has been restricted to freight trains; passenger service is still maintained by steam engine. The work of electrification is to be continued in the direction of Miskolc under the latest five-year plan but is not scheduled for completion before 1960. The entire stretch between Budapest and Satoraljaiújhegy is thought to be double-tracked throughout. Bridges along the route are double with mutual abutments, i.e., each track leading over a separate bridge.

Traffic volume data on these important lines is available only for the route via Miskolc and Hatvan. This line allegedly handles 48 trains daily in each direction.

From a strategic standpoint the route from Chop via Czechoslovakia and Satoraljaiújhegy has two decided advantages over the one via Zahony and Szolnok. In the first instance, it avoids two vulnerable Tisza River crossings, i.e., at Zahony and at Szolnok, and in the second

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enables traffic eastbound for points in Hungary, Czechoslovakia south of the Carpathians, and Austria to avoid the Budapest bottleneck and the vulnerable Danube River bridges in Budapest. Budapest is by-passed by means of a connection between Aszod and Vac on the line to Szob and Bratislava. This connection was opened in 1951 and follows a route Aszod-Galgamacs-Vachartyan. It is double-tracked at least between Aszod and Galgamacs and between Vachartyan (4732N-1915E) and Vac.¹⁴ The main line Budapest-Vac-Szob to which this cut-off connects is also double-tracked and is one of the principal connections between Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Austria.

The principal lines of northeast Hungary which connect with the USSR are interconnected by a number of lateral routes which, in view of their potential value as alternates and by-passes, help to reduce the over-all vulnerability of either of the main lines. Among the more important of these connections is a single-track stretch between Nyiregyhaza and Szerencs which is used to return empty freight cars to the Miskolc area from the transloading stations in Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine. The connection is especially vulnerable as is another important link, between Fuzesabony and Debrecen, at the Tisza River crossing.

Another connection between Budapest and Szolnok via Ujszasz (4718N-2005E) is according to current plans to be double-tracked throughout by 1960. This sector of railroad is part of the main Budapest-Bucharest route via Izköshaza (4634N-2114E). Sixty per cent of Hungary's traffic with Rumania is carried via Izköshaza. The line was originally constructed as a double-track line but portions of the second track were removed during the early 1930s, and again in 1945. Replacement of the second track has been underway since 1951 and stretches between Budapest and Mende (4725N-1930E) and between Nagykata (4726N-1945E) and Ujszasz were the first to be replaced. At Ujszasz this alternate line joins a single-track line from Hatvan. This latter connection has been much improved since the war, with heavier rails and fortified roadbed. Although the Budapest-

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Ujszasz-Szolnok line represents an alternate route between Szolnok and Budapest on the Budapest-Zahony trunk line, it, together with the main Zahony track via Cegled, could easily be rendered useless as a through route by the destruction of either of the double-track railroad bridges which span the Tisza and Zagyva Rivers between Szolnok and Szajol. Destruction of either of these key structures would also interrupt direct connections with Rumania. It has been reported that recognition of the extreme sensitivity of the Tisza River crossing between Szolnok and Szajol has prompted a Russian request for the construction of an atomic bomb-proof tunnel at this point.¹⁵

Additional lines of importance in northeast Hungary are two branches from the Budapest-Satoraljaiújváros trunk line which provide added connections with Czechoslovakia. One of these runs northward from Miskolc, crosses the Hungarian border at Hidasnémeti, and connects at Kosice (Czechoslovakia) with the main line from Chop (Ukraine) to Prague (Czechoslovakia). It is a principal traffic carrier between northeastern Hungary and Czechoslovakia, with connections to Poland. The nature of traffic carried on the line is not known, but is likely to include coke for the steel plants in the Miskolc area.

The second branch from the Budapest-Satoraljaiújváros trunk route runs from Hatvan to Salgotarjan and connects with Czechoslovak lines at Lucenec. This line was also originally double-tracked but was reduced to a single-track line in 1945. It currently is of greater importance as a domestic line than as an international connection but its availability as an alternate route to the Budapest area from Czechoslovakia is of strategic interest.

From Budapest two main double-track lines of rail communication lead north and northwest to Western Europe. These lines are extensions of the trunk routes which enter northeast Hungary from the Ukraine and are of great strategic importance to the USSR. The first line extends

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northward from Budapest and follows the east bank of the Danube via Vac, crosses into Czechoslovakia at Szob and continues to Bratislava and Vienna. The relatively new connection between Vac and Aszod permits through traffic from the USSR to Austria and western Czechoslovakia to by-pass the national capital.

The second line is the double-tracked, electrified Budapest-Hegyeshalom-Vienna line via Tatabánya, Komárom and Győr. This line is probably the best in Hungary. It has a high traffic capacity and was formerly used as a main supply route for Soviet troops in Austria. An important vulnerability of the line lies in its almost total dependence for electricity on the Bánhida power station (near Tatabánya). Loss of electric power would necessitate the use of 90 steam locomotives to maintain traffic at current levels.¹⁶ In view of the chronic shortage of locomotives in Hungary, it is doubtful that, if electric traction were interdicted on this line, service could be maintained except at the expense of other lines in the Hungarian system, or with considerable Soviet assistance.

At Hegyeshalom, a connection, possibly inoperative, leads to Bratislava (Czechoslovakia) via the border-crossing point of Rajka. Another connection between this line and Czechoslovakia is made at Komárom via the reconstructed Danube River bridge.

From Győr connections extend to Sopron (the old Győr-Sopron-Ebenfurt line) and to Szentgotthárd via Celldömök and Szombathely. Both of these lines are important as alternate routes into Austria, the latter of the two connecting at Celldömök with an important main line from Budapest via Szekesfehérvár which handles much Soviet military traffic. Some of the lines crossing the Austrian border between Sopron and Szombathely have been reported as closed, some as dismantled in part, and others as open on only a limited basis. The exact status of each of the individual connections is unknown, but Hegyeshalom is the only authorized crossing point for travelers. When linked together these lines form important north-south routes between

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Vienna and Bratislava on the one hand, and Yugoslavian cities on the other, via western Hungary.

Southwest Hungary is served by two main lines radiating from Budapest. The Budapest-Szekesfehérvár-Nagykanizsa-Murakeresztúr trunk route, which crosses into Yugoslavia at Kotoriba is important as a domestic carrier serving the oilfields of Zala County and as an international connection to Italy. The line is double tracked between Budapest and Szekesfehérvár. The sector Nagykanizsa-Murakeresztúr was formerly double-tracked but one track was dismantled in 1945.

The bridge connecting this line with Yugoslavia over the Mura River between Murakeresztúr and Kotoriba was permanently reconstructed in 1955. Previously a temporary bridge handled the occasional traffic between Yugoslavia and Hungary at this border-crossing point. An alternate crossing a short distance to the east near Gyekenyes is inoperative due to the fact that the war-destroyed bridge spanning the Drava River has not been replaced.

Double-tracking of the remainder of the Budapest-Murakeresztúr line has been reported for many years, and was originally begun as a wartime operation. It is likely that the work has been completed, but confirmation of this possibility is lacking. The last five-year plan (1950-1954) anticipated the electrification of the stretch Budapest-Szekesfehérvár, with power being derived from the large Dnóta power station near Varpalota. The plan was not realized and it is not known whether it has been abandoned. A branch line from Szekesfehérvár to Komárom on the Budapest-Hegyeshalom trunk line is important as a carrier of bauxite from mines north of Szekesfehérvár to the country's largest alumina plant at Almasfuzito. The processed alumina is returned to Dnóta for further processing into aluminum.

The second major line serving southwest Hungary is currently of domestic importance only. It runs from Budapest to Pécs via Pusztaszabolcs and Dombóvár. It is an important carrier of coal from the

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Pecs-Komlo mining area to Budapest and beyond as well as to the new steel center at Dunapentele (formerly Stalinvaros). Plans call for the eventual double-tracking of the line from Pusztaszabolcs to Dombovar. The roadbed was allegedly widened for this purpose in 1951. Grades in the Dombovar-Pecs area are steep enough to warrant the use of pusher locomotives on heavy freight trains.

In order to avoid a roundabout route to Dunapentele from the Komlo coal mines, a connection was recently established between Retzilas and the branch line from Pusztaszabolcs to Dunafoldvar and Paks. The new stretch has undergone much sinking, however, and is serviceable only for light loads at low speeds.¹⁷ Coal continues to move to Dunapentele via the longer route through Pusztaszabolcs. The stretch between this point and Dunapentele was rebuilt in 1951. Curves were eliminated, bridges replaced, and the roadbed strengthened during reconstruction. Between Racalmas and Dunapentele reconstruction involved the laying of what amounts to a new line which is 2-1/5 kms. shorter than the old route. It is eminently possible that some of the (coking) coal hauled on this route to Dunapentele originates in Poland and reaches its destination via Czechoslovakia and the Danube River crossing at Komarom.

The railroad lines of southwestern Hungary are linked to those in the southeastern part of the country only by two vulnerable bridges over the Danube, at Dunafoldvar and Baja. The Dunafoldvar crossing will assume increasing importance with the realization of plans to provide an additional through route from northeastern Hungary and the Ukraine to southwestern Hungary and Western Europe. This route will begin at Kisujszallas on the main line to Chop and will run via Turkeve, Szarvas, Kunszentmarton, Kecskemet, Fulopszallas, and Solt to the Danube River bridge between Solt and Dunafoldvar. The beginning of the route will also connect via Debrecen with an alternate route into Hungary via Rumania from Chust in the Ukraine. The clear purpose of developing this line is to enable traffic from the USSR to by-pass Budapest. To date, the only connections which have been

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built between existing sectors of the proposed trunk route are those from Dunafoldvar to Solt, and Lakitelek to Kunszentmarton. At present the chief value of the Dunafoldvar bridge crossing lies in its establishing a circuit route for freight shipments between Budapest and Dunapentele, relieving somewhat the burden on the lines serving the western bank of the Danube.

Of the two Danube River crossings in southern Hungary the one at Baja is probably the more important. It permits the direct shipment of coal from the Pecs mining district to consuming centers in southeast Hungary. The line also carries oil from the fields south of Lake Balaton, and uranium from the Pecs area, to the USSR via routes which by-pass Budapest or by transshipment into Danube River vessels at Baja. In exchange, southwest Hungary is provided direct access to the crops of Hungary's main agricultural area. The stretch of line between Baja and Bacsalmas was reinforced by heavier rails after the war to permit the movement of heavy freight from Baja to Budapest via Bacsalmas and Kis-kunhalas. Prior to the destruction of the bridge over the Danube at Baja, heavy freight shipments from the port at Baja had moved along the west rather than the east bank of the Danube.

As of 1953 work was reportedly in progress to establish a direct connection between Baja and Budapest by connecting Dunapataj (4638N-1857E) to Baja via Kalocsa (4632N-1857E). Leveling work on the roadbed was allegedly underway at a number of points along the proposed route.¹⁸

Two strategically important routes serve southeast Hungary from Budapest. One of these is the main route to central Yugoslavia and the southern Balkans via the border crossing between Kelebia and Subotica. Originally this line was constructed with double tracks between Budapest and Kunszentmiklos but the second track was removed following World War I. In 1948 re-laying of the second track was begun between Budapest and Soroksar and it was planned to replace the second track as far as Kunszentmiklos. The extent of additional efforts in this regard is

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
unknown. Of the two connections which Hungarian railroads make with those of Yugoslavia, the one at Kelebia is the more important from the standpoint of peacetime traffic volume.

The remaining main route from Budapest to southeast Hungary runs via Cegled to Kecskemet and thence to Szeged. The line is an important connection between Budapest and the Tisza River transloading center at Szeged. Szeged is also an important textile center and the probable destination for some of the cotton imported by rail from the USSR via Zahony. Pre-war connections between Hungarian, Yugoslavian and Rumanian lines at Szeged have not been re-established nor has the important Tisza River railroad bridge in Szeged been rebuilt. From Szeged connections are maintained with lines in eastern Hungary via Hodmezovasarhely and Bekescsaba. The connecting line crosses the Tisza River on a combination railroad and highway bridge seven miles northeast of Szeged.

Although the main route between Budapest and Szeged runs via Cegled, a more direct route is available by means of a branch from Budapest to Kecskemet. This branch allegedly is the supply line for Soviet and Hungarian military camps in the vicinity of Orkeny (4707N-1926E). The fact that the line Budapest-Kecskemet passes through what is reliably reported to be a restricted military area explains in part why the longer route via Cegled is used for through traffic to Szeged.

A final railroad line of importance in eastern Hungary is one which branches from the trunk route Budapest-Zahony at Puspokladany and leads to Oradea, Rumania. The line is important as a main route through the central Transylvanian Mountains in Rumania and as an additional connection with the USSR via Satu Mare (Rumania) and Chust (Ukraine). The amount of traffic carried on the line at present is not known, but is probably not of very great volume.

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c. Highways (See Map O)

As in the case of railroad development, recent improvements in the Hungarian road net are closely related to USSR strategic military and economic needs. In northeast Hungary the principal routes to the USSR have been widened and resurfaced since 1950. Similar work has been performed on routes leading to the southwest frontier.¹⁹ Primary roads in Hungary are hard-surfaced (asphalt, concrete, paving block) all-weather highways; secondary roads generally have a water-bound macadam surface.²⁰ Both classes of highways rest on heavy stone foundations.

As Map O shows, the major highway arteries are those which lead from the USSR into and through Hungary towards Austria and Yugoslavia. To a large extent these arterial routes parallel the railroads described in the preceding section. A comparison of Maps O and N illustrates how closely the major roads and railroad lines coincide and exemplifies the greater economic and strategic importance which some transport routes have in relation to others in present-day Hungary.

The parallel nature of roads and railroads is of especial importance to Special Forces in that, in a large number of instances, roads and railroads cross water barriers side-by-side or even on the same structure. It is a very likely possibility that Special Forces could, in the course of a single operation, interdict both an important rail artery and a corresponding road route. The vulnerability of both of the major media of transport to interdiction by Special Forces is therefore considerably increased.

Hungarian highways have a very limited economic importance. The greatest part of the commodities exchanged in the course of national and international trade are moved by rail. Due to a combination of such factors as limited vehicle park, inadequate width and other features of secondary road construction, winding routes, and minimum maintenance, roads in Hungary cannot be expected to assume a greater economic importance for many years. The problem of Hungary's limited vehicle park will not be solved until the domestic automotive industry (with a 1955 production

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of up to 3,664 units) located on Csepel Island in Budapest, is relieved of the necessity of exporting its products.²¹ For the foreseeable future, Hungary's roads will probably continue to function mainly as links in the domestic communications system, as feeders to railheads and river ports, and, most importantly, as strategic routes for military operations. In the last-named regard, however, the limited load-bearing capacity of many routes and of the bridges along them, together with the deterioration which can be expected to ensue during the conduct of military operations, will tend to restrict their over-all value. For example, during the course of the November uprising, Russian military forces in a number of instances had to erect temporary pontoon facilities when existing bridge structures proved incapable of handling the volume and weight of their military traffic. The vehicle bridge across the Tisza River at Szolnok, for example, was weakened by heavy Soviet armor and forced the construction of a pontoon facility at that point.²² Similar structures were erected across the Tisza at Zahony in an effort to break the bottleneck created there by the inadequacy of existing bridge-crossing facilities.²³

As in the case of railroads, the events of November 1956 clearly demonstrate which highways in Hungary are strategically important. The Russian Ground Forces intervention was carried out almost entirely along the routes designated in Map O as international through routes. These are the routes which have received the greatest attention in recent years with respect to maintenance and improvement. In November 1956 they were the principal arteries for the movement of Soviet forces stationed in Hungary as well as for the introduction of troops from the USSR, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. In the case of movement from the latter two countries, it appears that extensive use was also made of primary routes paralleling the Hungarian borders in neighboring countries, and emanating from the southwest corner of the Ukraine. Accordingly, the main arteries, with Budapest as a focal point, proved to be:

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- 1) from southwest Ukraine--via Zahony, Nyiregyhaza, Debrecen, Szolnok and Cegled to Budapest;
- 2) from southwest Ukraine--via Czechoslovakia and eastern Hungary entering at either Satoraljaujhely or Hidasnemeti and thence to Miskolc, Gyongos, Hatvan, Godollo and Budapest;
- 3) from southwest Ukraine--via Czechoslovakia entering at either Komarom or Rajka onto the route Budapest-Hegyeshalom;
- 4) from western Rumania to Budapest--via Oradea-Puspokladany-Szolnok and Cegled (part of Highway 1 above);
- 5) from Budapest--to Szentgotthard and Szombathely via Szekesfehervar;
- 6) from Budapest--to Nagykaniza via Szekesfehervar;
- 7) from Budapest to Barcs via Dunafoldvar and Pecs; and
- 8) from Budapest to Szeged via Kecskemet.

In the cases of the third and fifth through eighth routes above, the flow of Russian military traffic during the November uprising was from the outlying terminals, where Soviet Ground Forces were already stationed, toward Budapest. In a general war involving areas west and south of Hungary, however, these highways would probably act as through traffic carrier extensions of routes one, two and four above.

Another factor which was demonstrated during the November 1956 uprising was the sensitivity of the Tisza and Danube River crossings. Soviet forces quickly moved to protect not only the Danube River bridges in Budapest, a fact that was widely reported, but also those at Rajka, Komarom, Dunafoldvar, and Baja. Tisza River crossing-points at Zahony, Szolnok and Szeged were also promptly safeguarded.²⁴ The rapidity with which these points were secured further emphasizes the barrier nature of Hungary's major rivers. Although it is true that if the main highway bridges across the Tisza and Danube were destroyed they could be replaced by pontoon facilities, it may be assumed that the USSR prefers to avoid the necessity of having to build them, and would again undertake to afford the existing


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permanent bridges maximum protection in the event of further hostilities in Hungary.

The inability of the secondary highways in Hungary to serve as adequate substitutes for the arterial routes in the handling of a large volume of military traffic was also demonstrated during the November uprising. During the second phase of the Russian intervention, secondary approach roads from Rumania became choked with military traffic moving into Hungary. This occurred at a time when the main highways were also handling a large volume of military traffic.²⁵ If the arterial routes had not been available, it is questionable whether Russian Ground Forces would have been able to accomplish their mission without considerable delay. It is also likely that their ability to move swiftly and in force over secondary roads would have been seriously impaired had it been necessary to handle return supply traffic. Conceivably, this requirement might have necessitated the development of one-way traffic patterns.

The vulnerability of a military force operating in or through Hungary to the interdiction of its road supply routes is readily apparent when viewed in the above lights. Through the interdiction of judiciously selected key structures, Special Forces could seriously impede Soviet military operations in Hungary or in areas south and west of the country that are contingent upon lines of supply and communications extending through Hungarian territory. The interdiction of primary routes, forcing a shift of traffic to ill-suited secondary roads and possibly into one-way traffic patterns, would at the very least prove to be a considerable handicap to enemy operations.

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d. Waterways

Hungary's navigable waterways include, in addition to Lake Balaton, approximately 1,000 kms. of rivers and canals. Of these, only the Danube (416 kms. within Hungary), the Lower Tisza, and the Upper Tisza including the Trans-Tisza (or East Main) Canal accommodate vessels and barges of 1,000 tons capacity. The Middle Tisza; the Koros (from Csongrad to Bekescaba); the Berettyo (from its confluence with the Koros to its junction with the Trans-Tisza Canal); and the Maros (from its confluence with the Tisza at Szeged to Mako) can generally accommodate 400-600 ton craft. During high water the larger-capacity vessels can navigate the Tisza throughout. During the winter months navigation is generally suspended because of ice, and river craft are berthed at the principal ports on the Danube and Tisza Rivers. Detailed information on the foregoing waterways is available in standard intelligence reference sources.

Despite the fact that it is a canalized river, the Sio, connecting the Danube River and Lake Balaton, is navigable only intermittently between Szekezard and Siofok. If improved, as long-range plans anticipate, this waterway from Lake Balaton to the Danube would assume a great importance as an outlet for bauxite from the Bakony Mountains mining area. The ability to ship bauxite direct to the USSR via the route Balaton, Sio and Danube would relieve the Hungarian railroads of a very considerable burden.

The most important recent development concerning the waterways of Hungary was the opening in 1956 of the Trans-Tisza Canal between Tiszaalok and Bakonyzeg (see Map P). By means of this canal craft of up to 1,000-ton capacity may now ply between the southern terminus of the canal and Zahony on the Ukrainian border. The canal serves as an outlet for the crop-producing area of eastern Hungary and provides direct access to the nearest Russian transshipment points for these products.

Hungary's economic plans envision improvements to the Berettyo (four locks and three dams) and Koros Rivers to permit navigation by

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high-capacity craft between the upper and lower portions of the Hungarian Tisza via the Trans-Tisza Canal. In addition, the middle portion of the Tisza will also be improved, primarily by dams and locks near Kiskore and Szeged which by regulating stream flow will lengthen the period of navigation for craft of 1,000-ton capacity.

Plans for the much heralded Danube-Tisza Canal (the confluence of the Danube and Tisza Rivers is in Yugoslavia) apparently have been laid aside. Emphasis is now being placed on the further extension of irrigation canals (which will be navigable in part) in the region between Kiskore and Mazotour in Szolnok county. Parts of the new system are under construction (see Map F; see also Land Utilization above). The new canals will be fed from Tisza water backed up by a dam at Tiszabura.

Waterways are used almost exclusively for international trade but handle only a minor fraction of the country's total freight tonnage. Hungarian statistics allege that in 1955, 1,780,000 tons of Hungarian freight were hauled 847,000,000 ton kilometers on domestic waterways. Comparable figures for railroad freight in 1955 were 67,816,000 tons and 8,780,000,000 tons kilometers.²⁶ The principal items of freight conveyed by water are:²⁷ coal (324,000 tons); stone and gravel (336,000 tons); crude oil (274,000 tons); iron ore and manganese (145,000 tons); and construction and fire wood (145,000 tons). Agricultural products and a minor amount of bauxite, both of which are exported, are also moved by water.

Of the principal items of waterborne freight, iron ore and manganese are imported from the USSR and have as their destinations the steel centers at Dunapentele and Budapest. The iron ore could originate either at Kerch' or Krivoi Rog in the Ukraine. Manganese could come either from Nikopol via the Dnieper River, or from the Caucasus (Chiatura). Coal is also an important item and probably originates in the USSR (nearest source the Donbass), although some amounts may come from West European countries. In view of the fact that Hungarian imports of coal were expected to rise very sharply in 1957 (one million tons forecast²⁸), coal traffic on the Danube and Tisza Rivers may have increased considerably.

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Crude oil as transported by water in Hungary is primarily an import item, originating in Bulgaria and Rumania and shipped to Hungary for refining. (Hungary has excess refining capacity.) Some Hungarian high-viscosity crude which cannot be refined at Hungary's existing installations is, however, exported direct to the USSR. Major refineries at Szony and Almasfuzito on the Danube above Budapest are the most likely destinations for the imports. Hungarian statistics for recent years show waterborne crude oil shipments ranging between 270,000 and 330,000 metric tons annually.²⁹ The statistics make no mention of river shipments of refined products which are reported by many sources to be shipped to the USSR via Danube River barges. Such shipments totaled an estimated 336,000 metric tons in 1953.³⁰

Navigable waterways in Hungary are vulnerable to interdiction by Special Forces primarily through the collapsing of bridges into the main channels. In this regard the new Trans-Tisza Canal is especially vulnerable in that it is crossed by approximately 20 bridges. Interdiction of the waterways through the destruction of bridges would have the added effect of interrupting highway transportation.

Of the few navigation locks which exist on the waterway system, all can be regarded as critical. Interdiction of the lock at Tiszalok would render useless the Trans-Tisza Canal as an artery serving the agricultural east. A lock and pumping station at Baja are vital to the maintenance of the water level on the Baja-Bezdan (Yugoslavia) Canal which acts as a feeder to the Veliki Canal in Yugoslavia. Another lock and a dam at Siofok are critical to navigation between the Danube and Lake Balaton. The dam is used to regulate the level of water in the lake and in the Sio River. The interdiction of levees and floodgates along the Tisza and the Trans-Tisza Canal could result in the flooding of crop lands during high water and a denial of irrigation water during the dry summer months.

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e. Pipelines

Hungary has at least one and probably two pipeline systems for the transportation of crude oil and natural gas. The known system is located in Transdanubia and extends from the Zala county oilfields to Szony and Almasfuzito with branches to Budapest and Petfurdo. A second and newer system has been reported to span eastern Hungary. It allegedly connects the oil and gas fields of Maszolaalfalva to Nyirbator via Debrecen. Although pipelines are an important part of Hungary's oil industry, available evidence indicates that the bulk of the crude oil and refined products is moved by rail and river barge.

The main line in the Transdanubian system is an eight- or nine-inch welded steel line buried from one to one and a half meters underground. Closing valves on the line are located approximately one kilometer apart so that in the event of a break in the line the flow of oil or gas can be effectively halted. Ujudvar is a central meeting point on this system for short lines from the Lipse-Iovaszai area near the Yugoslav border. Zalaegerszeg, the site of a new refinery, is also a terminal point for a short line from the Gellenhaza and Nagylengyel oil fields.

Although a number of reports attest to the probability of a connection between the lines originating in the Iovaszai-Lipse fields on the one hand and the Nagylengyel-Gellenhaza fields on the other, reliable information on this subject is not available.³¹ One recent report from a fairly reliable observer alleges that a new pipeline is under construction between Zalaegerszeg and Szony.³² The route of the new line is unknown.

Pumping stations are located along the routes of the pipelines in Transdanubia wherever terrain obstacles must be overcome. Pumping stations on the main transmission line are located at Ujudvar, Balatonbereny, Balatonboglar, Siofok, Kopolnasnyek, Erd (Danube River crossing), Baracska, Ujbarok, and Szony. Reserve storage installations are also located at these stations; their function is to permit the uninterrupted transmission of crude oil during emergencies resulting from a break in the line or a loss of pressure.³³

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The pumps are electrically motivated but each installation is equipped with reserve internal combustion engine type pumps to be used in the event of electrical failure.

The main pipeline in Transdanubia is used alternately to convey crude oil to refineries in Budapest, Szony, Almasfuzito, and Petfurdo, and natural gas to Budapest and Petfurdo. Gas is piped through twice a week, usually on Thursdays and Sundays, but only if sufficient stocks of crude oil have been supplied to the refineries beforehand. The absolute quantities of the two products transported via the Transdanubian pipeline system are unknown. It has been estimated, however, that up to 400,000 metric tons of crude oil were shipped on this line in 1955. The amount of natural gas reaching the Obuda gas works in Budapest has been placed at 220,000 cubic meters per 24-hour delivery period.

Information on pipelines in eastern Hungary is more fragmentary than for western Hungary. An eight- or nine-inch line similar in construction to the main line in Transdanubia has been reported to run from the oil and gas field area of Maszolaalfalva near the Rumanian border to Debrecen via Barkonszeg. Pumping stations are said to be located at Maszolaalfalva, Barkonszeg, and west of Debrecen. The purpose of this line is not clear. It may serve to transport crude oil to a relatively new refinery at Debrecen, or to supply natural gas to that city, or for both purposes. A late 1956 Hungarian press release, which reported that a natural gas pipeline from Keroeszegapati (4702N-2158E) to Debrecen was under construction, fails to clarify the matter.³⁴

Another line which may be an extension of the one from Maszolaalfalva and which according to available information was completed in 1954, extends northeastward from Debrecen to Nyirbator.³⁵ An installation variously reported as a refinery (200,000 metric ton capacity) or storage depot (6,400 metric ton capacity) is the northern terminus of the line in Nyirbator. One source of untested reliability has reported, however, that the northern terminus is not Nyirbator but Nyirbogdany (4803N-2150E) where a 100,000 metric ton capacity refinery is located.³⁶

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Current economic plans call for the construction of a pipeline in this general area of eastern Hungary to convey natural gas from Rumania to a new chemical complex under construction in Tiszapalkonya.³⁷ It is not known whether this line will be part of the above-described system or entirely separate from it.

The sensitivity of Hungary's pipelines as a vulnerable part of the country's transportation system is illustrated by reports that the Transdanubian line is patrolled throughout its length. Guard stations reportedly are located at approximately ten-kilometer intervals along the line.

Interdiction of the main pipeline system in Transdanubia, if accomplished at some point between Ujudvar and the northern tip of Lake Balaton, would disrupt the flow of crude oil to the refineries and would also deprive Budapest and Petfurdo (chemical works) of natural gas supplies. In selecting a possible point of interdiction, however, Special Forces planners should bear in mind that destruction of pumping facilities would be more beneficial than would the simple cutting of the line. Pumping facilities cannot be easily replaced whereas a broken line can be repaired in a matter of hours. Similar considerations would apply to the lines in the eastern part of the country.

If Hungary's pipelines were interdicted, alternate means of transportation for the crude oil and natural gas usually handled by these facilities would have to be employed. These means would necessarily be rail and road tank cars. However, the rail tank car fleet can only with difficulty cope with present shipment problems occasioned in part by the fact that high viscosity crude oil from the country's largest producing field at Naglyengyel is not suitable for pipeline transmission without some arrangements for heating, especially at pumping sites. Pipeline interdiction, coupled with the destruction of pumping facilities, would therefore have a most deleterious effect on the Hungarian industry. If accomplished in conjunction with the interdiction of rail transport between the oil fields and the major refineries, it would probably force a prolonged suspension of the industry's activities.

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3. Minerals

Of the commercially exploitable mineral deposits in Hungary, some are sufficiently valuable to have attracted the attention of the USSR. Included in this category are bauxite, crude oil, and uranium. Hungarian bauxite especially is important to the USSR, although the full extent of that country's dependency on the Hungarian product cannot be accurately assessed. Only the large Russian alumina and aluminum plant at Zaporozh'ye in the Ukraine is thought to be supplied with Hungarian bauxite and alumina exclusive of any other source. However, the amounts of bauxite and alumina annually exported from Hungary are more than sufficient to keep this plant working at full capacity. It is possible, as is certainly the case with crude oil and uranium, that the exploitation of Hungarian bauxite is founded in Russian policy to make full use of satellite resources in order to conserve those of the Soviet Union. It is in the light of the possible existence of such a policy that Special Forces planners must determine to what extent it may be either necessary or desirable to interdict the mineral products which Hungary supplies to the USSR.

Minerals other than the foregoing which are extracted in Hungary are of such poor grade that they would be less than marginally valuable in other countries more richly endowed. In Hungary, however, they are vital to that country's economic structure. Coal, including coking coal, and iron ore fit this description. The quantitative and qualitative insufficiency of the domestic supplies of these minerals is a very important aspect of Hungary's internal economic vulnerability.

a. Coal³⁸

Hungary's coal deposits, which vary in size, type, and calorific content of the recovered mineral, are located in the crescent-shaped string of mountains extending from Miskolc in the north to Pecs in the south. Throughout this area there are located approximately 137 separate coal mines.³⁹ The most important mines are found in the districts of Pecs-Komlo (site of the country's only hard coal reserves), Tata-Banya-Dorog

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(good quality brown coal), Salgotarjan-Edeleny (low quality brown coal), and Varpolata (lignite).

Hungary's coal reserves, even when managed under the most intensive productive conditions of the Communist regime, are not able to produce coal in sufficient quantity and of adequate quality to meet all of the country's internal needs. Although coal productivity doubled under the Communist regime between 1949 and 1955 (i.e., from 11.8 to 22.3 million metric tons) only a 20 per cent increase in available energy was derived because most of the increase in volume was accounted for by poor quality lignite.⁴⁰

The poor quality of the coal currently available has posed serious problems to Hungary's economic planners. Despite attempts to improve the product by mixing it with higher quality imported coal, frequent breakdowns in boiler operations, including those of the railroads, continue to result from the cumulative corrosive effects of the inferior fuel. Other effects have been a further taxing of railroads due to the necessity to haul greater tonnages to supply needed caloric values, and the necessity to import increasing quantities of coal in an effort to meet the needs of Hungary's expanding industrial enterprises.

The November 1956 uprising seriously aggravated Hungary's very delicate coal position. As a result of the stoppage of production during the rebellion together with production shortfalls in earlier months, 1956 production fell ten million tons short of planned output.⁴¹ Despite countermeasures by the regime which consisted mainly of large-scale emergency imports, railway services, power plant operations, and most industrial activity had to be drastically curtailed through the winter of 1956-1957.⁴² Moreover, it was not expected that the crisis would be easily alleviated and the regime forecast that in 1957 Hungary would be forced to import four million tons of coal--an amount eight times more than the usual quantity, and equivalent to 16 per cent of the nation's requirement of approximately 25 million tons. Planned production for 1957, as determined in mid-year, set an optimistic 20.5 million tons as the target.⁴³ If, as everything indicates, production

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should fail to achieve this goal, Hungary will again face a severe coal crisis in the winter of 1957-1958.

The coal crisis of the winter of 1956-1957 was not an unusual event in itself for Hungary although its severity was greater than any heretofore experienced by the regime. Previous winters had been the occasions for similar crises with concomitant shortages of electric power, industrial halts and slowdowns, and suspended railroad operations.⁴⁴ The meaning of these crises for Special Forces planners is that coal obviously constitutes a glaring vulnerability in the Hungarian economy. Hungary's railroads annually consume 20 per cent of the nation's coal, power plants 30 per cent, and industry 33 per cent.⁴⁵ Without coal railroad services cannot be maintained, electric power cannot be produced, and industry, whether dependent upon coal directly (for fuel or in the manufacture of iron and steel, and coal chemicals) or indirectly (for power as for example the aluminum industry) cannot function.

Alternative fuels are of little help in times of coal crisis either because they are not available within Hungary in sufficient quantity or because the coal-reliant consumers are not prepared to use them. As examples of some of the alternatives which have been unsuccessfully employed in the past there may be noted briquettes from East Germany, and peat soaked in oil from Pakura. The former have been of a most inferior quality unusable even by East German standards. The latter is difficult to use because of boiler conversion problems and has a severe corrosive effect on boilers.

The problem confronting Special Forces planners is how to interdict the coal sector of the Hungarian economy. Two methods susceptible of practical exploitation by Special Forces suggest themselves. In some coal-producing districts one of these methods might suffice; in others a combination of both would perhaps be necessary to achieve worthwhile results.

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Interdiction of the railroads at points between the producing and consuming centers is the first, and probably the best means available to Special Forces to interdict Hungary's coal supplies. Railroad interdiction would, however, have to be carefully planned. For example, in the case of coal from the Pecs-Komlo district, the cutting of the very important branch railroad between Komlo and Oroszlo would entirely prevent the movement of coal from the Komlo mines. On the other hand, the interdiction of the main railroad lines leading north and east from the area as a whole toward Budapest and Dunapentele would, although seriously impede, not wholly stop coal shipments because of the availability of alternate railroad routes. Knowledge of the condition of the alternate lines in regard to roadbeds, weight of rails, length and frequency of sidings, and capacities of bridges would be necessary to determine the suitability of any single line for handling heavy coal traffic. In all probability local reconnaissance would demonstrate that many alternate lines would be incapable of carrying such traffic. The selection of the best possible points for interdiction would have to be made on the bases of normal coal traffic patterns, and the capacities of the main and alternate railroad lines serving each coal-mining district. The availability in Hungary of a greater number of alternative railroad routes than are to be found in other possible areas of Special Forces operations, as for example in many parts of the USSR, necessitates a more thorough analysis of local railroad traffic patterns than can be undertaken in this study.

Special problems would confront Special Forces operating in the northern part of Hungary. Here the selection of points of interdiction of railroads with regard to coal traffic would be governed not only by considerations relative to severing the producing from the consuming centers, but also by those relative to the railroad routes over which coal is transported. As in the earlier case, interdicting the main railroad lines would obviously be the first objective of Special Forces. But a more extensive program of interdiction would be required in view of the fact that the large industrial consumers are closer to their domestic sources of supply than in the case of Pecs-Komlo,

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and that the lines from the producing to consuming centers do not coincide with those over which imported coal is supplied to the region. The Miskolc area is the most noteworthy example. In this district local coal sources are nearby to the northwest, whereas imported coal and coke are brought in from the northeast. Finished products, consisting of steel, iron, chemicals, and fertilizers leave the area to the southwest and northeast. In order to sever the region from its coal supplies, more than one main line would have to be interdicted. The smaller number of alternate secondary routes over which coal can be shipped is, however, a factor favoring Special Forces operations in this area.

The second and less propitious method of interdicting Hungary's coal supplies consists of direct attacks on mines and their associated installations. Although the destruction of hoists and conveyors, the blocking of shafts and the flooding of galleries could all be employed to render any mine inoperable, such interdictory methods are less effective than those which can be advanced against the railroads for the single reason of economy of effort. A large number of direct attacks on mines would be required before the cumulative effect would be as great as the interdiction of one or two critical railroads. Nonetheless, in instances where the interdiction of an important installation, as for example a power plant, depends upon denying it its fuel from a nearby mine, the destruction of the connecting coal conveyor system promises the best results. The large 136,000 kw. Matra plant and the 60,000 kw. Tatabanya facility which are fed by conveyors from nearby coal pits are cases in point (see under Power).

b. Coke

Hungary has very little coal of the quality necessary to produce metallurgical coke. Coal from the Pecs-Komlo district is coked at Pecs and is also shipped to Dunapentele (formerly Sztalinvaros) for coking in the ovens of the large, new, steel center at that place. Some amounts may also be delivered to the Obuda gas works in Budapest for coking. At both Dunapentele and Budapest it is believed that the domestic product is mixed

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with imported coking coal in order to produce a more satisfactory end product. A large facility has been developed at Kazincbarcika to coke the brown coal of the Borsod county mines according to a German-developed process.

At best, Hungary's coke plants can produce only 10 per cent of the country's industrial requirements for coke and up to one million tons of that product are imported.⁴⁶ Better than half of this amount is obtained from Poland, either directly or through the intermediation of the USSR. Czechoslovakia and Belgium supply each an estimated 100,000 tons annually to Hungary: Up to 200,000 tons a year have been obtained in the past from West Germany.⁴⁷

Most imported coke and coking coal is delivered to Hungary by rail although some amounts arrive by water. This latter method is probably restricted to imports from Western Europe or the USSR. Water-hauled coking coal is probably delivered to the Dunapentele steel works although some amounts may also go to Budapest and other Danubian ports. The rail routes entering Hungary at Zahony and Satoraljaujhely are heavy coke and coal carriers. It is through their interdiction that Hungary could be deprived of the greatest part of its imported coal and coke supplies.

c. Bauxite

Bauxite is Hungary's most valuable natural resource. The Hungarian supply of this mineral is moreover one of the most valuable in the entire USSR and satellite bloc. The extent of the USSR's dependency upon Hungarian bauxite as well as on Hungarian processed alumina and aluminum is not known. USSR bauxite production is reported to be only somewhat less than Hungarian production of that mineral, and could cover an annual production rate of 300,000 tons of aluminum. However, the USSR is receiving bauxite, alumina, and aluminum from Hungary in amounts equivalent to 200,000 tons or more of aluminum.* It is possible that it is USSR policy to exploit Hungarian bauxite

* The exact amount is difficult to estimate and would depend largely on the quality of the bauxite received.

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is preference to depleting its own domestic reserves of that product, but such a policy would not constitute a dependency upon the Hungarian mineral. It is also possible that the USSR could be stockpiling the Hungarian products. Until some determination can be made of the aluminum consumption rate within the USSR, however, it will be impossible to determine the true importance of Hungarian bauxite, alumina, and aluminum to the USSR economy.

The pre-war rate of bauxite production in Hungary has more than doubled in the post-war period. More than 1.2 million tons of bauxite have been produced every year since 1950.⁴⁸ Hungary's bauxite reserves have been estimated at 200 million tons of good quality ore, but accessible high grade ore deposits are rapidly being exhausted.⁴⁹ The remaining high grade reserves are located in deep strata where recovery is both more difficult and more expensive.⁵⁰ Much low quality ore is currently being mined primarily because it is more readily accessible than are the better grade deposits. It is the low quality ore which is retained within Hungary; the better grades are exported to the USSR.

The decline in the quality of ore supplied to Hungary's alumina plants is responsible for a relative increase in the amount of ore consumed by them per ton of alumina produced. Whereas previously four tons of bauxite yielded two tons of alumina from which one ton of aluminum could be produced, about six tons of bauxite are now required per ton of aluminum and the ratio may become even more disparate.

Bauxite is recovered almost entirely from deposits in the Bakony and Vertes Mountains, west and north of Lake Balaton. Bauxite mines near Villany southeast of Pecs near the Yugoslav border are the sole exception to this rule. In the Bakony district bauxite mines are located near Tapolca (46°33'N-17°26'E), Sumeg (46°58'N-17°16'E), and Halimba (47°02'N-17°32'E). Of these mines those at Halimba are the most important. In the Vertes Mountain area, mines are located near Gant (47°23'N-18°23'E) and northwest of Szekesfehervar at Iszkaszentgyorgy (47°14'N-18°18'E).

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Domestic capacity to produce alumina and aluminum is limited by shortages of caustic soda and electric power and therefore up to 850,000 tons of the mined bauxite are exported annually. The greatest part of this tonnage is shipped by rail to the USSR. Minor quantities of bauxite are delivered to other satellites, among which Czechoslovakia is the largest recipient. In return for Hungarian bauxite which is used for the manufacture of abrasives, Czechoslovakia supplies Hungary with 500 million kw. of electric power. At the present time only minor amounts of bauxite are being exported by water and improvements to the Sio Canal connecting Lake Balaton to the Danube River will have to be effected before water transportation of bauxite can be pursued on a profitable scale.

From the 400,000 odd tons of bauxite which remain in Hungary slightly more than 150,000 tons of alumina are produced at plants located in Ajka, Almasfuzito, and Mosonmagyaróvár. The Almasfuzito facility is the largest, having a capacity of 60,000 tons. It is planned to expand this capacity to 100,000 tons at some future time. The Ajka alumina plant has an estimated capacity of 40,000 tons and the Mosonmagyaróvár facility's capacity has been estimated at 25,000 tons.⁵¹ This latter plant also recovers in the form of oxides 80 per cent of the titanium and vanadium present in the bauxite. The titanium oxide is processed for titanium in Hungary and is used in domestic steel production. Vanadium pentoxide is sent either to Czechoslovakia (Ostrava) or Poland (Katowice) for refinement into vanadium.

Only an amount of alumina sufficient to produce 37,000 tons of aluminum is retained in Hungary and the remaining surplus is exported in its entirety to the USSR. The exportable surplus ranges between 60,000 and 80,000 tons according to the quality of the product and constitutes a valuable addition to the total USSR alumina supply.

Aluminum is manufactured in Hungary at Ajka, Tatabánya, and Inota. The Ajka plant operates on its own alumina production and has an aluminum capacity of approximately 11,000 tons. The output of alumina at Ajka is more than sufficient to supply the aluminum plant and yields a substantial portion of the

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total alumina export surplus. Tatabánya has a capacity for aluminum equal to that of Ajka. It receives its alumina by rail from Mosonmagyaróvár. Electric power is supplied from the nearby 80,000 kw. Bányhidai power station. The Inota aluminum works are the newest and largest in the country. The design capacity of this plant is approximately 17,500 tons of aluminum. Power is obtained from the 120,000 kw. Inota power plant, one of Hungary's largest. Alumina is received from Almasfuzito via the rail route Komárom-Kisbér and Szekesfehérvár. Between 30,000 and 35,000 tons of alumina are required to produce the 16,000 tons or more of aluminum manufactured in this facility.

Of the estimated 37,000 tons of aluminum ingots produced by Hungary's aluminum plants, 20,000 tons are exported to the USSR and to other satellites. The remaining 17,000 tons are processed at rolling mills in Szekesfehérvár, Vac and Budapest.

Hungary's aluminum industry is open to interdiction in a number of ways. Exports to the USSR take place at the end of each step in the aluminum-making process from bauxite mines to rolled-aluminum products. The greatest damage to the entire industry would be accomplished if bauxite were prevented from reaching either the alumina plants in Hungary or the USSR. With the denial of bauxite supplies production of the intermediate and end products would cease when existing stocks of bauxite, alumina and aluminum were exhausted. Railway interdiction between the bauxite mines and the alumina plants, between the mines and the Danube River ports, and between the mines and the transloading stations on the Hungarian border undoubtedly are, in terms of long range results, the most effective means available to Special Forces to interdict this important aspect of Hungary's economy. If it should become desirable to halt immediately the production of aluminum ingots in Hungary, the denial of power supplies to the aluminum plants is the best means of accomplishing this objective. Severing the rail connections between the alumina and the aluminum plants would have much less of an immediate effect on aluminum

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production than would the loss of electric power, but would nevertheless force the plants to shut down once their alumina stocks were consumed.

d. Oil and Gas

Hungary occupies a most unique situation insofar as crude oil supplies and derivatives are concerned. The country is a net exporter of crude oil and petroleum products, has an apparent surplus refining capacity, but is dependent upon imported crude oil for its supplies of gasoline, diesel fuel, and light oil lubricants. This anomalous situation is accounted for by the fact that Hungarian refineries lack the necessary facilities to crack the heavy asphalt-based crude oil now being produced in the country.

Hungary's oil wells have produced up to 1.6 million tons of crude oil annually. This amount has been derived principally from two major fields centering on Nagylengyel and Iovasz in southwest Hungary. Some crude oil is also being produced at fields in eastern Hungary near the Rumanian border (see Map Q). According to recent estimates the rate of production is now only half of the figure given above. The drop in production is attributable in part to the effects of the November 1956 uprising but mainly to a recent decision to restrict production in order to prolong the life of the fields and recover a greater proportion of the reserves.

Crude oil is refined in Hungary mainly at the following locations (production capacity figures in parentheses): Szony (300,000 metric tons); Almasfuzito (200,000 m.t.); Csepel-Budapest (250,000 m.t.); Petfurdo (200,000 m.t.); Zalaegerszeg (200,000 m.t.); Nyirbogday (100,000 m.t.); and Szeged (50,000 m.t.). The refineries are primarily of the atmospheric and vacuum distillation type. Only the Szony plant is thought to possess any thermal cracking equipment. One recent report states, however, that similar equipment has been installed at the Zalaegerszeg refinery.⁵² This statement appears reasonable in view of the fact that the refinery was developed especially to handle the highly-viscous crude oil from the Nagylengyel-Gellenhaza fields. However, an official source whose information seems credible stated in 1955 when the Zalaegerszeg refinery was being built that thermal cracking capacity constituted

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only one per cent of the total refining capacity in Hungary and that cracking capacity would not be further developed under then current plans.⁵³

In order to offset its lack of thermal cracking capacity and satisfy needs for gasoline, diesel fuel, and light oil lubricants, Hungary imports light crude oil from Austria and Rumania. The foreign products are suitable for refining at Hungarian distillation plants. Domestic crude oil when processed at these refineries yields gasoline of only 26 to 30 octane and much modernization of equipment will be necessary before Hungarian plants will be prepared to supply a better product. The bulk of the domestic crude oil is therefore exported either as such or as residuals after topping, to other satellites and to the USSR. Poland and East Germany are major consumers among the satellites. Both of these countries have excess refining capacity in relation to domestic production of crude oil.

The Danube River and the strategic railroad line to the USSR via Zahony are the primary arteries for the outward movement of POL products. Budapest is the main transloading station for Danube River oil traffic, although the refineries at Almasfuzito and Szony are also points of transshipment. Komarom on the main railroad line to Chop is the most important point for the transloading of oil products shipped to the USSR by rail.

The Hungarian petroleum industry is most vulnerable to Special Forces interdiction through attacks on pipelines and railroads (see above under Transportation). If these transport media were cut, crude oil could not be moved from the oilfields for either refining or export. Railway interdiction would also prevent the importation of Austrian crude oil which is a major source of Hungary's gasoline and diesel fuel supplies. Interruption of traffic on the Danube River to the south of Budapest would effectively halt the delivery of supplies of Rumanian crude oil. This conclusion is advanced in view of the fact that the

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country's largest refining, storage and handling facilities are located on the Danube at Budapest, Szony, and Almasfuzito.

Natural and coke oven gases are assuming an increasing degree of importance in the Hungarian economy. An estimated 543 million cubic meters of the natural product were consumed in 1955.⁵⁴ Natural gas supplies are obtained from the main producing oilfields as well as from a number of locations in eastern Hungary where gas has been discovered in the course of exploratory drillings for oil. The more important sources which are currently being exploited have been previously discussed (see above under Pipelines).

The largest industrial users of natural and coke oven gas in Hungary are the chemical combines. Of these the Petfurdo chemical works is believed to rely upon this raw material resource in the manufacture of carbon black and nitrogenous fertilizers. The production of synthetic ammonia is an important intermediate step in the process. Production of fertilizer at the Petfurdo plant has been estimated at 75,000 to 80,000 tons per year.⁵⁵ As of February 1957, the plant was operating at only 75 per cent of the production rate in effect immediately prior to the November uprising. Reduced gas and coal supplies were responsible for the decline in production. The supply of natural gas to this facility can best be interdicted through the disruption of service on the main transmission line along the southern shore of Lake Balaton.

Plans have been advanced to pipe by-product coke oven gas from Dunapentele to Budapest and from Kazincbarcika to Miskolc, but the completion of work on the steel and chemical combines which are still under construction at those locations is a necessary prelude to the construction of the pipelines. Similarly, a new chemical complex at Tiszapalkonya, on which construction was begun in May 1956, will utilize natural gas, to be piped from either Rumania or sources in eastern Hungary, in the manufacture of synthetic fibers and nitrogenous fertilizers. Production of the latter is programmed for 30,000 metric tons annually. The center is due to be completed before 1960.

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Most of the gas produced at Kazincbarcika in the coking of coal is immediately utilized for the production of nitrogenous fertilizer, and nitric and sulfuric acids. As in the case of the Petfurdo works, synthetic ammonia production is the basis of the operation. Production capacity estimates for this facility are unavailable due to the fact that the plant has not yet been fully constructed. The history of this much-heralded plant is interesting, however, in that it not only sheds light on the current status of chemical and fertilizer production in Hungary but also on the success which has been achieved in developing the process of coking brown coal. The plant was originally opened in December of 1955; however, according to an official announcement in September 1956, it was only then about to start production. Unfamiliarity on the part of the workers with new machinery, breakdowns in the machines themselves which were largely prototypes, and errors in construction and assembly were responsible for the delayed inauguration of production. After a number of trial production efforts, a complete overhaul of the plant was found necessary in June of 1956.⁵⁶ During the early trial production efforts, the facility was run on imported coking coal rather than on the Borsod county brown coal which the plant was supposedly intended to cokes.⁵⁷ The most recent information on this facility indicates that following the November 1956 uprising a large part of the labor force was discharged and that three unserviceable compressors would have to be reconstructed before the plant could resume operation.⁵⁸ Until such a time as this plant is able to fulfill its intended function, Hungarian steel plants in the Miskolc area will remain completely dependent upon imported coke supplies.

Natural and coke oven gas supplies are vulnerable to Special Forces interdiction primarily through attacks on pipelines and railroads. As previously indicated, interruption of service on the main pipeline which supplies natural gas to the Petfurdo chemical works would effectively disrupt the productive efforts of that facility. The denial of coking

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coal supplies to the plant at Kazincbarcika would be sufficient to render that plant inoperative. If the latter facility should continue to rely upon imported coking coal, interdiction of the railroads approaching the Miskolc area from northeastern Hungary would be sufficient to achieve the objective of Special Forces. If, however, the plant should begin production of coke from local reserves of brown coal, it would be necessary for Special Forces to interdict rail lines approaching the area from the northwest.

e. Iron Ore

Hungary has but limited iron reserves and the greatest part (80 per cent) of her requirements are imported from the USSR. The best domestic reserves are found north of Miskolc at Rudabanya (4882N-2038E) and vicinity, but although they are the richest in the country, the deposits are of low iron content and the ore is concentrated before leaving the mining area.⁵⁹ The concentrated ore is further prepared before use by agglomeration. One such plant for this purpose is located at Diosgyor, the site of the Lenin steel works, one of two major iron and steel making facilities in Hungary. Ore from the Rudabanya mining area is transported to Diosgyor as well as to the nearby steel manufacturing center at Ozd by rail and can be interdicted easily by severing the branch rail line between Rudabanya and Kazincbarcika.

Iron is also found in the Bakony Mountain mining district, mostly as red mud in conjunction with bauxite. It has been reported that iron is recovered from the muds possibly directly through a smelting process in which alumina-bearing slag is also produced or indirectly from the ferruginous waste accruing in the reduction of the bauxite into alumina.⁶⁰ The total amount of iron ore produced annually by all processes probably does not exceed 430,000 metric tons.⁶¹ The current (1955-1960) five-year plan anticipates that the domestic iron ore production will be raised to approximately 700,000 tons by 1960, but on the basis of the current Hungarian situation it would appear that this goal is considerably optimistic.⁶²

Industrial requirements for iron ore in Hungary have been estimated to be in excess of 3.5 million metric tons annually.⁶³ This estimate seems

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much too high inasmuch as pig iron output amounts to less than 900,000 tons per year (885,000 tons in 1955).⁶⁴ The annual iron ore requirement for pig iron production should not be much in excess of 1.7 million metric tons. After deducting the amount produced domestically, imports of iron ore to be used in pig iron production should therefore total approximately 1.3 million metric tons. On the other hand, the 1955 level of steel production of 1.6 million metric tons indicates that at least 774,000 tons of pig and scrap iron together with an additional undetermined amount of iron ore are obtained from external sources, of which the USSR is the principal source. However, only if steel production were managed wholly on a basis of domestically produced pig iron and imported iron ore, a most unlikely prospect in view of the wastefulness of the process, would Hungary need to import 2.2 million tons of iron ore over the amount needed for pig iron manufacture. It appears, therefore, that Hungary's iron ore requirements are undoubtedly much less than the current estimate of 3.5 million metric tons. Moreover, imports of iron ore, pig iron, and scrap iron probably do not collectively total 3.5 million metric tons as judged by the indicated level of crude steel production.

Whatever the absolute quantity of iron (including ore, scrap, and pig) imported by Hungary, Special Forces planners are primarily concerned with the routes over which the materials are transported from Hungary's frontiers, for it is upon the disruption of these that the interdiction of Hungary's iron and steel making capacity primarily depends. Iron ore deliveries to the Ozd and Miskolc steel centers are effected along the two main railroad routes which link northeastern Hungary to Chop in the Ukrainian SSR. Some shipments of these materials may arrive along the alternate route between Miskolc and Czechoslovakia via Hidasnemeti. The production of iron and steel in the northeast Hungarian steel centers is contingent upon unlimited access to the aforementioned railroad routes. Sustained interdiction of the railway lines between Miskolc and Chop

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would therefore seriously affect Hungary's steel making capacity and would also prevent the shipping of raw and finished steel products to the USSR.

Interdiction of iron supplies to the steel mills at Dunapentele and Budapest presents a somewhat different problem to Special Forces planners. The Dunapentele facility is supplied primarily by the Danube water route and effective denial of imports would depend either upon the blocking of the navigation channel of that transport artery or upon the interdiction of facilities in the Kerch' Peninsula, administratively part of the Ukraine, which is the most likely source of the iron ore imports.⁶⁵ The amount of raw material being supplied to the new steel center at Dunapentele is not known, but up to the time of the November 1956 insurrection it was producing at the rate of 750,000 tons of steel per year. This production figure represents approximately 46 per cent of the estimated steel output for Hungary as a whole.⁶⁶ A recent report indicates, however, that 1957 production at Dunapentele is only a third of the former level. The very sharp decrease in the productive rate has been attributed by Hungarian officials to a shortage of raw materials.⁶⁷

Work on the construction of the Dunapentele steel center has not as yet been fully completed. An ore concentrating plant, a second blast furnace, and two rolling mills remain to be constructed, in addition to the existing three open-hearth furnaces, a blast furnace, coke oven, and various ancillary plants.⁶⁸

The Csepel Island steel plant (formerly known as Matyas Rakosi works) in Budapest has four open-hearth furnaces, a rolling mill, a tube plant, and various allied shops. It can receive its supplies of pig iron and crude steel by either of the rail or water routes previously discussed. The interdiction of these routes, therefore, would be sufficient to cause production in this facility to be suspended.

f. Manganese

Manganese ore is mined in Hungary at Epleny and Urkut in the Bakony Mountain area. The Urkut mines are the more productive and are alleged to

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yield an average 7,000 metric tons of ore per month.⁶⁹ Epleny's production has been estimated at 1,000 metric tons per month.⁷⁰ According to these estimates Hungary is capable of producing up to 96,000 tons of manganese annually. Of this amount probably only half is needed by the domestic steel industry and the remaining half is available for export.⁷¹ Poland is a likely consumer of the Hungarian product although other manganese-short satellites may also look to the Hungarian surplus.

Domestic consumers can be deprived of their manganese supplies by severing rail connections between the eastern and western parts of the country, i.e., at the Danube River. The Dunapentele steel center is the sole exception to this rule. In the case of this facility, as well as in the cases of foreign consumers, the diverse number of rail routes serving the Bakony region would make the interdiction of manganese shipments more difficult for Special Forces. Hungarian manganese is not, however, of such strategic importance to warrant the singling-out of this product for consideration by Special Forces planners. It should rather be considered in relation to other strategic requirements and its interdiction accomplished, where possible, in conjunction with the carrying out of other Special Forces objectives.

g. Uranium

Deposits of good commercial grade uranium ore were discovered in Hungary in late 1954. Exploitation of these deposits was begun in early 1956 under the direct supervision of USSR personnel.⁷² The ore deposits are located near Pecs in the vicinities of Bakonya and Kovagoszollos. The full extent of the reserves is unknown, but it has been alleged that the ore is encountered in layers of from two to ten meters in thickness beginning at a depth of 25 meters. The best ore has been discovered 200 meters down in the Kovagoszollos area.

Initial plans anticipated the employment of 25,000 workers to mine and prepare uranium ore for shipment to the USSR.⁷³ At the time of the outbreak of the November revolt, however, only an estimated 2,000 workers

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were directly engaged in uranium production.⁷⁴ Most of the miners were discharged immediately after the revolt when the electric power shortage in the Pecs area prevented the operation of the mine.⁷⁵ The interrelated vulnerabilities of power, uranium ore mining, and coal were clearly demonstrated in this instance. Before adequate power supplies could be re-established in the uranium mines, it was first necessary to restore production in nearby coal mines inasmuch as the shortage of electric power resulted from a lack of coal. The labor force in the Pecs area uranium mines was, therefore, transferred en masse to the nearby coal pits.


Hungarian resentment over outright Russian exploitation of this national resource was reflected in the demands made by various insurgent groups during the November 1956 insurrection (see Part I, "Resistance"). At present it appears that the USSR fully expects to continue to exploit the ore deposits under the terms of a 25-year agreement with Hungarian authorities.⁷⁶


Two methods of delivering the ore to the USSR can be employed. It can be shipped by barge down the Danube River after transloading from railway freight cars at either Baja or Mohacs which are the nearest ports, or it can be shipped all the way to its ultimate destination by rail. Available information indicates that the latter method has been decided upon. The Gyor railway car manufacturing plant has reportedly begun production of 60-ton capacity freight cars designed especially to transport uranium ore, and so constructed as to permit the interchanging of trucks between European standard gauge and Russian broad gauge.⁷⁷ Interchanging of the trucks would be effected at either Zahony or Chop.⁷⁸

Special Forces could interdict Hungarian uranium ore shipments to the USSR in a variety of ways. Communication between Pecs and the Ukrainian border could be completely severed by the destruction of the Danube River bridges. The uranium mines could be interdicted directly through attacks on installations including hoists, shafts, ventilating equipment, etc. The mines could also be interdicted directly through their power supplies. The best approach to the problem of interdiction, however, would probably be

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for Special Forces to consider uranium and coal output in the Pecs-Komlo region as one interdictory assignment to be carried out through attacks on vulnerable key railroad structures. This approach is justified not only in view of the nature of Special Forces operations but also because Hungarian uranium undoubtedly represents but a minor fraction of the total USSR supply of this product and should not, therefore, be singled out as a primary objective of interdiction in Hungary.





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4. Power⁷⁹

Electric power production is handicapped in Hungary by a qualitative and quantitative lack of coal and by the unsuitability of the country's water resources to hydroelectric development schemes. Less than one per cent of the installed generating capacity is of the hydroelectric type and although a number of plans exist to develop hydroelectric power stations on the Danube River, these have not yet been acted on. Faced with the necessity of providing increasing amounts of power to the country's expanding heavy industry, the Hungarian government has been forced to look to the further development of thermal generating capacity. The construction of two new hydroelectric plants on the Tisza River at Tiszaok and Tiszafured in the northeastern part of the country are the only exceptions to this rule. However, the decision to construct these plants resulted mainly from the fact that regulatory dams were to be erected at these locations, and was not in any way based upon a belief that these sites were desirable as hydroelectric plant locations. The 11,520-kw. Tiszaok facility, which is now in operation, was strongly opposed by Hungary's power engineers on the grounds that the available head of water was both so small and irregular as to hardly justify the construction of the plant. It was built, as will be a similar plant at Tiszafured, in view of the argument that however modest and irregular the power output it could not be neglected because of the country's poor coal reserve position.⁸⁰ Power from the Tiszaok hydroelectric plant will be available only for slightly more than half the year, i.e., 208 days. The plant cannot function at either high or low water periods.⁸¹ There is no reason to believe that the performance rating of the new Tiszafured plant will be any better.

Hungary's major thermal plants are significantly concentrated in three areas which, for the most part, coincide with domestic coal deposits. Only the 136,000-kw. Kelenfold plant in Budapest is not located near a coal field. The areas of power plant concentration are:

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- 1) Between Győr and Miskolc in a 30-mile-wide belt along the northern border. Included in this area are major plants serving the Budapest urban area; the coal and lignite mines at Bánhida, Tatabánya, and Dorog; the iron and steel mills at Miskolc, including Dölgör, and Ózd; and various other industrial locations.
- 2) At the northern end of Lake Balaton at Ajka and Tota, serving the aluminum industry in that area.
- 3) Near the southern border in the Pécs-Komló coal and uranium mining region.

As Map R shows, few power plants of significant size are located in Hungary's eastern agrarian region.

The installed capacity of Hungarian power plants is estimated to total slightly over 1,000,000 kw. On this generating base Hungary produced in 1955 5.4 billion kwh. of electric current. Under the current five-year plan, 663,000 kw. of new generating capacity is to be added to the existing base and power output is to rise to 8.35 billion kwh. by 1960. It is unlikely that the plan will be fulfilled on schedule insofar as new generating capacity is concerned, but power production may rise as a result of the more intensive utilization of existing capacity and a further extension of the national transmission system. A rise in the total amount of power available within the country will also be abetted by imports of up to 710 million kwh. of electric power from Czechoslovakia and Poland. Power is currently received from Czechoslovakia via Komárom, and a new connection through Vac is expected to tie in the Hungarian grid with the Czechoslovak system and through it with that of Poland.⁸² Even with the realization of all of these plans, however, demands for power will probably continue to outstrip supplies, especially if further expansions to the aluminum industry take place and railway electrification continues to develop according to schedule.

Electric power constitutes one of the most serious vulnerabilities in the Hungarian economy. The experience of recent years demonstrates that power shortages and failures resulting mainly from a lack of coal can force drastic

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curtailments in industrial activity. The aluminum industry, which alone consumes up to 17 per cent of the total power produced in Hungary, is especially dependent upon uninterrupted power supplies, as are the electrified railroads. The vulnerability of the Budapest-Hegyeshalom railroad has been discussed above with respect to the fact that 90 steel locomotives would have to be employed to maintain service on this line if electric traction were prevented by a loss of power.

Production shortfalls in recent years have been attributed equally to a lack of coal and a shortage of electric power. The most recent and most outstanding example occurred in December of 1956 when the effects of the November revolt were being most severely felt. At that time, industrial production was officially announced as being but a quarter of the level in effect in September, just prior to the insurrection.⁸³ The electric power shortage was given as a prime cause of the industrial shutdown.⁸⁴ Similar though less widespread shutdowns in previous years were also caused by power shortages.⁸⁵ In the past, during less severe crises, the regime has attempted to meet the power shortage problem by staggering the working schedules of various industrial plants in order to even out the power demand curve.⁸⁶ Night shifts have been resorted to frequently in this regard as have direct rationing methods whereby industrial plants are allotted power quotas which they may not exceed.⁸⁷

In view of the high plant utilization factor (approximately 64 per cent) which prevails in Hungary, it is obvious that with plants working at almost two-thirds of their capacity at all times in order to meet power demands, the loss of any major plant in the system will have an immediate and serious effect on total power supplies.⁸⁸ This effect can hardly be minimized in view of the fact that power rationing, staggered consumption schedules and night shifts are already a common practice. It is only through the combined output of all plants that power demands continue to be met.

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Although electric power production is an outstanding vulnerability in the Hungarian economy, this vulnerability is not one which can be easily exploited by Special Forces. The situation in Hungary is somewhat unique as compared to other areas of the Soviet orbit in that nearly all of the principal power plants are located in close proximity to their fuel supplies. The plants are, moreover, linked in a grid system that permits an exchange of power with other countries and is designed to assure a continued flow of power to the most needy consumers in the event of local power failures. Nevertheless, Special Forces could in a variety of ways seriously impair power production and distribution in Hungary.

Despite the fact that important power plants are located near their fuel supplies, Special Forces might nonetheless, in some instances, succeed in depriving them of their coal by interdicting conveyors or short connecting stretches of railroad between the power plants and the mines. In other instances where the plants are removed from urban surroundings, it might be feasible to carry out direct attacks on the plants themselves. In the case of Budapest, which has the largest share of Hungary's industrial base, the interdiction of coal between that city and the surrounding mining areas would severely curtail its industrial output. Power could still be supplied through the national grid but a combination of coal and power transmission system interdiction would leave the city powerless.

A greater number of opportunities are open to Special Forces with respect to the interdiction of Hungary's power transmission system. As Map R demonstrates, a large number of important sub-stations are located in areas remote from major power-producing sites. The interdiction of these sub-stations or of the high-tension transmission lines to either side of them would have the desirable effect of isolating local areas from outside power sources. Similarly, power from the large plants on the main transmission system can be removed from the system by severing the transmission lines to either side of the plants. In instances where more than two connections are maintained by a plant with the national grid as, for example, in the case of the 120,000 kw.

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In a plant, all connecting links would have to be severed to deny that plant's power to the system. It must be remembered, however, that the durative effect of interdicting Hungary's power transmission system would not be as long as would be the effect resulting from the destruction of the power-producing facilities themselves.

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5. Telecommunications (Map S)

Hungary is a key telecommunications center between eastern and western Europe and between western Europe and the USSR. Despite a considerable expansion in telecommunications facilities in recent years, Hungary's telecommunications system is still inadequate to the needs of the country. Telecommunications development has not kept pace with industrial expansion, and areas in the southern and western parts of Hungary which have the greatest need for improved facilities have been neglected in preference to the development of a more extensive communications system in the northern and eastern parts of the country. These latter areas, of course, are strategically important to the USSR.

Existing telecommunications facilities consist in the main of underground and overhead telephone and telegraph lines and their associated terminal equipment. These facilities are supplemented by radio communications serving government enterprises, including the railways, the river fleet, and the security forces, as well as by domestic and international broadcasting stations. Recent and reliable analyses of the various parts of the Hungarian telecommunications network are readily available in standard intelligence reference sources.⁸⁹

Hungary is largely independent of external sources for telecommunications equipment. A number of factories in Budapest manufacture a wide range of equipment including telephone exchanges for all types of service, telephone and telegraph instruments, receiver and carrier equipment, radio receivers, low- and high-power radio transmitting equipment, and telecommunication cables. The Hungarian telecommunications equipment industry is, however, dependent upon the uninterrupted flow of raw materials supplies, some of which are imported. Among the more important import items are copper and materials with copper content, cadmium, lead, and molybdenum. It is possible that in view of an acute shortage of copper, aluminum is being substituted for this metal in Hungarian manufactured telecommunications equipment in all feasible instances.

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In the years since World War II Russian military forces have developed in Hungary an independent telecommunications network which is obviously designed to support Soviet military efforts to the west and south of Hungary. This network does, however, make full use of underground civilian cable connections between Hungary and the Ukraine. Soviet military forces have independent overhead wire lines, some of which are, however, carried on poles in common with civilian wires. One of the more important Russian lines is a direct cross-country connection between the Soviet embassies in Budapest and Vienna. Unlike the domestic Hungarian lines, the Russian line does not follow road or railroad routes. All Soviet military telecommunication lines and centers are afforded a high degree of security protection by Russian ground forces.

The Hungarian Army may or may not have a completely independent telecommunications network. It is likely that in some areas it makes use of civilian wire lines whereas in other areas of strategic importance it avails itself of an independent network. This is, however, carried on poles which also serve the civilian network.

The Hungarian railways, border guards, and internal security forces all operate their own telecommunications nets. The railroad net is the most elaborate in that it includes two underground cables connecting Budapest with Mosonmagyaróvár and Tarnok. The remainder of the net is composed entirely of overhead open wire routes. The main railway telecommunications center is located in Budapest; secondary centers are located in Szombathely, Pécs, Szolnok, Debrecen, and Miskolc, all of which are peripheral to the national capital.

The most important telecommunications centers in terms of all forms of telecommunications are: Budapest, Szekesfehervar, Szolnok, Cegléd, Nyiregyhaza, Miskolc, Győr, Veszprém, and Jellafured. If these centers were isolated through the destruction of equipment in the facilities located in them, or through the severance of the lines connecting them to other centers, a large percentage of internal and international communications traffic would be disrupted.

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
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In the absence of the total destruction of all lines and equipment, alternate means of telecommunications will always be available to military forces and government agencies in Hungary. The forced use of alternate means of communication would, however, bring results of a considerable decrease in traffic volume and delays in transmission due to overloaded circuits. Such a situation would be to the advantage of Special Forces insofar as it would disrupt enemy efforts against them wherever these efforts were dependent upon rapid communications.

The interdiction of telecommunications facilities, especially overhead wire lines, could be carried out easily by Special Forces in conjunction with the interdiction of the transportation network and especially of the railways. On the other hand, the interdiction of underground cables, which are of more importance than overhead wires, would be a more difficult task for Special Forces. The cables generally follow the main highways rather than the railroads and would have to be approached in a different manner. It would be possible to render them inoperative through the destruction of repeating equipment, which is sometimes housed in bunkers located along the cable route. More frequently, however, the repeating equipment is housed in the main post offices in urban centers. In all instances Special Forces would probably want to consider telecommunications interdiction as an objective to be carried out in conjunction with a more important task, such as railway and highway interdiction.

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6. Conclusions

The over-all economic vulnerabilities of Hungary must be viewed both in terms of Hungary proper and of Hungary as an integral part of the Soviet orbit. Insufficient supplies of basic minerals such as coal and iron ore upon which the industry of Hungary depends in large tonnages constitute a significant weakness in the country's economic structure. In terms of Soviet orbit needs it is bauxite and uranium ore in particular which represent an important or potentially important contribution of Hungary to the Soviet economy. In both cases the resulting economic vulnerabilities can be best utilized by Special Forces operations through interference with the railway transportation system which both for the internal economy of Hungary as well as its links with the other satellite nations and the Soviet Union itself constitutes the most important life artery and physical vulnerability. This is not to say that in individual instances such as discussed in the text direct interference at the source is not feasible.

Electric power production and distribution must be viewed as another artery vulnerable to Special Forces operations.

Hungary's railway system can be split into three separate parts through the destruction of major bridges over the Tisza and Danube Rivers. A disruption of the railway transportation system along these lines would have a most adverse effect on the national economy. It would also prevent the movement of war materials and troops from the USSR through Hungary to areas south and west of that country. Inasmuch as the bridges over the Danube and Tisza Rivers are of such large size and are so unfavorably located as to place them, except under extraordinary circumstances, beyond the limit of Special Forces capabilities, it is to equally vulnerable but more favorably situated and smaller-scale key structures that Special Forces would probably want to look to accomplish the task of railroad interdiction. Structures of this nature are very numerous on the Hungarian railways. Moreover, because of the fact that the principal railroad routes tend to coincide with militarily important highway routes, Special Forces could

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often interdict both of these means of transportation whenever they overcome terrain obstacles on side-by-side structures. By concentrating their efforts on railroad and highway interdiction, therefore, Special Forces could produce crippling effects on both the Hungarian economy and any military effort by the USSR that would be dependent upon these transportation media for its success.

An insufficient amount of electric power, although an outstanding weakness in the Hungarian economy, is nonetheless one which would be more difficult for Special Forces to exploit than would the weakness of the railroad and other parts of the transportation system. The electric power transmission network is, however, open to Special Forces attack although its interdiction would probably have less of a long-term effect than would the outright destruction of power plant facilities. In some instances power production could be interdicted indirectly through fuel (coal) supplies including the destruction of conveyors and short connecting railroads between the coal mines and power plants. In other instances, however, important power plants may prove to be so disadvantageously located (in highly urbanized areas) or afforded such a high degree of security protection that Special Forces would choose to concentrate on the interdiction of the main transmission lines to either side of the plants. They would thereby deny the power output of these plants to the national grid. In still other instances where it would be desirable to achieve the effect of denying an important rural area of its power supplies the destruction of readily accessible sub-stations on the main transmission lines would be well within the capabilities of Special Forces.

Hungary's telecommunications system and such secondary means of transportation as pipelines and waterways are vulnerable to interdiction by Special Forces but are not intrinsically important enough to warrant their being selected as primary objectives of Special Forces operations. In view of the fact, however, that the most important pipeline (in Transdanubia) and the major telecommunications wire lines parallel railroad and highway routes in open

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country, these features of the Hungarian economy could be interdicted together with the railways and highways in the course of a single Special Forces operation.

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PART V

SUITABILITY AREA ANALYSIS

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1. Introduction

(1) In accordance with the scope and format of previous studies, the present report undertakes to describe and evaluate specific regions within Hungary which, because of suitability factors of terrain and population, as well as of economic vulnerabilities, compare favorably with other less suitable areas.

This task poses special problems in the case of Hungary. In the first place, it should be pointed out that the selection of a Special Forces operational area delimited by the national boundaries of a small country such as Hungary can easily become unrealistic because even limited operations by Special Forces are not likely to be confined always within the national boundaries of a particular country. More likely they will in the case of Hungary extend over a larger area, involving neighboring sections of other satellite countries such as Czechoslovakia or of the Soviet Union itself. Wherever a region suitable for Special Forces operations within Hungary extends, as a natural region, beyond its national frontiers, as is the case in regard to the aforementioned border areas of Czechoslovakia and the USSR, the Special Forces operations planner may in an individual case find it desirable to center Special Forces operations directed at some objective within Hungary outside of this country, if an adjacent region offers better physical and human features of the type which are a prerequisite for such operations.

The conclusion to be drawn from this observation is that while the scope of the present study limits it by necessity to Hungary proper, its findings may have to be supplemented by the Special Forces planner by taking into consideration comparative findings which concern adjacent territories; in particular, the Georgetown University Research Project reports on the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania may have to be consulted. For any of these regions it seems desirable that the conclusions pertaining to adjacent national territories be considered.

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(ii) The current report, like others of a similar nature, includes a discussion of security forces factors and emphasizes that Special Forces operations would be seriously impeded in areas where special security measures and border zones have been established. However, it should be realized that these control factors remain valid only as long as uprisings or limited war would be limited to the national area in question. In a war which would involve other countries in addition to Hungary, security factors along the borders may easily become obsolete. The withering-away of the security zone and frontier control along the USSR-Hungary border has been documented, on and after 4 November 1956, when the Soviet mechanized units operating from the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania entered Hungarian territory without regard to existent Hungarian border controls.

(iii) In previous studies practical and technical considerations prompted an analysis which distinguished (a) between those areas of a national territory which, for reasons of their physical and human geography, proved unfavorable for Special Forces operations, and (b) those where such operations might be more successfully undertaken because of a combination of favorable or relatively favorable factors, such as cover and concealment, presence of anti-Communist population groups, and accessibility to the type of objectives which under Special Forces operations doctrine would be of primary interest to Special Forces. Again, the case of Hungary requires a different organization of the area analysis to be presented. The smallness of the country and the absence of clearly distinguishable natural regions within the over-all area militate against subdivisions in terms of distinguishable Special Forces suitability areas. Instead, the present report distinguishes between (a) those sections of Hungary which are not generally suited for Special Forces activities, either because of their highly urbanized, industrialized, or even metropolitan character, or because of the fact that the countryside is more or

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less an open plain without cover and concealment features and one which is densely populated throughout, and (b) other sections of the country offering more favorable physical conditions for Special Forces operations. The present study deals with the latter complex in one Special Forces Suitability Area which, for purely technical reasons, is on the maps accompanying this part of the report (a, b, c) subdivided into three sectors.*

In general, it must be stressed that Hungary, in spite of the fact that its populace proved its violent anti-Communist determination during the October-November 1956 revolt and that its guerillas, during the uprising itself and in the weeks following, carried out partisan operations in the mountains of the Special Forces Suitability Area, is a territory which must be rated low in terms of Special Forces suitability factors. None of the physical subregions possessing favorable, or relatively favorable, cover and concealment features is extensive enough to warrant the conclusion that guerilla or Special Forces units could be maintained there for extended periods, if and as long as the rest of the country is controlled by the enemy. In particular, Hungary ranks low on the list of suitability areas as compared with most** other satellite countries as well as those territories within the confines of the USSR on which studies have been prepared by the Georgetown University Research Project.

(iv) The following discussion will be concerned with the examination, for the Suitability Area, of various physical and human as well as economic vulnerability features which for the country as a whole

* The necessity to use three 1:250,000 maps to depict the Suitability Area instead of presenting the entire area on one map explains the references in the text below to Maps a, b, and c. This breakdown must not be interpreted as an indication of three separate natural regions.

** The area of East Germany (GDR) shares with Hungary important negative features, such as lack of cover and concealment factors and absence of regions distant from densely populated areas.

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have been treated in the first parts of this study. In the following analysis the terrain, vegetation, and climatic factors of the suitability region which are of specific interest to Special Forces will be emphasized. The discussion includes also population factors within this region, including distribution and density, ethnic and religious factors, and wherever possible distinctions in regard to resistance activities and attitudes. Finally, while the study does not attempt to select any targets within the Suitability Area, it is concerned with defining and evaluating the objectives which are considered to be of specific interest to Special Forces planning. Among these, as in previous studies, the communications and electric-power systems of the country loom largest. Here emphasis must be laid upon the country as a whole and the role which it is assigned within the Soviet orbit. Consequently such vulnerability factors which are of more than local consequence have been given special consideration. On the other hand, specific objectives such as bridges, tunnels, power stations, etc., have been evaluated only where they are found either within the Suitability Area itself or close enough to warrant Special Forces operations conducted from points within it.

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2. Geographic Factors¹

The forested slopes of the mountains provide the best sites for basing guerilla-type operations in Hungary. Only few areas are suitable for such sites as mountainous land is limited to less than 15 per cent of the total territory. Suitable areas, designated by a shaded pattern on Map T, are located in the northern highlands extending across Hungary from the Czechoslovakian-Hungarian border to the northern shores of Lake Balaton and, in the south, in the Mecsek Mountains north of Pecs. Well-forested mountain slopes are located also beyond the borders of Hungary. Map a shows part of the mountainous region of southern Czechoslovakia from which foot troops could penetrate Hungary by way of numerous mountain passes and wide valleys of the tributaries of the Tisza and Danube Rivers. Forested mountains in Yugoslavia, which could offer a basis for operations directed at Hungary, are shown on Map c; however, the Drava River would be a major obstacle in the movement of troops into Hungary.

The areas designated as being suitable for guerilla bases do not form a continuous mountain barrier but consist of groups of hills, high plateaus, and mountain ranges separated by low corridors along which movement is relatively easy. Terrain, vegetation cover, and population density and distribution offer more favorable conditions for the purposes of Special Forces planners in these selected areas than is the case in the plains and low rolling loess plateaus. The mountainous terrain, while it is rugged enough to provide concealment, does not entirely prohibit cross-country foot movement. Forests in the selected areas provide the best vegetation cover in Hungary. Population density in mountainous regions is one-fourth that of the lowlands. Most of the inhabitants of mountainous regions live in small valleys or on low mountain slopes.

Survival in the mountains of Hungary is made easier by the abundance of wild animals, nuts, berries and mushrooms. Wild boars can be found in the thick underbrush, and, in addition to deer, small animals, especially hares, are also present. Wild birds include pheasants,

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partridges and grouse. Trout and other species of fish live in streams and lakes. Since World War II, there has been a decline in the number of fish in some streams.

Mountains in the selected areas are described in greater detail below. The northeastern chain of mountains, which are the southernmost spurs of the Carpathian Mountains, are highest in elevation. From the northeastern border to the Danube River, the mountain ranges are the Hegyalja, Cserehat, Bukk, Matra, Cserhat and Borszony. The configuration of these ranges, with the exception of the major portion of the Borszony Mountains, may be seen on Map a. The Borszony and the other ranges of the northern highlands appear on Map b. In Transdanubia, the northern highlands include the Pilis, Buda, Gerecse, Vertes and Bakony Mountains. This chain is cut at its southern edge by a fault depression occupied in part by Lake Balaton and the Velencei To. Remnants of volcanic activity associated with the fault are visible in the Tapolca Basin on the northern shore of Lake Balaton. The remaining area in which suitable guerilla bases may be located is the Mecsek Range in southern Transdanubia. This range is shown on Map c.

a. Hegyalja Mountains

The Hegyalja Mountains, the easternmost mountain mass, are located between the Bodrog and Hernad Rivers. They separate the Upper Tisza Basin from the loess-covered corridor of the Hernad River. The mountains are rough and high and have densely wooded volcanic slopes. Many peaks exceed 2,000 feet. Near the Czechoslovakian-Hungarian border, the summit is over 2,900 feet. The western edge of the mountain mass is a bluff which drops sharply some 350 feet to the Hernad Valley. In the southwest and the south, the mountain slopes grade more gently into the Tisza Plain. The range, which extends into Czechoslovakia, is a deeply dissected narrow barrier throughout most of its length. There are many steep slopes and rocky cliffs, but the ascent along many of the roads which follow the valleys is gradual. Numerous tracks skirting the peaks of the mountain range cross the area. However, the drainage pattern makes cross-country movement difficult. Dense beech

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forests cover the mountain summits. Oak forests occur at the lower elevations. There are scattered clearings on some peaks and in the valleys, but the most extensive clearings occur along the southern border of the range. Here the slopes have a deep cover of loess, which supports many vineyards, famed for their wines. Settlement is concentrated in the valleys and on low slopes bordering the range.

b. Cserehat Mountains

The Cserehat Mountains are located west of the Hegyalja Mountains. The range is contained in a triangular area bounded by the northern border, the Sajo River, and the trench-like depression of the Hernad Valley. The western half of the Cserehat is a dissected limestone plateau with gravel terraces in the south. The terraces are aligned with the Sajo River. The eastern half of the Cserehat is a low, hilly loess upland.

The limestone plateau is a rough region with deep, narrow valleys separated by long narrow ridges. Ridgetops, which are higher in the north than in the south, are an average of 800 feet above the valley bottoms. The highest point is about 1,900 feet above sea level. Steep slopes and cliffs impose local barriers to movement.

Like many limestone regions, the plateau is pitted in places with sinkholes. Underground water erosion has also carved a number of caves in the limestone cliffs. Some of the larger caves, such as the Aggtelek, are visited by many tourists, and their value for Special Forces operations may be limited. The Aggtelek cave system is one of the largest in Europe and lies at the extreme northern border of the country. Four of its total fourteen miles of underground passages are over the border in Czechoslovakia.

Though the plateau is heavily forested with stands of oak and beech, the forests are sufficiently open for foot troops. Roads crossing the slopes and ridges are connected to valley roads winding through well settled farmland, pastures, orchards and vineyards. Many roads lead to

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and beyond the frontier. One of the main routes through the plateau follows the Bodva River from the border to Miskolc. Most of the Bodva Valley is broad and open, but there is marshland in several sectors and the valley is constricted at several points where the river has cut gorges 700 feet deep.

The hilly upland in the eastern half of the Cserhat Mountains has a complex pattern of ridges and spurs carved out of the deep deposits of loess. Drainage is generally southward, and the trend of relief features is from north to south. The southern part of the upland is less intricately dissected, but the valleys are deeper. Many streams have cut valleys as deep as 350 feet. Occasionally the beds of gravel and sedimentary rock on which the loess rests are exposed. The upland has less forest cover than the limestone plateau to the west. Cover is extensive only locally as much of the fertile loess lands are cultivated or in pastures. The loess becomes mud during wet weather and hampers cross-country movement. At other times movement is easy except for the steep valley walls and locally cliffed sedimentary beds.

c. Bukk Mountains

Between Miskolc and Eger the Bukk Mountains stretch about 37 miles from east to west and 30 miles from north to south. The range is a limestone block surrounded by deeply fissured summits. The surface of the block is pitted with sinkholes leading to caves. Water disappearing into these sinkholes emerges as springs along the lower slopes. The caves, though they are not large in size, provide adequate cover for small groups of men and supplies. From the center of the range rises an arid upland plateau known as the "Giant's Table." The highest summits here are over 3,000 feet. The plateau is about 12 miles long and four miles wide and is rimmed with a steep-sloped escarpment. The surface of the plateau is comparatively less rugged than the block surrounding it.

Wild life thrives in the Bukk Mountains. There are herds of deer, flocks of mouflon, wildcats, foxes, badgers, squirrels, martens, and hares in great numbers, in addition to many species of wild birds. Numerous trout streams run down the margins of the range, joining the Sajo River in the north and east and joining the Eger River in the west.

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The entire range is covered with a carpet of forests. The southern margin, of volcanic origin, is covered with luxuriant vineyards. The valleys at the border of the range are cultivated and densely settled. The valleys near Miskolc and Eger lead to resorts, cottages and hostels in the mountains. Overlooks and marked hikers' trails are also common in these areas. Recreational activities continue throughout the year. In the winter there is sleighing, skating and skiing.

d. Matra Mountains

The Matra Mountains are separated from the Bukk Mountains by the Tarna River in the east and from the Cserhat Mountains by the Zagya River in the west. The Zagya Valley is relatively open, but the Tarna River notches the eastern extremity of the Matras in four narrow gorges. The range follows the northern boundary for about 25 miles and has an average width of nine miles. From this solid block of mountains rise the highest summits in Hungary. Mt. Kekes reaches a peak of almost 3,300 feet. The range is composed of the eroded cones of four volcanoes lying on limestone. Deep valleys and ravines have been carved in the mountain ridge by wind and water erosion. Many small caves offer concealment. Some abandoned caves near Nagybatory were once used for storage. The Western Matra Mountains rise abruptly from the Zagya Valley. In the Central Matras the steep slopes of the northern portion of the ridge are cut by deep valleys. In contrast the slopes of the southern half of the ridge merge gradually with the plain. Low hills extend as far south as the Budapest-Hatvan railroad. In the Eastern Matras there are steep slopes and occasional landslides.

Most of the range has a dense cover of forests. The northern slopes and the higher elevations are covered with extensive beech forests. Huckleberries grow at the lower margin of the beech forests. Below the beech forests and in the southern region forests are composed of oak mixed with birch, wild fruit trees and brushwoods. Wild strawberries and blackberries are common in areas cleared of forests. In the Western Matra Mountains many slopes are barren.

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The lower slopes of mountains at the rim of the range are well settled and cultivated with vineyards, melons and tobacco. In the interior of the range there are only a few isolated communities, such as the village of Matrakerosztes in the valley of the Kovicese River. However, there are many health and recreation resorts on Galya Peak and on the plateau south of it. Here there are many mineral springs, the result of volcanic activity, ski runs, overnight shelters, observation towers and a network of hiking trails. The region is also famous for hunting. Constant care given to the preservation of game, chiefly deer, boar, and mouflon, accounts for the presence of many game wardens in the forests.

e. Cserhat Mountains

The Cserhat Mountains, bounded by the Zagyva River, the Hatvan-Budapest railroad, the road from Vac to Balassagyarmat and the Czechoslovakian-Hungarian border, consist of an irregular low mountain area named after one of its central peaks. Summits do not usually exceed 2,100 feet. The whole surface is dissected by a close network of valleys. Most of these valleys are relatively open, particularly the parallel system draining towards the Zagyva in the southeast. Southward towards the Nagy Alföld the Cserhat Mountains decline gradually into low undulating hills. Forest cover, which is less extensive in the Cserhat Mountains than in the Matra and Bükk Mountains, is best on the isolated volcanic peaks. The entire area is well settled and cultivated and is traversed by a fairly dense network of roads and tracks.

f. Borszony Mountains

The Borszony Mountains lie west of the Cserhat Range. They are bounded on the south by the Danube River and on the west and north by the lower reaches of the Ipoly River. The configuration of the major portion of the range can be seen on Map b. The eastern slopes appear on Map a. The mass is only 10 to 12 miles in diameter and rises to a summit over 3,000 feet in elevation. Extinct volcanoes form a semi-circular ridge from which a number of narrow valleys radiate in all directions. The southern margin

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of the range drops in a sheer cliff towards the Danube River, which flows through gaps between the Borszony and Pilis Mountains.

The steep slopes of the mountains are covered with oak and beech forests. However, forest cover has been reduced by large-scale timber extraction, and the woods are criss-crossed by glades cut to control pests and fire. The mountains are crossed by many trails so that even the more remote parts of the range are within easy reach of Budapest. Many villages are hidden in the mountains. They are connected by winding roads through wooded valleys. The gentler slopes are covered with orchards. At lower altitudes herds of cattle graze on the wet meadows.

g. Pilis Mountains and Buda Hills

The Danube River guards the northern and eastern approaches to the Pilis Mountains and the Buda Hills, located between Esztergom and Budapest southwest of the great river bend. The Pilis Mountains are separated from the Buda Hills by a trough extending from the northern part of Budapest to Dorog, a village five miles south of Esztergom. Two streams trending from northwest to southeast flow through the trough.

The center of the Pilis Mountains, only 15 miles from the heart of Budapest, rises to a summit over 2,400 feet in elevation. Most of the range consists of volcanic lavas and tuffs. Forested slopes drop steeply in the north and east, where many small streams radiate from the range in deep valleys leading to the Danube River. The south central part of the range is a broad plateau approximately 2,300 feet high. To the southwest, mountains of limestone and sandstone are separated in part from the volcanic rocks by a deep valley southeast of Dobogoko. Small marsh lakes occupy the valley. In the southwestern mountains caves are located among the steep slopes and bare cliffs. Forest cover is sparse on the limestone ridges. Some slopes are covered with low bushes, but often there are exposures of bare white rock. The gentler slopes and valleys are covered with orchards and fields.

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The Buda Hills, arid in parts, are a complex, broken mass of limestone and sandstone. The highest part of the hills is a broad, flat plateau slightly over 1,800 feet in elevation. In the northeastern and southern parts slopes are very steep. The southern part, with rocky water courses cutting through it, is one of the wildest parts of the Buda Hills. In the limestone of this complex hill mass there are many caves and some small enclosed basins.

h. Gerecse and Vertes Mountains

Towards the west the Gerecse and Vertes Mountains are separated from the Pilis Mountains and the Buda Hills by the Zsambek Basin. The basin has steep margins and a floor of rolling, lush meadowland. The Gerecse Mountains consist of broad limestone blocks with summits over 2,000 feet high. The blocks are broken by many cliffed slopes and small valleys. In the west the mountain slopes descend steeply to the Tata-Tovaros lowland. In the north the slopes fall abruptly to the Danube River. Mountain tops are wooded and provide excellent observation stations. Low slopes are covered with vineyards. South of the Gerecse Mountains, the Vertes Mountains rise to a summit of 1,560 feet. The range, a square limestone plateau, is both rugged and densely forested with birch and oak. In both the Gerecse and Vertes Mountains, communication routes are poor. There are only a few bad roads leading through the mountains.

i. Bakony Mountains

North of Lake Balaton, between the Marcal Valley and the Mór trough, the Bakony Mountains form a belt of forested country 60 miles long and 20 to 25 miles wide. The elevation of the summits, approximately 1,300 feet in the west, increases to 2,300 feet in the east. The mountains are chiefly limestone. They are heavily forested and have deep ravines. The forested slopes have served as secure hiding places for outlaws in the past. Heights are often dominated by the ruins of old castles. The mountain basins are intensively cultivated. Orchards and vineyards are concentrated on the slopes facing Lake Balaton.

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The Bakony Mountains are divided into three groups by troughs. North of the Veszprem-Devecser trough, the mountains slope gently towards the Kis Alföld. The plateaus are arid. In some places, such as in the mountains near Szekesfehervar, there are bare rock slopes furrowed by the wind, but for the most part the Northern Bakony Mountains are thickly forested with oak and hornbeam trees. There are few roads through this area, and clay soil on low slopes hampers cross-country movement. The Central Bakony Mountains, between the Veszprem-Devecser and the Tapolca-Sumeg troughs, are composed of limestone in the west and of volcanic basalt in the east. The western part is roughly eroded, covered with forests and sparsely populated. The eastern part is broken with steep hills covered with vineyards. Movement in the east is easier than in the west. South of the Tapolca-Sumeg trough, the mountains rise fairly abruptly from the surrounding country and join the hills of Zala County in the west. Of the three mountain groups, movement is easiest in the Southern Bakony Mountains.

j. Mecsek Mountains

Though they are not very high, the Mecsek Mountains provide suitable guerilla bases in southern Transdanubia. The highest altitude is approximately 2,200 feet at Zengovar, ten and a half miles northeast of Pecs. The view from this peak includes the mountains of Yugoslavia to the south and the flat horizon of the Nagy Alföld to the east. The range consists chiefly of sandstone and limestone, in which there are a number of caves. There are some lavas in the north and in the outlying hills to the southeast. The southern flank of the range is a steep cliff facing the Pecs Plain. In the east, slopes fall abruptly from a 150-foot terrace dominating the Danube floodplain. In the northeast the range becomes gradually open with good sites for observation. In the north and west the range is an irregular broken area with wooded hilltops and vineyards at the foot of the mountains. The northern

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3. Resistance and Population Factors

Despite a very limited history of resistance as evidenced by their insignificant opposition to the German occupation during World War II and notably less active resistance than other East European countries to post-World War II Soviet domination, the Hungarians proved by their sensational nationwide revolt of October-November 1956 that their national pride and traditional values had not been destroyed by Communist tyranny and that they have a high resistance potential and capability for guerilla warfare. With the exception of the AVH (security police), some senior army officers, and a small minority of Communist Party members all segments of the population supported the revolution. Armed opposition occurred in the north-eastern and western counties of the country, notably in and around the urban areas of Miskolc, Vac, Budapest, Szekesfehervar, Veszprem, Dunapentele, and Pecs and throughout the northwestern counties of Gyor-Sopron and Komarom. Guerilla activity during the revolt period and in the weeks following was most prominent in the mountainous regions of the Special Forces Suitability Area delineated in this report. At one period or another guerilla rebels operated in the Bukk, Matra, Pilis, Vertes, Bakony and Mecsek Mountains which together constitute a low, discontinuous and topographically varying system of mountains arching in a crescent from the northeast borders of Hungary with the USSR, past Lake Balaton, and terminating at the southwestern border of the country around Pecs. Some guerilla activity may also have occurred in the Hegyalja Mountains in the extreme northeast of the country and in the Borszony Mountains directly north of Budapest on the border with Czechoslovakia. Thus the liquidation of the uprising by overwhelming Soviet armed force reduced the resistance of the Hungarian people to guerilla activity in the only regions of Hungary where cover and concealment, however limited, could be found.

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The uprising of October-November 1956 demonstrated that there are practically no differentiating characteristics among the people in the various regions of Hungary that transcend their hatred of the Soviet-dominated Communist regime that has tyrannized them during the post-World War II period. Thus within the Suitability Area delineated in this report, Special Forces will seldom be inhibited in their operations on account of hostile population attitudes, although specific local contacts and operations must take into account the danger of betrayal by individual pro-regime elements which may be found in any area or in any occupational or class group. (The general attitudes of various groups and their resistance potential have been discussed in Part I of this report.)

Industrial workers, students, and the intelligentsia were the most active participants in the revolt and will in all probability prove to be extremely valuable sources of guerilla material and/or informational contacts in the event of war, especially since the security forces of the regime will not be able to contain them indefinitely in the urban areas where they reside and since in so small a country as Hungary no area of cover and concealment is very far from one or more large towns.

The chief university towns in Hungary are Debrecen, Budapest, Pecs, and Szeged.

The peasants, who will in most instances be the class with which Special Forces will come in primary contact, are perhaps the most uniformly anti-Communist class in the whole country. Although, as their backwardness in the uprising indicates, they are not as readily adaptable to, nor as capable of generating leadership for, the purposes of Special Forces, their trustworthiness and knowledgeability of localisms will prove to be valuable assets in the organization of guerilla activities, and in the long run they will probably contribute an important share of manpower for such activities.

The Roman Catholic clergy, who with the exception of a few so-called "patriotic priests" have been the strongest national bulwark against the

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ideology of Communism, will prove to be valuable local contacts, especially in the rural areas. Catholicism is the predominant religion in western Hungary and is strongly represented in several other sections of the country. The centers of the Protestant religion--chiefly the Evangelical (Lutheran) and Reformed (Calvinist) churches--are in eastern Hungary. The center of the Reformed religion is Debrecen; that of the Evangelical religion reportedly in Bekescsaba. The very small Greek Orthodox body in Hungary is located near the Hungarian-Rumanian border. There is one Greek Catholic diocese in Hungary with its see in Hajdudorog in the northeastern part of the country.

Of the various minority groups in Hungary the most likely to be of practical assistance to Special Forces are the Germans, many of whom are to be found in all-German mining villages in the Mecsek mountain range and some of the other coal-mining areas of western Hungary. Other German settlements are scattered through Bacs-Kiskun, Pest, and Tolna counties and the southwestern environs of Budapest. The great majority of Hungarian Jews are concentrated in Budapest. Yugoslav communities are established near the Yugoslav-Hungarian border in the vicinity of Baja and Bacsalmás, in Baranya, Somogy, and Zala counties, and in the Raba River valley in the west. Slovaks are found north and northwest of Budapest; Rumanians are present in Bekes and Hajdu-Bihar counties. Gypsies may be encountered in almost every part of the country and appear to have no fixed point of major concentration.

The sizeable cross-border ethnic Hungarian minority elements, many of whom undoubtedly harbor irredentist aspirations, may prove to be valuable assets to Special Forces operations in Hungary based on the utilization of the more favorable cover and terrain features closely surrounding the country on all sides, i.e., in Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Sizeable enclaves of Hungarians are located in Slovakia along the whole length of Hungary's northern border;

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in Transcarpathian Ukraine, adjacent to the northeast border; in Rumania, particularly in Transylvania; and in the Vojvodinan and, to a much smaller extent, in the Croatian and Slovenian provinces of Yugoslavia.

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4. Economic Vulnerability Factors (Map a)

That portion of the Special Forces Suitability Area shown on Map a contains Hungary's second largest industrial complex along the Sajó River in the sector between Miskolc (4806N-2047E) and Ózd (4813N-2018E). Most of the industry which consists of iron and steel mills together with chemical and other plants is concentrated in the vicinities of Miskolc (including Diosgyor (4805N-2041E)), Kazincbarcika (4815N-2038E), and Ózd. The iron and steel mills of this area are heavily dependent upon supplies of iron ore and coking coal from external sources. Brown coal deposits in the area are nonetheless extensively exploited. This coal is used to fuel power plants and industrial establishments throughout northeast Hungary but it is unsuitable for iron and steel making. An attempt is being made, however, at the Kazincbarcika coking plant to produce metallurgical-grade coke from the brown coal and thereby reduce the dependency of the steel mills in this region on imported coke supplies. Hungary's largest iron ore deposits are in this part of the Suitability Area in the vicinity of Rudabánya (4822N-2038E).

The transportation net in northeastern Hungary is probably better developed than in other parts of the country. Recent improvements in the transportation system in this area have been made largely under Russian guidance and with a view towards improving connections between Hungary and the Ukraine.

Two strategically important rail routes pass through the area. Both emanate from Chop (4825N-2211E) in the Ukraine and lead to Budapest and beyond that point to Austria and Yugoslavia (see Suitability Area Maps b and c). Transloading facilities between Russian broad-gauge and European standard-gauge are located at Zahony (4824N-2211E) and Komoro (4818N-2206E) in Hungary, at Cierna nad Tisou in Czechoslovakia, and at Chop in the Ukraine.² The Zahony transloading station is the largest in Hungary and probably exceeds in capacity the facilities at Chop. An average of five to six Russian broad-gauge trains arrive daily at Zahony. Each carries between 2,500 and 2,600 metric tons of goods.³

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The daily capacity of the Zahony transshipment center is estimated at 18,000 tons of freight per day. The current upper limit at Zahony proper is probably 15,000 tons with an additional 3,000 tons being handled at nearby Komoro. The freight transshipped at the latter location consists entirely of crude oil and POL products. Zahony on the other hand handles foodstuffs destined for the urban population of Budapest together with the very important items of coal, coke, and iron ore for the Sajo River industrial region. Pit props for the mines located in the Area of Map a as well as those in Transdanubia (Map b) are also a significant item of freight arriving at Zahony.⁴

Export shipments through Zahony consist of bauxite from mines in the area of Map b, oil from southwest Hungary (Map c), steel and steel products including machinery, motor vehicles and locomotives, alumina, aluminum, and uranium ore from mines near Recsk (4756N-2006E) and Pecs (Map c). In view of the fact that with the exception of crude oil the capacity of the Zahony yards is fully utilized by incoming freight shipments, it is likely that products exported from Hungary pass through Zahony for transshipment at Chop.

In addition to its economic significance the Zahony transloading area has a prime military value. How great this value is has been indicated in a report that between 31 October and 2 November 1956 during the course of the Hungarian uprising up to 92 trains carrying two Soviet divisions passed through this point.⁵ It has been alleged, however, that the Zahony yards themselves could not handle the greatly increased volume of traffic at this time, and the Russian broad-gauge track which had terminated at Komoro was extended by 8,000 Soviet construction troops as far as Nyirbogdany (4803N-2152E). At this point the arriving Russian troops disembarked from the trains and proceeded toward Budapest by highway.

The conversion of the railway gauge was accomplished by outwardly shifting one rail for a distance of 3-1/2 inches. The change in gauge was made without regard to its effects on connecting lines. The track was

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probably restored to its original status when the emergency passed but the rapid change of gauge has been cited as evidence of the logistical capability of the USSR in respect to a major military effort by rail through the Hungarian-Ukrainian border area.⁶

Little definitive information is available on the connections which Hungarian railways make with the Ukraine via the Hungarian border-crossing point of Satoraljaújhely (4824N-2139E) and the Czechoslovak-Ukraine border-crossing at Cierna nad Tisou. It is most likely that some shipments of coal, coke, and iron ore reach the steel mills in the area of Map a via this route, and that finished and semi-finished products from these same as well as other establishments elsewhere in Hungary are delivered to the USSR along this rail line for transshipment at Chop. The connecting railroad line Nyiregyhaza (4758N-2143E)-Szerencs (4810N-2112E), which crosses the Tisza River and its arms between Tokaj (4807N-2124E) and Rakamaz (4808N-2127E) is very important as part of a circuit route between Zahony, Miskolc, Cierna nad Tisou, and Chop.

Other rail connections which are made between Hungary and Czechoslovakia along the northern border of Hungary are also important both economically and strategically. The main route from Chop via Satoraljaújhely, Miskolc, Hatvan (4740N-1941E), Aszod (4739N-1929E), and Vac (4746N-1908E) crosses into Czechoslovakia again at Szob (4749N-1825E) (Map b) and leads to the western part of Czechoslovakia with further connections to Austria. The route avoids vulnerable bridge crossings of the Tisza and Danube Rivers. The sector between Miskolc and Hatvan is being electrified. South of Hatvan electrification is complete as far as Budapest.

A number of well-maintained highways are located in the area covered by Map a. None has any great economic importance except in terms of its use as a feeder to the nearest railroad. The military value of these highways, however, cannot be overlooked and the vulnerable physical

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structures located along them enter therefore into the planning of Special Forces wherever they would endeavor to cut a nearby railroad line.

The part of Hungary's transportation system included within the limits of Map a is vulnerable to interdiction by Special Forces at the numerous key structures shown on the map. The numbers appearing beside the symbols representing these structures are keyed to the partial list of key structures following this text. While the interdiction of branch and alternate railway lines with little traffic volume would normally be less advantageous than the interdiction of main trunk lines, this situation can change significantly if, as a result of the disruption of service on the main routes, the alternate lines should assume a greater than normal importance. In many instances it will be found that on double-tracked lines in this as well as in other parts of the Suitability Area each track crosses a terrain obstacle on a separate structure. This situation is especially noteworthy in respect to the double-tracked line entering Hungary at Satoraljaújhely. If Special Forces were to sever this and similar lines they would have to be prepared to interdict more than one structure at any location.

As examples of the results which could be obtained by Special Forces operations against the transportation system in that part of the general Suitability Area shown on Map a the following are mentioned. The interdiction of structure No. 18 on Map a would deny the iron and steel mills at Miskolc, Diosgyor, and Ozd direct access to the coal, coke, and iron ore supplies which they receive from the USSR. Shipments of domestic iron ore from Rudabanya could be interdicted either through the disruption of service on the branch line between Rudabanya and Kazincbarcika or through attacks on the mining installations themselves. The branch railroad line crosses a number of small streams as well as the Sajó River before connecting at Kazincbarcika with the line between Miskolc and Ozd.

The bridge over the Tisza River between Zahony and Chop is vital to the movement of goods between Hungary and the USSR. It could be approached and interdicted by Special Forces from points to either side of the Hungarian-

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Russian border as well as from places in nearby forested areas in Czechoslovakia. An unconfirmed report alleges that an underwater crossing of the Tisza has been planned for the Chop-Zahony connection in order to reduce at this point the physical vulnerability of this very important transportation route.⁷ The circuit between Zahony, Chop, and Miskolc could be broken by Special Forces through the interdiction of structures Nos. 3 or 12.

The interruption of power supplies in northeastern Hungary would have many desirable advantages for Special Forces although the power distribution network in this area is elaborate enough to provide for alternate supplies of power in times of emergency. Nevertheless, because Hungary as a whole suffers from a deficiency of electric power, the loss of power produced by any of the major plants in the system would be felt in areas far removed from the plant itself. For example, the electrified section of railroad between Budapest and Hatvan is dependent upon power from the Matra power plant (key structure No. 83). If this facility were interdicted, or if the transmission lines connecting it to the railroad were destroyed, electric traction on the railroad would probably have to be suspended. Key structure No. 74 at Bereente (4824K-20402) which is one of the largest power plants in Hungary is a major supplier of power to the industries and mines in the Sajó River industrial region. Loss of power from this source would have a very serious if not a critical effect upon industrial production in this sector. Effects would also be produced upon areas removed from the Sajó River industrial region in that surplus power produced at Bereente is fed into the national grid. The transmission lines leading from the plant toward the south would be readily accessible to Special Forces interdiction.

Power production at the Bereente plant is indirectly vulnerable through the interdiction of fuel supplies. These are obtained by conveyor from a coal dressing plant located approximately one kilometer

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west of the power plant. By interdicting the conveyor system between the power and coal dressing plants, Special Forces could seriously disturb electric power output in this area. A similar type conveyor system extends between nearby mines and the coal dressing plant. Coal is also delivered to the preparation plant by rail. Local coal utilized by the power plant and the other industrial facilities in the immediate area, including especially the coking plant at Kazincbarcika, must be prepared beforehand. Any damage which would force the coal preparation plant to suspend operations would therefore have a widespread effect.

Another possible worthwhile objective of Special Forces in northeastern Hungary would be the destruction of the power plant and navigation lock at the junction of the Tisza River and Trans-Tisza Canal near Tiszaok (4801N-2123E). This canal is expected to become one of the more important navigable waterways in Hungary. By means of it the agricultural products of the Eastern Hungarian Plain can be moved northward by river to the Soviet border at Zahony and Chop. Forest products from areas in Rumania can also be shipped downstream to areas in eastern and southern Hungary. The destruction of the navigation lock at Tiszaok would prevent in large measure the easy movement of these various products. Interdiction of the power output of the associated hydroelectric plant would remove 12,500 kw. of power from the total amount of power available in this area.

Both above and underground telecommunications lines connecting Hungary with the USSR are found in the area covered by Map a. For the most part these lines follow the main rail and road routes in the area. Their interdiction would be disruptive of rapid telecommunications between the USSR, Hungary, and Austria. The telecommunications lines could be approached by Special Forces in conjunction with an interdiction of an important rail or road route.

An oil or gas pipeline has been reported to extend between Nyirbator (4750N-2208E) and Maszolaalfalva, via Debrecen. Only a small length of the

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line is shown on Map a. It is possible that the line does not run to Nyirbator from Debrecen but rather connects the latter place to Nyirbogdany which has a small refinery. Nyirbogdany lies on the main railway line to Zahony and Chop and is not far removed from the oil transloading station at Komoro.

5. Partial List of Key Structures (Map a)

Structure	Location	Remarks
1. Railroad bridge	Over Tisza River at Zahony (4824N-2211E)	3 spans at 83 meters each; steel lattice girder; dual gauge (i.e., three rails)
2. Railroad bridge	Near Zahony	15 meters long
3. Railroad bridge	North of Nyiregyhaza (4758N-2143E)	Carries narrow-gauge line over main line to Zahony
4. Railroad bridge	Nyiregyhaza	23.8 meters long
5. Railroad bridge	South of Buj (4806N-2138E), on narrow-gauge line to Sarospatak (4819N-2134E)	17 meters long
6. Railroad bridge	Near Gava (4809N-2136E), on narrow-gauge line to Sarospatak	17 meters long
7. Three railroad bridges	North of Balsa (4810N-2132E), over Tisza River and branches on narrow-gauge line to Sarospatak	Main bridge 204 meters long; others 96 meters long each
8. Railroad bridge	Over Bodrog River on narrow-gauge line to Sarospatak	3 spans at 44 meters each
9. Two railroad bridges	North of Satoraljaiújhely (4824N-2139E) on main line, over branch of Bodrog River	25 meters long each; line forks at this point, one branch to Kossice, the other to Chop
10. Railroad bridge	Over tributary of Bodrog River on main line to Satoraljaiújhely	20 meters long; adjoining highway bridge
11. Two railroad bridges	Over highway and Szerencs River north of Szerencs (4810N-2112E)	26 meters and 18 meters long each

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Structure	Location	Remarks
12. Five railroad bridges	Over Tisza and arms between Tokaj (4807N-2124E) and Rákamaz (4808N-2127E) on important circuit line Szerencs, Chop-Nyiregyháza	Largest 670 feet, 3 steel spans over main channel; others: 240 feet, 3 steel spans, steel lattice girder; 595 feet, 7 spans; 37 meters, single span; and 320 feet, 4 spans
13. Railroad bridge	On branch line Szerencs-Hidasnémeti (4830N-2114E)	20 meters long
14. Railroad bridge	On branch line Szerencs-Hidasnémeti	270 feet long, 3 spans, over Hernád River
15. Three railroad bridges	On alternate line Miskolc (4806N-2047E)-Kosice	15-20 meters long each
16. Railroad bridge	On main line Miskolc-Satoraljaújhely	340 feet long, 2 spans over Hernád River
17. Railroad bridge	On main line Miskolc-Satoraljaújhely	16 meters long
18. Railroad bridge	On main line Miskolc-Satoraljaújhely over Sajó River	290 feet long, 3 spans, steel, concrete pier
19. Railroad bridge	In Miskolc over Szenva River on important line to Kazincbarcika (4815N-2038E)	30 meters long
20. Railroad bridge	Over Sajó River on branch line Miskolc-Komjati (4832N-2045E)	330 feet long, 3 spans
21. Railroad bridge	Over Bodva River on branch line Miskolc-Komjati	30 meters long
22. Railroad bridge	On spur line to Rudabánya (4822N-2036E)	15 meters long
23. Railroad bridge	Over Sajó River on spur line to Rudabánya	200 feet long, 6 spans
24. Railroad bridge	East of Kazincbarcika on important line from Miskolc	15 meters long
25. Two railroad bridges	To either side of Vadna (4816N-2033E); westernmost and largest crosses Sajó River	50 meters long, single span, and 16 meters long
26. Railroad bridge	South of Putnok (4818N-2026E) on line to Eger (4754N-2022E) and Füzesabony (4745N-2025E), over Sajó River	50 meters long, 2 spans

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Structure	Location	Remarks
27. Railroad bridge	Over Sajó River on important spur line Bahreve (4818N-2021E)-Ozd (4813N-2018E)	200 feet long, 2 spans, through steel lattice girder
28. Railroad bridge	North of Ozd	18 meters long
29. Railroad tunnel	South of Kirald (4815N-2024E) on line Putnok (4818N-2126E)-Füzesabony	208 meters long
30. Two railroad bridges and two tunnels	North of Eger (4754N-2022E)	Bridges each 16-18 meters long; tunnels 62 meters and 114 meters long
31. Railroad bridge	East of Eger railroad station	15 meters long
32. Railroad tunnel	Between Miskolc (4806N-2047E) and Diosgyor (4806N-2041E) on important spur line	1,263 feet long
33. Railroad bridge	Over Rima River between Füzesabony and Mezőkovác (4748N-2034E)	15 meters long
34. Railroad bridge	East of Füzesabony on line to Debrecen (4731N-2139E)	22 meters long
35. Two railroad bridges	At Porozlo (4739N-2039E) over Eger River channels	One 930 feet long, 18 spans; one 260 feet long, 5 spans
36. Railroad bridge	Over Tisza River at Tiszafured (4737N-2045E)	916 feet long, 3 spans including 2 deck and 1 through steel lattice girder
37. Railroad bridge	At Tiszafured over alternate channel of Tisza River	305 feet long, 6 spans
38. Railroad bridge	East of Ohat-Pusztakocs (approx. 4736N-2058E)	22 meters long
39. Railroad bridge	West of Balmazújvaros (4736N-2120E)	28 meters long
40. Two railroad bridges	Between Ohat-Pusztakocs and Tiszacsege (4742N-2100E)	Approx. 20 meters long each
41. Railroad bridge	South of Polgar (4752N-2106E) near Polyas (4748N-2106E)	17 meters long
42. Railroad bridge	North of Polgar	18 meters long
43. Railroad bridge	West of Kal-Kapolna (4744N-2016E) on main line Hatvan-Miskolc	25 meters long

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Structure	Location	Remarks
44. Railroad bridge	West of Kal-Kapolna on main line Hatvan-Miskolc	180 feet long, over Tarna River
45. Railroad bridge	West of Kal-Kapolna on main line Hatvan-Miskolc	28 meters long
46. Two railroad bridges	East of Vamossyork (4741N-1956E) on main line Hatvan-Miskolc	19 and 30 meters long, respectively
47. Railroad bridge	North of Kal-Kapolna on secondary line to Kisterenye (4800N-1950E)	30 meters long
48. Railroad bridge	Northwest of Parad (4755N-2002E) on secondary line Kal-Kapolna - Kisterenye	16 meters long
49. Railroad bridge	Between Salgotarjan (4807N-1948E) and Kisterenye on important line Hatvan-Lucenec (Czechoslovakia)	15 meters long
50. Two railroad bridges	South of Kisterenye on important line Hatvan-Lucenec (Czechoslovakia)	19 meters long each
51. Railroad bridge	North of Selypicukorgyar (4746N-1940E) on important line Hatvan-Lucenec (Czechoslovakia)	25 meters long
52. Railroad bridge	North of Selypicukorgyar on important line Hatvan-Lucenec (Czechoslovakia)	15 meters long
53. Railroad bridge	At Hatvan on important line Hatvan-Lucenec (Czechoslovakia)	18 meters long
54. Two railroad bridges	At Hatvan (4740N-1941E) on main double-track line to Satoraljaushely crossing Sogyva River	20 meters long each
55. Railroad bridge	South of Hatvan on important alternate line to Szolnok (4710N-2011E)	28 meters long
56. Railroad bridge	Over small stream west of Aszod (4739N-1929E) on main line Hatvan-Budapest	24 meters long
57. Railroad bridge	South of Galgamedsa (4741N-1923E) on important Budapest out-off	20 meters long
58. Railroad bridge	South of Vac (4746N-1908E) on important Budapest-Vac-Bratislava (Czechoslovakia) main line	20 meters long

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Structure	Location	Remarks
59. Railroad bridge	On branch line Vac-Dregelypalank (4803N-1903E)	18 meters long
60. Railroad bridge	On branch line Dregelypalank-Balassagyarmat (4805N-1917E)	160 feet, 8 spans, reinforced concrete beams
61. Railroad bridge	On branch line Dregelypalank-Balassagyarmat	20 meters long
62. Railroad tunnel	On branch line Balassagyarmat-Galgamedsa	158 meters long
63. Railroad bridge	On branch line Balassagyarmat-Ipolytarnoc (4814N-1938E)	16 meters long
64. Railroad bridge	On branch line Balassagyarmat-Ipolytarnoc	18 meters long
65. Steam power plant	Satoraljaushely (4824N-2139E)	1,200 kw. (1944). Supplies Satoraljaushely. Fuel: brown coal.
66. Steam power plant	Szerencs (4810N-2112E)	3,300 kw. (1944). Industrial plant of sugar refinery. Fuel: brown coal.
67. H.E. power plant	Tisza (4801N-2125E). On Tisza River at point of junction with Trans-Tisza Canal.	12,500 kw. Maximum installed capacity operable only about 200 days per year because of river fluctuation.
68. Steam power plant	Nyiregyhaza (4758N-2143E)	4,700 kw. (1948). Supplies Nyiregyhaza. Fuel: brown coal.
69. H.E. power plant	Tisza (4802N-2104E). On Hernad River near the confluence with Tisza River	4,700 kw. (1947). Supplies Tisza and nearby vicinity.
70. Steam power plant	Tiszapalkonya (4753N-2103E)	Planned for 200,000 kw. Construction begun in 1953. Work still in progress in 1957 with first power-producing unit being installed. Fuel: brown coal from Borsod basin.
71. Steam power plant	Kurutyán (4818N-2037E)	2,400 kw. (1945). Industrial plant of steel mill. Fuel: brown coal.

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Structure	Location	Remarks
72. Steam power plant	Dísznoshorvat (4818N-2039E)	2,000 kw. (1944). Supplies Dísznoshorvat. Fuel: brown coal.
73. Steam power plant	Barcika (4815N-2037E)	8,000 kw. (1945). Supplies Borsod coal mines. Surplus output is transmitted to Diosgyor steel mill. Fuel: brown coal.
74. Steam power plant	Berente (4814N-2040E)	Rated at 200,000 kw., although producing only 160,000 kw. in 1956. Industrial plant of chemical works producing fertilizer and coke. Also will supply power to Budapest-Miskolc railroad and other industries of Kazincbarcika area. Fuel: brown coal. One of the largest power plants in Hungary.
75. Steam power plant	Diosgyor (4806N-2041E)	32,000 kw. (1945). Industrial plant of steel mill. Supplies also magnesium and cement works at Diosgyor, oil refinery near Miskolc and freight car plant at Miskolc. Fuel: brown coal.
76. Steam power plant	Miskolc (4806N-2047E)	10,000 kw. Under construction.
77. H.E. power plant	Tiszafured (4737N-2045E). On Tisza River	10,000 kw. Under construction.
78. Steam power plant	Ozd (4813N-2018E)	24,800 kw. (1944). Industrial power plant of steel mill. Fuel: brown coal.
79. Steam power plant	Belapatfalva (4804N-2022E)	4,000 kw. (1944). Industrial power plant of cement works. Fuel: brown coal.
80. Steam power plant	Egercsehi (4803N-2016E)	2,000 kw. (1945). Industrial plant of coal mines. Supplies also local cement works. Fuel: brown coal.
81. Steam power plant	Salgotarjan (4807N-1948E)	20,000 kw. (1952). Supplies Salgotarjan, Paszto, Hatvan, and Szolnok areas. Fuel: brown coal.

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
Structure	Location	Remarks
82. Steam power plant	Nagybatony (4758N-1950E)	1,200 kw. (1945). Industrial plant of coal mines. Fuel: brown coal.
83. Steam power plant	Lorinci (4744N-1940E), 7 kms. north of Hatvan and 200 m. east of railroad	128,000 kw. "Matra" plant (1954). Supplies Lorinci and Budapest-Hatvan railroad. Fuel: brown coal.

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


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6. Economic Vulnerability Factors (Map b)

With the exception of one mining area shown on Map c, all of Hungary's bauxite mining and aluminum manufacturing industry is located within the limits of Map b. The alumina and aluminum plant at Ajka (4706N-1734E) is closest to the Halimba (4702N-1732E)-Sumeg (4658N-1717E) area where the largest portion of the bauxite reserves are found. Attacks on mines and transportation routes between the mines and the Ajka plant would affect the production of alumina and aluminum at Ajka. Aluminum production, which requires large quantities of electric power, could be curtailed by interdicting the 50,000-kw. Ajka power plant (key structure No. 91). This plant in turn is vulnerable to loss of its coal supplies which originate at mines in Padrag (4703N-1733E). Disruption of transportation services aimed at bauxite mining in the Halimba area could also include as an objective the denial of coal supplies to the Ajka power plant. The branch railroad line Padrag-Csekut (4704N-1733E) is the major artery over which coal and bauxite are delivered to the Ajka area. The line crosses at least one short bridge over the Csinger River. The exact crossing-point is not known and therefore is not shown on Map b.

Bauxite from mines north of Szekesfehervar (4712N-1825E) is delivered to the alumina plant at Almasfuzito (4743N-1815E). After processing at that place the alumina is returned to the Szekesfehervar area to the Inota aluminum works. The rail line Szekesfehervar-Komarom (4745N-1806E) handles most of the traffic. The interdiction of this rail line would, however, be difficult in view of the fact that it lacks suitable key structures over 15 meters in length. Special Forces could, however, probably find any number of structures of lesser length on this line (e.g., culverts), although these could be more easily repaired than structures which more closely resemble regular bridges.

In lieu of interdicting bauxite and alumina traffic on the main rail line, there are other possible ways of diminishing or halting the production of alumina at Almasfuzito and of aluminum at Inota. For example,

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the transportation routes which connect the bauxite mines to the main rail-road line could be interdicted through a series of local attacks. Attacks on the mines and their associated installations would be another method of interdiction open to Special Forces. The Inota aluminum plant could be deprived of its electric power supply. Power is obtained from the adjacent 120,000-kv. Inota power station, which in order to generate its electric output is dependent upon coal mined at Varpalota (4712N-1808E). If the coal supplies were interdicted neither electric power nor aluminum production could be continued at Inota. The loss of power would also be felt in other areas receiving power from the Inota plant through the national grid.

On the northern border of Map b Hungary's transportation system makes three important rail and highway connections with Czechoslovakia. Two of these are Danube River connections on a combined road and railroad bridge at Komarom (key structure No. 9) and a road bridge at Medve (approximately 4745N-1740E) (key structure No. 11). The third connection is at Szob (4749N-1852E) on the main trunk line from the USSR discussed in reference to Map a.

On the western border only one railroad line crosses into Austria. This is the trunk route Budapest-Hegyeshalom (4755N-1710E). Other crossing-points into Austria could be re-established in a short time even where, as around Pinkamindszent (4702N-1629E), tracks have been removed from the roadbed.

The trunk connection between Hungary and Austria via Hegyeshalom is electrified. Power is supplied mainly by key structure No. 77, the 80,000-kw. Banihida power plant. This facility receives its fuel supplies from mines at Tatabanya (4733N-1826E), some three kilometers distant from the plant. Tatabanya is also the site of an aluminum plant and another of the country's largest power plants. The power plant (60,000-70,000 kw.) (key structure No. 76) supplies the aluminum mill. Coal from the Tatabanya mines is in this case also the source of fuel. The coal is received via a conveyor which is approximately three kilometers long. If military operations would cause coal production to be suspended at the Tatabanya mines this would

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curtail electric power production at these two large facilities, and aluminum production at the aluminum mill.

Interdiction of the Banihida power plant's fuel supplies would also cause a suspension of service on the rail line to Hegyeshalom insofar as electric traction is concerned. Steam locomotives could, of course, be substituted for the electric engines, but in view of the locomotive shortage in Hungary and the fact that at least 90 steam engines would be required in replacement of the electric variety, it is doubtful that more than limited service could be maintained under conditions where electric power was unavailable.

The Budapest-Hegyeshalom rail line could also be interdicted directly through attacks on suitable key structures. Key structure No. 12 on Map b is a critical bridge over the Raba River. Immediately west of the bridge the rail line bifurcates, with one branch leading to Sopron (4741N-1636E) and the other, the main line, continuing to Hegyeshalom. Direct rail service between the northwestern corner of Hungary and the remainder of the country could be broken through the interdiction of this key structure. In addition, the Mosonmagyaróvár (4752N-1717E) alumina plant would no longer have a direct connection with the Tatabanya aluminum facility which it supplies.

Throughout the area of Map b principal rail and highway routes closely parallel and frequently cross one another. Many of the crossings are accomplished by bridges which carry the rail line over the highway or vice-versa. Examples may be seen in key structures Nos. 27, 34, 49, and 61. Successful interdictory efforts at such points would cause users of either transportation route to employ alternate avenues of movement in the affected area. In the case of key structure No. 34, where two rail lines cross each other, interdiction would probably necessitate the rerouting of oil shipments from the refineries at Zalaegerszeg (4650N-1651E) to points in north and northwest Hungary. Key structure No. 61 similarly carries the main rail trunk line Budapest-Dombóvár (4623N-1808E) (Map c) over an equally important line between Budapest and Szekesfehervar. Each line is a major traffic carrier. The first handles coal from the Pecs (4605N-1813E)-Kömlöd (4611N-1815E)

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district (Map c) and connects Budapest with the steel center at Dunapentele (4658N-1855E). The second line connects Budapest through Szekesfehervar with the aluminum, oil-refining, and chemical industries to the west and with the oilfields to the south.

A lengthy portion of the oil and gas pipeline from the Zala County oilfields (Map c) is shown on Map b along the southern shore of Lake Balaton. It leads to refineries at Szony (4744N-1810E), Almasfuzito, Budapest, and Petfurdo (4709N-1807E). The pipeline can be interdicted almost anywhere along its route but a cut in the line south of Lepseny (4659N-1815E) would have the best results. All refineries served by the line are located north of that point. The pumping station near Siofok (4654N-1803E) would be a likely structure for interdiction. This task could be carried out in concert with the interdiction of key structure No. 68 on the trunk railroad Budapest-Nagykanizsa, which crosses the Sio Canal at Siofok. Destruction of key structure No. 68 would halt service on the important railroad route and would also block the Sio Canal to shipping between the Danube River and Lake Balaton. Important open wire telecommunications lines which parallel this railroad could also be interdicted in the vicinity of key structure No. 68. Telecommunications facilities would, of course, be objectives of Special Forces attack elsewhere in the area of Map b wherever they would be found in conjunction with other key structures.

The large new Hungarian steel center of Dunapentele (Sztalinvaros) appears on Map b near its eastern border on the Danube River. Almost half of Hungary's steel-making capacity is located at this place. The steel center is very vulnerable to the interdiction of its raw materials supplies. Most of the iron ore and coking coal consumed at Dunapentele is received from the USSR via the Danube River and could be interdicted by blocking the navigation channel in the river; the blocking of the channel would have to be accomplished downstream from the steel center. Another supply route from the USSR is via rail from Zahony.

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Closing the Danube River to navigation downstream from Dunapentele would have other important effects. Shipments of oil and alumina to the USSR from Szony, Almasfuzito, and Budapest, all of which are upstream from Dunapentele, could no longer be made via this water route. All traffic between Budapest, Hungary's largest river port, and all downstream points including the Soviet Union, would also be halted.

Some raw materials needed at Dunapentele arrive by rail from places south and west of the steel center. Domestic coking coal is obtained from mines at Pecs and Komlo (Map c) via the rail route Dombovar-Pusztaszabolcs (4708N-1845E). The new rail connection between Retszilas (4650N-1837E) and Dunapentele was constructed in order to shorten the delivery route for this coal, but structural deficiencies in the new line have prevented its being utilized for its intended purpose. The 63,000-kw. power plant at Dunapentele is totally dependent upon coal from outside the immediate area. The facility is said to operate on brown coal and could be receiving its supplies from a number of locations including Varpalota and Tatabanya as well as Pecs and Komlo. Interdiction of the rail lines north and south of Dunapentele would deny coal from these sites to the power station.

The Danube River, which forms the eastern boundary of the area represented by Map b, separates western from eastern Hungary. Apart from the bridges located in the City of Budapest, which as a metropolitan area is not included in the general Suitability Area of Hungary, only two other crossings of the Danube River are made in Hungary. One of these is shown on Map b at Dunafoldvar (4648N-1856E) (key structure No. 63); the other crossing appears on Map c between Bataszek (4611N-1843E) and Baja (4610N-1856E).

The bridge at Dunafoldvar is presently important as a link in the circuit route between Budapest and Dunapentele. This route facilitates the interchange of steel products between Dunapentele and plants in Budapest. The crossing-point will assume added strategic importance with the completion of work on what will be a new trunk rail connection between

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Kisujezallas (outside the Suitability Area) on the main line to Chop, and Transdanubia. Inasmuch as the Dunafoldvar crossing involves three distinct bridges rather than one continuous structure it should not be eliminated as a Special Forces objective in the belief that its size places it beyond the capabilities of Special Forces personnel.

Similar considerations might apply to the other Danube River bridges connecting Hungary to Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, it is only from the standpoint of severing rail connections that Special Forces would want to approach these structures. Although these bridges are equally important under normal conditions as highway connections, the fact that temporary highway bridges can be easily erected at numerous points on the Danube makes questionable the worth of any Special Forces operation which would seek to interdict a Danube River bridge for the sole objective of severing a highway artery. Indicative of this point is the fact that in early November 1956, Russian troops easily and rapidly bridged the Danube at Nagymaros (4747N-1858E) north of Budapest in order to facilitate their movements around that city.

7. Partial List of Key Structures (Map b)

Structure	Location	Remarks
1. Railroad bridge	Between Nagymaros (4747N-1858E) and Zebegeny (4748N-1855E) on main double-track line Budapest-Bratislava	30 meters long
2. Railroad bridge	Between Zebegeny and Szob (4749N-1852E) on main double-track line Budapest-Bratislava	30 meters long
3. Railroad bridges	North of Szob over Ipoly River	480 feet; separate single-track bridges each 3 span, steel lattice girder.
4. Railroad tunnel	North of Budapest on branch line to Esztergom (4747N-1845E)	2,560 feet long
5. Railroad bridges	North of Budapest on main double-track electrified line to Hegyeshalom (4755N-1710E)	360 feet long, 2 single-track bridges; 2 spans each, steel lattice girder (deck type).

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Structure	Location	Remarks
6. Railroad bridge	On same line, east of Bicske (4729N-1838E)	28 meters long
7. Railroad bridge	On same line, west of Bicske over Valviz River	360 feet long, 2 spans, steel lattice girders deck type).
8. Two railroad bridges	On same line east of Felsogalla (4732N-1826E)	15 meters long each
9. Railroad bridge	West of Komarom (4745N-1806E) over Danube River connecting with Czechoslovakian lines	689 feet long; steel through truss; also highway bridge nearby.
10. Road bridge	Over Danube River at Medve (approx. 4745N-1740E)	Construction details unknown
11. Railroad bridge	At Acs (4742N-1801E) over Corco River on main line Budapest-Hegyeshalom	18 meters long
12. Three road bridges over railroad, and one railroad bridge over Raba River	Gyor (4741N-1738E) on main line Budapest-Hegyeshalom	Bridge over Raba River, 555 feet, 2 spans, reinforced concrete; replaces WW II destroyed structure.
13. Railroad bridge	Southeast of Abda (4741N-1733E) over Rapca River on main line Budapest-Hegyeshalom	45 meters long, reinforced concrete, main highway bridge 800 meters northeast.
14. Railroad bridge	South of Mosonmagyaróvár (4752N-1715E) on main line Budapest-Hegyeshalom	15 meters long
15. Railroad bridge	Northwest of Mosonmagyaróvár station on main line Budapest-Hegyeshalom	19 meters long
16. Five railroad bridges	On branch line Hegyeshalom-Rajka (4800N-1712E)	From 15 to 25 meters long each
17. Two railroad bridges	On branch line Hegyeshalom-Csorna (4737N-1715E)	Approx. 50 meters long each, single span, steel lattice girder.
18. Railroad bridge	North of Sarrod (4738N-1652E) on line to Austria	28 meters long; border-crossing inoperative.
19. Two railroad bridges	Between Kapuvar (4736N-1702E) and Fertőszentmiklos (4735N-1653E) on Gyor-Sopron main line	About 25-30 meters long each
20. Railroad bridge	North of Repcelak (4725N-1701E) on branch line Hegyeshalom-Szombathely	22 meters long

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Structure	Location	Remarks
21. Railroad bridge	North of Repcelak on branch line Hegyeshalom-Szombathely	21 meters long
22. Three railroad bridges	On connecting line Buk (4723N-1646E)-Vasgerszeg (4722N-1655E)	20-30 meters long each
23. Two railroad bridges	On secondary line Sopron-Szombathely south of Buk over Ablanc River	One 170 feet long, 3 span, steel lattice (through)
24. Railroad bridge	West of Szombathely (4714N-1637E) on line to Buceu (4716N-1629E) and Austrian border.	30 meters long; border-crossing inoperative.
25. Railroad bridge	South of Szombathely on main line Budapest-Szentgotthard (4657N-1616E)	30 meters long
26. Two railroad bridges	South of Kormend (4701N-1636E) on main line Budapest-Szentgotthard	25-30 meters long each
27. Railroad and highway bridges	West of Ratot (4658N-1625E) on main road and rail route Budapest-Szentgotthard	Road overpasses railroad on 220-foot, 4 span, deck type bridge; railroad crosses small stream on 15-meter long bridge.
28. Railroad bridge	At Szentgotthard over Iapincs River	37 meters long; border-crossing point inoperative.
29. Railroad bridge	Between Zalalovo (4651N-1631N) and Davidhaza (4651N-1636E)	30 meters long; border-crossing closed.
30. Four railroad bridges	South of Kormend on connecting line to Zalalovo	Largest, 250 feet, 2 spans, steel lattice girder, over Raba River.
31. Three railroad bridges	East of Alsobagod (approx. 4653N-1647E) on branch line from Zalaegerszeg to border over Zala River and tributaries	Largest 60 meters
32. Three railroad bridges	North of Zalaegerszeg (4650N-1651E) on important connecting line	Largest 190 feet, 7 spans, deck type, over Zala River.
33. Railroad bridge	Zalaszentivan (4653N-1654E) over Zala River	370 feet, 4 span, steel lattice girder through type.
34. Railroad bridge	Zalaszentivan	10 meters long; carries line from Celldomolk to Zalaegerszeg over line from Szombathely to Nagykaniza.

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Structure	Location	Remarks
35. Three railroad bridges	North of Vasvar (4703N-1648E) on line Szombathely-Nagykaniza over Raba River channels	Main channel crossing; 465 feet, 5 span, steel lattice girder (through type); middle bridge 170 feet, 2 spans, similar type.
36. Railroad bridge	Between Szombathely and Vasvar	35 meters long
37. Two railroad bridges	Over Raba River on main line Budapest-Szombathely	Main channel crossing, 360 feet, 3 spans, steel lattice girder.
38. Railroad bridge	Over Raba River on branch line Repcelak-Celldomolk (4715N-1709E)	265 feet, 2 spans, steel lattice girder (through type)
39. Railroad bridge	Over Raba River on connecting line Csorna-Papa (4720N-1728E)	265 feet, 1 span, steel lattice girder, 4 deck spans.
40. Two railroad bridges	North of Marcalto (4726N-1722E) on line Csorna-Papa	One 300 feet long, 3 spans, steel lattice girder; two small bridges to south of town on same line.
41. Two railroad bridges	North of Celldomolk on connecting line to Gyor	21 meters long each
42. Railroad bridge	Over Marcal River on main line Budapest-Szentgotthard	19 meters long
43. Railroad bridge	Over Zala River on connecting line Balatonszentgyorgy (4641N-1718E)-Celldomolk	230 feet long, 2 spans, steel lattice girder (through type)
44. Railroad bridge	Between Tapolca (4653N-1726E) and Sumej (4653N-1717E) on connecting line	16 meters long
45. Three railroad bridges	Between Tapolca and Balatonederics (4648N-1723E)	18-40 meters long each
46. Two railroad bridges	Between Tapolca and Badacsonytomaj (4648N-1731E)	16-22 meters long each
47. Railroad bridge	East of Badacsonytomaj	30 meters long
48. Road bridge	Over main line railroad Budapest-Szombathely near Somlojeno (4707N-1721E) at conjunction of important road and railroad through routes	16 meters long

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Structure	Location	Remarks
49. Two road bridges	Over main line railroad Budapest-Szentgotthard near Varoslod (4708N-1739E) at conjunction of important road and railroad through routes	16 meters long each
50. Road bridge	Over main line railroad Budapest-Szentgotthard near Herend (4708N-1745E)	10-15 meters long
51. Railroad bridge	Veszprem (4705N-1754E) on connecting line to Balatonalmadi (4702N-1801E)	28 meters long
52. Two railroad bridges	North of Gyulafiratot (4706N-1757E) on connecting line Veszprem-Gyor	20 meters long each
53. Railroad tunnel	North of Epleny (4713N-1755E) on same line	1,054 feet long
54. Three short tunnels	North of Zirc (4716N-1752E) on same line	
55. Road bridge	Over branch railroad Hajmasker (4209N-1801E)-Csajag (4703N-1811E) on trunk road Budapest-Szentgotthard	16 meters long
56. Road bridge	Over main line Budapest-Szentgotthard on main trunk road route Budapest-Szentgotthard	16 meters long
57. Road bridge	South of Szekesfehervar (4712N-1825E) over main line Budapest-Mirakeresztur	16 meters long
58. Railroad bridge	Szekesfehervar on main line from Budapest	16 meters long
59. Road bridge	South of Dinuyes (4710N-1834E) trunk road crosses over main line from Budapest	18 meters long
60. Railroad bridge	Over Valliz River near Baracksa (4717N-1845E) on major trunk line from Budapest	
61. Railroad bridge	Northwest of Erd (4721N-1856E) at conjunction of two important trunk routes	18 meters long

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Structure	Location	Remarks
62. Railroad bridge	Over small stream south of Erd on important line Budapest-Dombovar	16 meters long
63. Three railroad bridges	At Dunafoldvar (4648N-1856E) crossing east arm and main channel of Danube River and small tributary	East arm bridge 1 span, steel lattice girder (through), 226 feet long, road bridge along-side; main bridge combination road and rail, steel through truss center spans and steel deck-type approach spans, 1,616 feet long; western-most bridge 16 meters long, over small Danube tributary.
64. Railroad bridge	South of Retszilas (4650N-1837E) on main line Budapest-Dombovar over Sarviz Canal	170 feet long, 1 span, steel lattice girder
65. Railroad bridge	South of Simontornya (4645N-1833E) on main line Budapest-Dombovar over Sio Canal	170 feet long, 1 span, steel lattice girder
66. Railroad bridge	Over Sio Canal at Mezőkomárom (4649N-1817E) on branch line Lepseny-Tamas	20 meters long
67. Railroad bridge	Balatonfoldvar (4651N-1753E) on main line Budapest-Mirakeresztur	15 meters long
68. Railroad bridge	Siofok (4654N-1803E) over Sio Canal on main line Budapest-Mirakeresztur	30 meters long; largest bridge on this very important line, rebuilt in 1956.
69. Railroad bridge	Southeast of Siofok over Sio Canal on branch line Siofok-Kaposvar (4621N-1747E)	26 meters long
70. Road bridge	Over railroad on branch line Szekesfehervar-Tapolca (4653N-1726E)	8 meters long
71. Railroad bridge	South of Csajag (4703N-1811E) branch line Szekesfehervar-Tapolca overpasses branch line Hajmasker-Csajag	9 meters long

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Structure	Location	Remarks
72. Steam power plant	Esztergom (4747N-1845E)	1,000 kw. (1944). Supplies Esztergom and nearby vicinity. Fuel: brown coal.
73. Steam power plant	Dorog (4743N-1844E)	35,000 kw. Under expansion in 1956. Industrial plant of coal mines. Supplies also nearby calcium carbide plant, limekilns, and cement works. Fuel: brown coal.
74. Steam power plant	Iabatlan (4744N-1830E)	1,600 kw. (1944). Industrial plant of brick and cement works. Fuel: brown coal.
75. Steam power plant	Pilisvorosvar (4737N-1854E)	1,000 kw. (1939). Supplies Pilisvorosvar. Fuel: brown coal.
76. Steam power plant	(Tatabanya (4733N-1826E) north of town	60,000-70,000 kw. Supplies Tatabanya, local aluminum plant, and nearby coal mines. Fuel: brown coal via conveyor from Tatabanya mines.
77. Steam power plant	Banhida (4735N-1824E) on western outskirts near Lake Greg	80,000 kw (1951). Supplies Banhida, electrified railroad Budapest-Hegyeshalom, Budapest streetcar system, and Gyor. Fuel: brown coal from Tatabanya mines 3 kms. distant.
78. Diesel power plant	Acs (4742N-1801E)	3,100 kw. (1944). Industrial plant of Acs sugar mill. Fuel: oil.
79. Steam power plant	Gyor (4741N-1738E)	20,000 kw. (1944). Industrial plant of railroad car factory (Mavag). Also supplies other local industries and Sopron, Csorna, Mosonmagyaróvár, Pethaza and Kapuvár. Fuel: brown coal.
80. Steam power plant	Gyor (4741N-1738E)	7,500 kw. (1944). Supplies Gyor and vicinity. Fuel: brown coal.
81. Steam power plant	Mosonmagyaróvár (4752N-1717E)	1,470 kw. (1945). Primarily built to supply Magyaróvár powder factory. Now supplies Mosonmagyaróvár district. Fuel: brown coal.
82. Steam power plant	Mosonszentjános (4746N-1708E)	1,000 kw. (1945). Supplies Mosonszentjános and nearby vicinity. Fuel: brown coal.


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Structure	Location	Remarks
83. Steam power plant	Fusztasomorja (4747N-1707E)	2,500 kw. (1944). Supplies Fusztasomorja and nearby vicinity. Fuel: brown coal.
84. Steam power plant	Pethaza (4736N-1654E)	2,600 kw. (1944). Industrial plant of sugar refinery. Fuel: brown coal.
85. Steam power plant	Sopron (4741N-1636E)	3,600 kw. (1945). Supplies city and local industries. Fuel: brown coal.
86. Diesel and steam power plants	Szombathely (4714N-1637E)	1,800 kw. and 400 kw. (1944). Supplies city. Fuel: oil and brown coal.
87. Diesel power plant	Sarvar (4715N-1656E)	1,000 kw. (1944). Industrial plant of sugar refinery. Fuel: oil.
88. H.E. power plant	Ikerpar (4712N-1653E) on Raba River	1,470 kw. (1948). Supplies Ikerpar and nearby vicinity. Inoperative at low water periods.
89. Steam power plant	Keszthely (4646N-1715E)	2,500 kw. (1944). Supplies city. Fuel: brown coal.
90. Steam power plant	Ajkarendek (4708N-1734E)	1,600 kw. (1944). Industrial plant of coal mines. Surplus output is transmitted to Deveszer. Fuel: brown coal.
91. Steam power plant	Ajka (4706N-1734E) south of town	50,000 kw. (1951). Industrial plant of aluminum plant. Also supplies Padrag and Csinger Valley coal mines and krypton works. Fuel: brown coal from Padrag. To be expanded 1956-1960.
92. Diesel power plant	Veszprem (4705N-1754D)	4,000 kw. (1944). Supplies Veszprem and nearby vicinity. Fuel: oil.
93. Steam power plant	Vorosbereny (4703N-1800E)	9,000 kw. (1945). Industrial plant of coal mines. Fuel: brown coal.
94. Steam power plant	Fuzfo (4704N-1802E)	8,800 kw. (1944). Industrial plant of chemical and explosives plant. Fuel: brown coal.

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Structure	Location	Remarks
95. Steam power plant	Petfurdo (4709N-1807E)	10,000 kw. (1944). Industrial plant of chemical works producing nitrogen and explosives. Fuel: brown coal.
96. Steam power plant	Varpalota (4712N-1808E)	12,000 kw. (1948). Industrial plant of coal mines. Also supplies the Pet nitrogen Works. Fuel: brown coal.
97. Steam power plant	Inota (4712N-1810E)	120,000 kw. (1956). Industrial plant of aluminum works. Also supplies Varpalota mines and Pet nitrogen works. Fuel: lignite. Plant known as November 7 power plant. One of largest power plants in Hungary.
98. Steam power plant	Szekesfehervar (4712N-1825E)	4,500 kw. (1947). Supplies city and Mazobel aluminum plant. Fuel: brown coal.
99. Steam and diesel power plant	Ercsi (4715N-1854E)	2,700 kw. and 200 kw. (1944). Industrial plant of sugar refinery. Fuel: brown coal and oil.
100. Steam power plant	Dunapentele (4658N-1855E)	63,000 kw. Industrial plant of metallurgical works. Fuel: brown coal.

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8. Economic Vulnerability Factors (Map c)

The Lispe (4632N-1642E)-Lovaszi (4632N-1633E) oil fields and the Pecs (4605N-1813E)-Komlo (4611N-1815E) coal and uranium mining district are the most important sectors of the Suitability Area covered by Map c. Oil and natural gas from the Lispe-Lovaszi area are transported to the remainder of Hungary and to the USSR via rail and pipeline. The main pipeline from the oil fields runs eastward toward Nagykanizsa (4627N-1659E) and thence northward via Ujudvar (4632N-1700E) where it again bends to the east and joins with the main trunk rail route between Nagykanizsa and Budapest. Pumping stations on the line in the area of Map c are located at Ujudvar and Balatonbereny (4642N-1719E). These would be the places where interdiction of the line would produce the greatest results. The pipeline can also be interdicted at points in the area of Map b.

Some reports indicate that a second pipeline connects the Lispe-Lovaszi oil fields with the Zalaegerszeg (4650N-1651E) refinery shown on Map b. The existence of this line has not been confirmed. If it exists, its most probable route is the one shown on Map c.

Oil from Lispe-Lovaszi is also transported from the area by rail. One heavily-used route is that which connects Nagykanizsa to Budapest. Oil is also shipped eastward by rail to Mohacs (4559N-1842E) and Baja (4610N-1856E) on the Danube River for transloading into Danube River barges. Alternate routes are available for this traffic and it could not be too easily interdicted by Special Forces.

Coal and uranium ore shipments from the Pecs district follow the main rail route via Dombovar (4623N-1808E) although some coal destined for eastern Hungary is moved across the Danube River at Baja. On the Dombovar route key structure No. 10 may be regarded as critical. At this point the main line from Komlo and Pecs to Budapest crosses the line from Kaposvar (4621N-1747E) to Bataszek (4611N-1843E). Both lines cross the Kapos River while crossing each other. Two railroad bridges

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are involved in the cross-over. A third bridge serving the Dombovar-Bataszek line crosses the river immediately to the east of the other two bridges. Interdiction of the three bridges would prevent traffic moving through Dombovar from the south. If key structure No. 9 to the north of Dombovar were destroyed, this important railroad junction would have but one remaining rail connection which would be with Kaposvar to the west. The successful interdiction of key structures Nos. 9 and 10 would therefore negate the utility of Dombovar as a junction and switching point.

Along the Hungarian-Yugoslav border only one railroad connection with Yugoslavia is maintained within the area of Map c. This connection is between Murakeresztur (4621N-1652E) and Kotoriba (approx. 4620N-1648E). Other bridges over the Drava River between Hungary and Yugoslavia are not known to have been repaired or replaced after being destroyed in World War II. Although the exact status of the various bridges is unknown, they are, nevertheless, shown on Map c and are accounted for in the following list of Key Structures on the assumption that if necessary, they could be made operative again after temporary repairs.

Power supplies in the area of Map c are inadequate to the expanding needs of the oil and coal mining centers. In order to remedy the deficiency, power is to be imported from plants located on Map b. The routes of the transmission lines are shown on Map c. One of the new lines is under construction and will connect Pecs and Komlo with the Inota (4712N-1810E) power plant (Map b) through Kaposvar.

A large new steam power plant (key structure No. 37) is under construction at Pecsujhegy (4605N-1813E), a suburb of Pecs, and an oil or gas fuel steam plant (key structure No. 38) is planned for the Iavaszi oil field area. The Pecsujhegy plant will supplement power produced at existing power stations in Pecs and Komlo (key structures Nos. 34, 35, and 36). All of these plants use locally-mined coal as fuel. Their proximity to their fuel supplies makes them difficult to interdict except through transmission lines and possibly through transformer stations. The new Pecsujhegy

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facility presents a special situation. In view of a water-supply shortage in the Pecs district, water for the new steam power plant is expected to be obtained from the Danube River. A 40-km.-long pipeline will bring the water to the plant from a point on the river north of Mohacs. A pumping station will be installed at the point of intake. Interdiction of either the water pipeline or the pumping station could conceivably force the Pecsujhegy power station to cease power production. Construction is not known to have as yet begun on the Lovaszi power plant.

9. Partial List of Key Structures (Map c)

Structure	Location	Remarks
1. Railroad bridge	Tolnanemedy (4643N-1828E) on main line Budapest-Dombovar	30 meters long; new bridge built 1956.
2. Railroad bridge	Pinczehely (4641N-1826E) over Kapos River on main line Budapest-Dombovar	30 meters long
3. Railroad bridge	Near Keszohidegkut-Gyomk (4636N-1825E) on connecting line to Tamasi (4639N-1817E)	20 meters long
4. Railroad bridge	North of Szekeszard (4621N-1842E) on secondary line Saregres-Bataszek over Sio River Canal	166 feet long, single span, steel lattice girder.
5. Railroad bridge	Ocseny (4619N-1845E) on secondary line Saregres-Bataszek	16 meters long
6. Five railroad bridges	Between Bataszek (4611N-1843E) and Baja (4610N-1856E) over Danube and arms on important line Pecs-Kiskunhalas	Bridge over main channel 1,875 feet, 7 spans, steel lattice girder--4 through and 3 deck spans; combination rail and highway bridge; other bridges deck type from east to west, 30 meters, 45 meters, 250 feet (5 spans) and 500 feet (10 spans).
7. Railroad bridge	East of Bataszek on important line Pecs-Kiskunhalas	18 meters long
8. Railroad tunnel	Northwest of Bataszek on connecting line to Dombovar	1,600 feet long

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Structure	Location	Remarks
9. Railroad bridge	Northeast of Dombovar (4623N-1808E) on main line from Budapest	30 meters long
10. Three railroad bridges	Dombovar: Main line Budapest-Komlo-Pecs crosses line Kaposvar-Baja; both lines cross Kapos River at same point; immediately east Dombovar-Baja line crosses the river	Each bridge 20-25 meters long
11. Railroad bridge	South of Dombovar on line to Bataszek	28 meters long
12. Two railroad bridges and one railroad tunnel	Between Bakoca-Godisa (4613N-1805E) and Szent-lorine (4603N-1759E) on important line Pecs-Dombovar	Bridges steel lattice girder (deck type), 340 feet on 3 spans, and 220 feet on 2 spans; tunnel 200 meters long.
13. Railroad bridge	East of Pecs (4605N-1813E); main line to Bataszek overpasses important branch line to Mohacs (4559N-1842E)	
14. Railroad bridge	North of Magyarboly (4550N-1829E) on line connecting with Pecs-Mohacs route	22 meters long; border-crossing inoperative.
15. Two railroad bridges	Between Villany (4552N-1827E) and Vokazy (4554N-1820E) on branch line Pecs-Mohacs	18 meters long each
16. Two railroad bridges	Between Dravaszabolcs (4547N-1814E) and Yugoslav border on inoperative line Pecs-Donji-Miholjac	Bridge condition not known; line does not operate beyond Dravaszabolcs.
17. Railroad bridge	West of Baranya-Midveg (4551N-1802E) on branch line Barcs-Mohacs	15 meters long
18. Three railroad bridges	Between Dravaszatara-Zalata (4549N-1749E) and Yugoslav border	Bridge conditions unknown; line does not operate beyond Dravaszatara-Zalata.
19. Railroad bridge	South of Barcs (4558N-1728E) over Drava River on inoperative line to Virovitica (Yugoslavia)	886 feet long, 6 spans, 2 spans destroyed during WW II not known to have been rebuilt.
20. Two railroad bridges	South of Munkacs (4621N-1652E) at Yugoslav border on main line Budapest-Kotoriba; one of two crossings into Yugoslavia	Main bridge over Mura River, 458 feet long, 5 spans, preceded by a shorter, 40-meter long bridge.

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
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
Structure	Location	Remarks
21. Railroad bridge	Between Nagykanizsa (4627N-1659E) and Munkacs on main line from Budapest	50 meters long
22. Two railroad bridges	East of Redics (4636N-1629E) on branch line from Zalaegerszeg	30-45 meters long each; line inoperative beyond Redics.
23. Railroad bridge	West of Gutorfolde (4638N-1644E) on branch line from Zalaegerszeg	20 meters long
24. Two railroad bridges	South of Zalaapati (4644N-1706E) on branch line Turja-Balatonszentgyorgy	40 meters and 20 meters long
25. Railroad bridge	Over Zala River west of Balatonszentgyorgy (4641N-1718E) on branch line to Turje	170 feet, 5 spans, deck type
26. Railroad bridge	South of Marcali (4635N-1725E) on connecting line Balatonmariafurdo-Somogoszob	18 meters long
27. Railroad bridge	East of Balatonmariafurdo (4642N-1723E) on main line Budapest-Nagykanizsa	50 meters long
28. Railroad bridge	Between Balatonmariafurdo and Balatonfenyves: (4643N-1729E) on main line Budapest-Nagykanizsa	18 meters long
29. Railroad bridge	West of Balatonfenyves on main line Budapest-Nagykanizsa	16 meters long
30. Railroad bridge	South of Fonyod (4644N-1733E) on connecting line to Kaposvar	30 meters long
31. Diesel power plant	Nagykanizsa (4627N-1659E)	1,500 kw. (1944). Industrial plant of flour mill. Fuel: oil.
32. Steam power plant	Kaposvar (4621N-1747E)	2,200 kw. (1947). Industrial plant of sugar refinery. Fuel: brown coal.
33. Steam power plant	Maza (4616N-1824E)	4,600 kw. (1947). Industrial plant of coal mines. Surplus output supplied for general use. Fuel: brown coal.

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Structure	Location	Remarks
34. Steam power plant	Komlo (4611N-1815E)	5,000 kw. (1945). Industrial plant of coal mines. Also supplies districts of Bataszek, Dombovar, and Baja. Fuel: black coal.
35. Steam power plant	Komlo, 5 kms. from village (direction unknown) and in a valley between two sloping mountains	Industrial plant of coal mines. Fuel: black coal.
36. Steam power plant	Pecs (4605N-1813E)	21,840 kw. (1947). Supplies city and coal mines and industries in the Pecs area. Fuel: black coal.
37. Steam power plant	Pecsujhegy, northeast of Pecs	Under construction; slated completion late 1958. Water to be obtained via 40-km. pipeline from point on Danube River north of Mohacs. Pumping station at point of intake. Fuel: lignite and shale.
38. Steam power plant	Lovaszi (4632N-1633E)	Planned for over 25,000 kw. Fuel: oil or natural gas.





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26. Hungarian Statistical Yearbook, 1956, Ch. VIII (U). The waterborne freight tonnage figures seem unrealistic in that they indicate an average haul of 475 kms., which is longer than the navigable portion of either the Danube or the Tisza in Hungary. It is possible to account for this disparity, however, by considering that many voyages would begin at a Danubian port and terminate at a port on the Tisza. Such voyages would be accomplished by way of Yugoslavia, but could be counted as continuous journeys for the portion accomplished in Yugoslavia.
27. 1955 metric tonnage figures.
28. Free Europe Committee, Inc., East Europe, February 1957 (U). Forecast based on Hungarian press statements in December 1956.

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29. Hungarian Statistical Handbook, op. cit. (U).
32. OARMA Hungary, R-763-56 (DOI Jul 56), C-3 (ID 2024491) (S).
34. Det. 1, 7056th Air INISERON, 7050th Air INISERWG (USAFE), IR-13928-56 (DOI Sep 56), Uneval. (C).
36. World Oil, August 1956 (U).
37. Free Europe Committee, Inc., East Europe, March and April 1957 (U).
38. See NIS 19, Hungary, Sec. 63, "Fuels and Power," March 1956 (S/SpH/NOFORN), for an evaluation of those aspects of the Hungarian coal industry not presented in this report.
39. OARMA Hungary, R-90-55 (DOI 1955), C-3 (ID 1273434) (C).
41. Free Europe Committee, Inc., East Europe, February 1957 (U).
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., July 1957 (U).
44. Free Europe Committee, Inc., "Fuel Crisis in the Soviet Bloc," Part II, Hungary, 1954 (U).
48. Hungarian Statistical Yearbook, op. cit. (U).
50. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. OARMA Hungary, R-82-55 (DOI 1955) (ID 1273432) (C).
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57. OARMA Hungary, R-141-56 (DOI Feb 56), C-3 (ID 2009314) (C).
58. OARMA Hungary, R-144-57 (DOI Feb 57), C-3 (ID 2039687) (C).
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60. Cf. OARMA Hungary, R-32-55 (DOI 1955), C-3 (ID 1270628) (C); [REDACTED]
61. Hungarian Statistical Yearbook, op. cit. (U).
62. Free Europe Committee, Inc., News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1956 (U).
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64. Hungarian Statistical Yearbook, op. cit. (U).
65. See Georgetown University Research Project, Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Ukraine, September 1957 (S/SPH/NOFORN). It is possible that, with an improvement in relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia, the latter country could become a major source of iron ore, which would also probably be transported on the Danube River.
- [REDACTED]
67. New York Times, 11 August 1957 (U).
68. Free Europe Committee, Inc., News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1956 (U).
69. ACSI, Project No. 6550, Hungarian Country Book (ID 950050) (S/SPH/NOFORN).
70. Ibid.
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72. Confidential Source
73. New York Times, 28 January 1957 (U).
74. Confidential Source
75. Confidential Source
76. Confidential Source
77. Confidential Source
78. Confidential Source
79. Cf. NIS 19, Hungary, Sec. 62, "Fuels and Power," March 1956 (ID 935103) (S/SPH/NOFORN), for detailed information on power plants and the power transmission system in Hungary.

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81. Ibid.
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83. Free Europe Committee, Inc., East Europe, March 1957 (U).
84. Ibid.
85. Cf. Free Europe Committee, Inc., News From Behind the Iron Curtain, September 1956 (U); JIG USFA, R-9221-54 (DOI 1954), C-None (ID 1253824) (C).
86. Free Europe Committee, Inc., News From Behind the Iron Curtain, September 1956 (U).
87. Ibid.
88. Plant utilization factor from Hungarian Statistical Yearbook, op. cit. (U).
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PART V

1. The following principal sources were used in the preparation of the section entitled "Geographic Factors":

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2. Cf. Georgetown University Research Project, Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Ukraine, September 1957 (S/SpH/NOFORN) for an analysis of the transshipment facilities of the Ukrainian side of the Hungarian border.
3. OARMA Hungary, R-280-57 (DOI May 57), Uneval. (ID 2047309) (C).
4. OARMA Hungary, R-256-57 (DOI Mar 57), C-3 (ID 2045114) (C).

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